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"An expert is someone who has made all the mistakes that can be made, but in a very narrow 
field." (Nils Bohr, 1885 –1962)1 
The Danish physicist described the complexity that experts face in dealing with knowledge 
transfers, especially when it comes to academic knowledge. From an economic perspective, the 
public goods properties of knowledge – non-rivalry and non-excludability – result in a non-
trivial discussion about knowledge transfers (Arrow, 1962). The growing relevance of this 
discussion is mirrored by the emergence of the endogenous growth theory (Romer, 1986, 1994) 
using innovative knowledge to explain economic development in developed and developing 
countries. In particular, knowledge spillover has been identified as contributing to the exchange 
of knowledge among different actors on the market (Audretsch and Keilbach, 2007). The global 
(Kautonen, 2010), national (Lundvall, 1992) and regional (Cooke et al., 1998) innovation 
systems are key for companies to gain a competitive advantage by commercialising knowledge 
spillover (Audretsch and Keilbach, 2007). The decision to use internal and external knowledge 
sources constitutes firms’ innovative capacity. This can be difficult for companies due to the 
diversity of external knowledge-intensive sources, like universities (Laursen and Salter, 2004), 
research institutes (Tether and Tajar , 2008) and knowledge-intensive business services2 (KIBS) 
(Landry et al., 2012). A growing strand of literature on service innovation and knowledge 
network structures provides evidence of its complexity (Sakata et al., 2013). To deal with 
innovative knowledge, expert companies for transferring knowledge have generated attention 
for research. 
Despite the empirical evidence of growing demand for expert services (Muller and Doloreux, 
2009; Sakata et al., 2013), standard economic theory struggles to explain the emergence of 
expert firms. In the neoclassical theory, the appearance of business models based upon 
distributing information violates the standard assumption of perfect information on markets. 
Information asymmetries existing ex-ante could be healed by adding new information on the 
respective market. Nevertheless, the information asymmetries appearing ex-post constituting a 
credence good cannot be explained in the neoclassic framework (d’Andria, 2013), since market 
participants perceive information homogenously on the neoclassical markets (Deligönül and 
Çavuşgil, 1997). The missing ex-post validation is the characteristic feature of experts services, 
since customers cannot overcome the credence goods in this case due to the costly or impossible 
                                                 
1 Quoted by Mackay  (1991, p. 35). 
2 As KIBS are services defined with an over average share of academic employees who provide service mostly 




validation of information for the customers on credence goods markets (Dulleck and 
Kerschbamer, 2006). 
The assumption of perfect information has been criticised in economic research since the 
emergence of neoclassical theories, whereby prominent examples include Arrow’s (1962) 
seminal work on the role of knowledge for firms and Akerlof’s (1970) contribution to 
understanding the establishment of a low quality level on so-called “lemon” markets. 
Nevertheless, economic policy still operates on the belief of overcoming the imperfect 
information distribution by providing additional information (Ek and Söderholm, 2010; Newell 
and Siikamäki, 2013). Partially low demand for certain expert services can be explained by 
misguided information policy; for example, in the case of publicly provided information about 
energy efficiency, customer do not change their demand and lower their demand for energy 
efficiency measures, while policy-makers aim at the opposite (e.g. Bartiaux, 2008; Gram-
Hanssen et al., 2007). 
Based upon the seminal work on fraudulent experts (Darby and Karni, 1973), the research on 
credence goods has been used to explain expert markets and their behaviour, mostly applying 
theoretical (d’Andria, 2013; Dulleck and Kerschbamer, 2006), experimental (Beck et al., 2014) 
and quasi-experimental (Balafoutas et al., 2013) methodology. Nevertheless, the knowledge 
about experts’ behaviour remains in its exploratory phase. Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006) 
confirm the need for “a more profound understanding of the specific problems associated with 
markets for diagnosis and treatment”. To analyse expert markets, some qualitative and 
qualitative-quantitative approaches have been applied (Howden and Pressey, 2008; Latzy, 
Shannon et al., 2014; Owen et al., 2014; Virkki-Hatakka et al., 2013) to gain insights from case 
study research (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). 
Established quantitative survey methodology struggles to add empirical evidence resulting from 
the nature of credence goods due to its missing ex-post validation of information asymmetries. 
The impact of credence goods – ex-ante and ex-post information asymmetries – requires a 
reconstructive methodology whereby the process of the whole transaction is observable 
(Mayring, 2004). Qualitative research has been considered a non-mainstream method in 
economics, receiving growing attention (Helper, 2000; Lenger and Kruse, 2012). Nevertheless, 
mainstream research has questioned the reliability, accuracy and credibility of this explorative 
approach (Starr, 2014). In particular, the fear that experts do not express objective opinions and 
lack information on the topic of the interview is formulated in the discussion about conducting 
research based upon qualitative methodology (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). The 
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generalisation on an economical level can only be conducted carefully, especially in the case of 
implementing policy measures, since qualitative research cannot be representative by 
definition. Nevertheless, suitably defined research questions are key to enriching existing 
knowledge (Starr, 2014) since qualitative research makes human relations and social 
interactions transparent, especially in a complex environment (Lenger and Kruse, 2012). It 
allows dynamic interaction between the interviewer and respondents benefiting from the 
reciprocity of this methodology.  
Qualitative research has to orient towards recognised social science standards to increase the 
reliability and robustness of data production (Malterud, 2001). For profound analysis, recorded 
and transcribed expert interviews are used in the next chapters. Beginning with a structured 
questionnaire from open exploratory questions to a set of closed questions based upon a 
literature review is suitable to generate new knowledge (Reja et al., 2003). By preventing biased 
answer behaviour, the theoretical sampling technique is applied (Glaser, 1965; Glaser and 
Strauss, 2008). In contrast to randomised research designs, careful selected interviewees assure 
the robustness of the data. According to pre-defined factors, the qualitative sample needs to 
cover the relevant variety of opinions concerning the research question. The selection process 
follows an iterative logic to fulfil theoretical saturation, assuring that all relevant opinions are 
included in the sample (Glaser and Strauss, 2008). Furthermore, the application of statistical 
methodology and the testing of hypothesis is limited (Edmondson and McManus, 2007). A 
rigorous analysis – like the qualitative content analysis (Mayring, 2004) – guarantees reliable 
research results. 
Analysing expert markets, the knowledge-intensity of the research object develops a high 
degree of complexity. A case study design (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007) 
is particularly suitable for analysing the EEC (Energy efficiency consultant) sector3 and the 
demand of KIBS by SMEs and sectors due to the following arguments. In a SME environment, 
CEOs prefer human interaction in research formats due to reciprocity and clarifying aspects 
(Bartholomew and Smith, 2006). In the field of KIBS expert firms, the majority of SMEs are 
hardly in touch with academic literature and its specific language used in the KIBS research. In 
particular, SMEs have a low response rate for surveys, explained by a low time capacity of 
responsible employees and CEOs, which makes it difficult to generate new knowledge (Newby 
et al., 2003). Furthermore, in the EEC field, the majority of the research field follows the 
                                                 
3 The EEC is a knowledge-intensive expert sector but does not belong to the group since the customers are 
predominantly private homeowners. Furthermore, the EEC sector in Germany is largely dominated by small firms 
according to Prognos et al. (2013). 
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definition and characterisation of the expert service due to heterogeneous markets in various 
countries (Gram-Hanssen et al., 2007; Owen et al., 2014; Virkki-Hatakka et al., 2013). The 
exploration due to dynamic changes in recent years on credence good markets and inexperience 
with some expert markets limits the choice of methodology. 
 
Review of expert markets 
Reviewing the literature on expert markets, the theoretical and experimental insights focus on 
problems caused by credence goods and the fraudulent behaviour of experts. This is a 
prerequisite to analyse the literature on KIBS and EECs. 
One of the first contributions about the effect of information asymmetries on customers comes 
from Akerlof (1970), discussing the low quality level on used vehicle markets. These “lemons” 
can be explained by imperfect information distribution, which shows that information is 
connected to the general quality of supplied goods. Categorising this problem, the definition in 
search, experience and credence goods classifies goods according to the information that 
customers possess (Darby and Karni, 1973). Building upon these seminal papers, the literature 
on credence goods deals with the principle (customer)-agent (expert) relation, discussing the 
fraudulent behaviour of experts in different markets. The literature builds upon Dulleck and 
Kerschbamer’s (2006) theoretical framework, which formulates the credence goods problem 
due to overcharging, charging the customer more than the received quality level; under-
treatment, providing the customer with an insufficient level of quality to solve the customer’s 
problem: and overtreatment, where the customer receives an overly-level of quality. The first 
results have been published, addressing specific expert markets testing the theoretical 
assumptions in terms of laboratory (Dulleck et al., 2011; Mimra et al., 2014) and experiments; 
for example, taxi drivers (Balafoutas et al., 2013), car repairs (Beck et al., 2014; Schneider, 
2012) and online reviews (Latzy, Shannon et al., 2014). All these papers confirm an impact on 
customers’ fear of experiencing fraud by experts, leading to a low market efficiency and low 
demand. The first implications for economic policy by sharing information publicly have been 
suggested. Especially various forms of advertisements implementing reputation mechanism, 





The demand side of the KIBS sector 
The KIBS service has been analysed according to its impact on the productivity and innovative 
capacity of client firms, especially at the European (Camacho and Rodriguez, 2007; European 
Commission, 2005), national (Czarnitzki and Spielkamp, 2003) and regional level (David 
Doloreux, Richard Shearmur, 2012). The use of KIBS influences knowledge exchange 
processes being fostered and the access to knowledge-intensive sources for companies 
becoming easier (den Hertog, 2000). In particular for SMEs, KIBS have the function to diffuse 
innovative knowledge (Muller, 2001; Muller and Zenker, 2001). Especially in peripheral 
regions, the function does not work due to the low density of KIBS (Camacho-Ballesta et al., 
2013). Furthermore, transferring innovation in these regions is considered problematic (Karlsen 
et al., 2011). The support of KIBS has been identified as an effective instrument for regional 
policy (Varis et al., 2012). Nevertheless, credence attributes have only been discussed in a few 
KIBS sub-sectors; for example, the legal (Camignani and Giacomelli, 2010), marketing 
(Howden and Pressey, 2008) and accounting sector (Demski, 2007). 
While the literature on KIBS has concentrated on service innovation activities, the demand side 
cooperating with KIBS has been underexplored with respect to SMEs’ internal perspective. The 
positive impact of the use of innovative knowledge (Doloreux and Shearmur, 2013; Mas-Verdú 
et al., 2011; Simmie and Strambach, 2006) has mostly been stated, whereas relatively little is 
known about firms’ strategic decisions to cooperate with KIBS and companies’ reactions 
towards the KIBS’ induced knowledge. Accepting KIBS as key in regional innovation systems 
(Muller and Zenker, 2001; Pinto et al., 2012), the contribution to the competiveness of regions 
– especially in peripheries – varies due to the density of KIBS, which can explain differences 
in regional innovative capacities (Muller and Doloreux, 2009). The mechanism of using KIBS 
offers a more detailed perspective on regional development. Therefore, SMEs as cooperation 
partners require more research focusing on the ex-ante and ex-post evaluation of SMEs and the 
role of their CEOs. In particular, detailed insights into the effect of the low density of KIBS 
changes the selection process of KIBS and thus warrants further analysis. 
 
Energy experts for the reduction of energy consumption 
The EEC sector in the European Union is characterised by public interventions. The Directive 
on End Use Energy Efficiency and Energy Services (Directive 2006/32/EC) has the strongest 
influence, aiming to reduce the energy consumption of the residential sector with expert 
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services. This has been transformed into different national regulations with the existence of 
public, private-public and private EECs. The distinct small literature strand on EECs has stated 
only a minor influence of the services on the energy efficiency in the residential sector (Gram-
Hanssen et al., 2007; Palmer et al., 2013; Virkki-Hatakka et al., 2013), although customers 
request the support from EECs in hypothetical choices (Achtnicht and Madlener, 2014). Just to 
highlight the most important results, the self-perception of experts’ performance contributes to 
customers’ satisfaction with energy audits (Mahapatra et al., 2013), the EEC sector comprises 
diverse educational and professional backgrounds (Virkki-Hatakka et al., 2013) and a 
considerable adjustment to policy-makers’ rather than customers’ needs can explain the low 
effectiveness of EECs (Palmer et al., 2013). Furthermore, the low knowledge about the 
existence of EECs by homeowners (Palmer et al., 2013) and the invisibility of EECs’ impact 
(Owen et al., 2014) reflect the complexity of the EEC service. 
While some stylised facts have been presented as determining challenges for the EEC sector, 
the problem with the limited resonance of homeowners increasing the retrofit activities in the 
residential sector has not yet been solved. Since the literature mostly focuses on the complexity 
of the retrofit activities (Galvin and Sunikka-Blank, 2013; Stieß and Dunkelberg, 2013), the 
author identified a need to analyse the complexity of the use of experts adding to the pre-existent 
complexity; namely, even before implementing EECs, the retrofit market was characterised by 
credence attributes. Beforehand, customers perceived ex-ante information asymmetry about the 
outcome of energetic refurbishment measures, since the largest share of homeowners are private 
individuals in the residential sector with little experience (Stieß and Dunkelberg, 2013) due to 
a renovation cycle between 30 and 50 years. Additionally, the ex-post evaluation remains 
difficult due to the technical complexity of energy efficiency measures. Furthermore, the 
behaviour of crafts companies and builders participating in the retrofit makes the identification 
of the outcome ex-post difficult, especially because the homeowners’ or inhabitants’ behaviour 
intendedly or unintendedly influences the outcome of retrofit (Owen et al., 2014). Therefore, 
the demand for energetic refurbishment measures is largely driven by the credence attributes. 
Acknowledging the information asymmetries, it has – to my knowledge – been unexplored how 
the presence of EECs interacts with the complexity of retrofit. In addition, the uncertainty of 
homeowners about experts’ behaviour has an impact on the EEC market and its demand. 
Therefore, analysis is needed to explore the mechanism of EECs as economic instruments 
contribute to the European and national climate goals. 
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In the following section, I discuss the results of the case studies, concentrating on the effect of 
credence attributes in expert markets and customers’ reactions. 
 
Summary of the studies on SME-KIBS demand (Chapters 2 and 3) 
To start with the second chapter, the contribution “Knowledge-intensive business services as 
credence goods – A demand-side approach” by Daniel Feser and Till Proeger concerns the 
internal perspective of SMEs’ on pre- and post-cooperation effects engaging in business with 
KIBS. Exploratory interviews with CEOs from SMEs were used to conduct a qualitative content 
analysis. While the literature focuses on a higher innovativeness of client firms driven by highly 
specialised knowledge, this analysis emphasises the relevance of information asymmetries 
occurring ex-ante and ex-post, which influences the outcome of the cooperation with KIBS. 
Even companies that regularly use KIBS state problems in estimating and evaluating the value 
of KIBS input due to its credence goods attributes. This can substantially limit the innovative 
capacity of SMEs. The general avoidance of risk and lacking financial resources of KIBS 
discussed in literature hold only minor relevance, while trust in the cooperating KIBS influences 
SMEs’ willingness to cooperate. In the pre-cooperation decision-making process, informal 
networks – which are contacted to overcome the information asymmetries with expert firms – 
foster the uncertainty. Furthermore, the selection of KIBS depends on the quantity and quality 
of KIBS firms in the peripheral innovation system. Most of the CEOs described only few 
contacts with KIBS before initiating new cooperation. Therefore, the CEOs are largely involved 
in the pre-cooperation initiation, valuing trust as most important factor. Based upon three case 
studies, the innovative outcome resulting from the cooperation with KIBS is shown. The first 
case highlights a company using KIBS only for routine outsourcing with a low, indirect 
innovative impact on the firm. Additionally, the second case exemplifies a disruptive new-to-
the-firm innovation influencing the business model of the company and the willingness for 
further cooperation. In the third case, a company with a routine in using KIBS is analysed. Due 
to the knowledge-intensive environment, KIBS are used to develop incremental innovation but 
information asymmetries require the need to analyse the trustworthiness of KIBS, which makes 
the pre-cooperation phase difficult for the respective firm. The need for regional policy to grant 
systematic support overcoming the information asymmetries and fostering trust between SMEs 
and KIBS can be explained by KIBS services as a credence good. Moreover, informal networks 
function as distributors of negative experiences of SMEs cooperating with KIBS. The authors 
offer policy implications to support regional policy – in particular, structurally weak areas – 
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since the density of KIBS is lower in comparison to metropolitan regions. In the policy 
implications, the authors propose establishing formal network structures with support of local 
commerce and craft chambers. This could help SMEs to find cooperation partners with the help 
of a neutral intermediary to advance information about different KIBS. Consequently, the 
mistrust and informational barriers could be reduced. 
The third chapter by Daniel Feser and Till Proeger – entitled “Bad News travels fast. The role 
of informal networks for SME-KIBS cooperation” – concentrates on SMEs’ perspective 
deepening the knowledge about communication via family members, friends, acquaintances 
and business partners concerning the cooperation with KIBS. The lack of information about the 
quality of KIBS makes informal networks more important as a source of information, 
particularly in regions with a low density of formal networks offering the platform to contact 
KIBS on a neutral level. Based upon the same sample of experts as in chapter two, the authors 
analyse the role of communication, linking the results with insights from Behavioural 
Economics concerning the perception of negative news. While the literature mostly emphasises 
the positive impact of KIBS in metropolitan innovation systems, this chapter is concerned with 
peripheral regions. During the interviews, a general risk aversion and financing problems were 
attributed minor relevance by the interviewees. As an essential reason to cooperate, the personal 
attitude of the SME manager was identified as being crucial for cooperating with KIBS. 
Furthermore, in the pre-cooperation phase, the spread of stories of SME companies as “easy 
victims” was observable. The selection mostly relied on the CEOs’ trust in the KIBS staff, 
which choose KIBS based upon recommendations within their informal network. Building 
upon three short case studies, the authors show in the first two cases how informal network 
contacts foster a negativity bias, circulating negative examples of SME-KIBS cooperation. By 
contrast, the final case exemplifies the role of formal networks supporting the cooperation of 
an inexperienced SME starting an innovative partnership with KIBS, which the CEO of the 
respective firm met at a sectoral network. The authors interpret the results aligning with 
research from Psychology and Experimental Economics, emphasising the prevalence of 
negative information during personal communication supporting the dissemination of worst 
case examples. Consequently, regional policy in peripheries could support formal network 
structures in reducing the uncertainty by offering best practice examples and communication 
platforms with KIBS for SMEs to systematically reduce the information asymmetries. 
Taking the first part of this book into consideration, innovative cooperation between KIBS and 
SMEs is influenced by the information asymmetries ex-ante and ex-post. The description of 
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KIBS as an important external source to improve SMEs’ competitiveness with new knowledge 
is limited by the credence good. Especially in the case of peripheral regions, SME-KIBS 
cooperation seems to appear coincidental since the information about KIBS is influenced by 
negative stories of SMEs’ informal networks. 
 
Summary of the studies on the EEC market (chapter 4 untill chapter 8) 
The fourth chapter – “Energy efficiency consultants as change agents? Examining the reasons 
for EECs’ limited success” – by Daniel Feser and Petrik Runst highlights the role of EECs in 
improving energy efficiency in the housing sector. Since information policy has been used as 
an approach to reduce the energy efficiency gap, EECs have gained a prominent role in 
disseminating information during the retrofit to improve the diffusion of innovation as change 
agents. The literature points to problems of EECs in fostering energy efficiency in the housing 
sector, while little explanation has been offered for EECs’ low impact. The authors concentrate 
on the information asymmetries caused by the experts, influencing the willingness of 
homeowners to conduct energetic refurbishment. The content analysis builds upon a set of 17 
expert interviews with stakeholders from the EEC sector. The authors show that the retrofit 
market is already influenced by information asymmetries. Adding EECs’ service contributes to 
more uncertainty due to the credence attributes, resulting in uncertainty for customers since 
they cannot observe the price correlating with the quality of the expert service. A state 
intervention introducing a certification scheme aims to reduce the information asymmetries 
about EECs’ quality. Nevertheless, EECs and homeowners perceive the entry requirements and 
licensing only as a small step to improve the quality at a minimum standard. This is grounded 
in the design and implementation of the certification scheme, demanding only minimum 
prerequisites for EECs to offer the certified service and the monitoring function of EECs, which 
increases customers’ uncertainty about EECs’ behaviour. Consequently, there is a mismatch 
between customers demanding the access to subsidies from EECs and EECs’ incentives to 
follow standard regulation results in a minor role as change agents for EECs. The given policy 
implications deal with the internal perspective on energy audits to increase the quality of EECs 
– in particular the knowledge basis – and the external perspective to lower the information 
asymmetry for homeowners. 
In the fifth chapter – “Asymmetric information as a barrier to knowledge spillovers in expert 
markets” – the authors Daniel Feser and Till Proeger discuss the role of credence goods in the 
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knowledge spillover theory of entrepreneurship. The thesis that increasing knowledge-intensity 
promotes the occurrence of knowledge spillover has been unanimously used in the literature. 
Based upon a set of semi-structured interviews – like in chapter 4 – the authors concentrate on 
expert services, which characterises a credence good. The EEC sector constitutes a knowledge-
intensive sector that has recently emerged and has been influenced by public interventions. The 
incentives for increasing the knowledge basis in the EEC sector are rather low since the 
commercialisation of additional knowledge spillover is difficult to signal to homeowners. 
Furthermore, the implementation of a certification scheme has been described as having a low 
influence on knowledge spillover due to the minimum standard required from the certificates. 
By contrast, the impact of the participation in formal professional networks positively 
contributes to knowledge spillover according to the respondents. In particular, entry barriers for 
new members guarantee an adequate level of knowledge for participating EECs. Furthermore, 
the monitoring of every member’s knowledge leads to a higher transparency of all members’ 
competences and increases the willingness to cooperate with other members. This is fostered 
by activities that aim to enlarge the knowledge comprising formal and informal events. The 
trust in members’ knowledge level and knowledge-sharing activities results in a higher 
willingness to cooperate with other members. This partially leads to a specialisation process 
due to the high complexity of the retrofit technologies and consequently to a competitive 
advantage. As the incentives for additional knowledge are low for EECs, the authors 
recommend improving the public certification scheme to improve the knowledge level and 
support the network structures in the EEC sector, since only about 25% of the market 
participants are organised in professional networks. 
The chapter 6 – “Heterogeneous professional identities as an intra-sectoral knowledge filter” – 
by Daniel Feser and Till Proeger highlights the role of heterogeneity as a knowledge filter 
precluding knowledge spillover. Thus far, literature focuses on geographical, institutional and 
individual factors to explain difficulties for knowledge spillover, while the influence of 
heterogeneous professional identities has not been explored. Based upon explorative interviews 
(see chapter 4), the authors analyse the role of professional identities and their impact on the 
knowledge exchange process in the EEC sector. Furthermore, the research of Behavioural 
Economics on cooperation between heterogeneous groups is linked to the discussion on 
knowledge filters in the EEC sector. The EEC sector is characterised by heterogeneous actors 
with professional backgrounds in architecture, engineering and crafts business. The 
professional identity of the EEC profession is created by identities of its sub-sectors 
implemented during trainings, which are conducted from institutions of the professional 
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background. While heterogeneity has been suggested as increasing creativity, the authors find 
that the different sectoral identities lead to distrust between the actors in the EEC sector. The 
impact of different identities is described in three exemplified cases, resulting in knowledge-
creating processes that mostly take place in the sub-group of the own professional background. 
This can be explained by the behavioural biases of groups, which show that heterogeneity can 
lead to a low willingness to engage in cooperation to exchange knowledge. The consequence 
for innovation policy is that a common basis in heterogeneous sectors like the EEC sector is 
crucial to fostering knowledge spillover. In particular, common training courses and 
institutional structures could overcome the knowledge filter in the EEC sector. 
The chapter 7 – “Energy audits in a private firm environment – Energy efficiency consultants’ 
cost calculation for innovative technologies in the housing sector” – offers quantitative evidence 
from the EEC market. While most of the research has offered qualitative and theoretical 
insights, the authors conducted a large-scale online survey. This paper is a replication of 
Mahapatra et al. (2011), conducting a survey with Swedish EECs concentrating on personal 
and contextual factors and recommendations for improved energy audits measured by self-
perception. Additionally, the respondents were asked to conduct a case study based upon 
exemplified energy audits testing to recommend innovative technologies and estimate their cost 
calculation. The results regarding the personal factors differentiate in comparison to Mahapatra 
et al. (2011), where only about half of the EECs agreed to fulfil the expectation of the customers 
in contrast to about 98% in this German survey. This can be explained by the different 
frameworks used for offering energy audits. In the case of Mahapatra et al. (2011), mostly 
public servants answered the questionnaire, while in our example the EEC market is dominated 
by small private firms. The respondents evaluated the contextual factors as being more 
problematic. Especially the low willingness to pay for energy audits is assessed as puzzling by 
about half of the respondents. The case study showed that EECs recommend applying 
innovative technologies aside from disruptive solutions, which were largely excluded. 
However, the cost calculation demonstrated that EECs estimate the upfront costs as being very 
optimistically oriented towards the minimum costs and substantially differing from the average 
upfront costs, which were based on empirical data. The recommendation of the respondents 
focused on information asymmetries of the customer regarding energy audits and energetic 
refurbishment, while the calculation of economic efficiency is considered least important. The 
results show that contextual factors regarding customers’ needs and behaviour are central to 
foster energy efficiency in the housing sector.  
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The contribution – “Die Energieberatung als der zentrale Akteur bei der energetischen 
Gebäudesanierung?” (translated in English: Energy consulting as a central actor in energetic 
housing modernisation?) – in chapter 8 by Daniel Feser, Till Proeger and Kilian Bizer deals 
with the question of how EECs are organised in Germany. Grounded on the results of the 
literature stating a low retrofit rate in the housing sector, a qualitative approach is used to 
explain the perspectives of EECs in the current political framework in terms of challenges and 
opportunities. The policy transfer article is based upon ten interviews with stakeholders from 
the retrofit sector. EECs are implemented to increase the low retrofit rate, which needs to double 
according to the German federal government to achieve a climate neutral housing stock by 
2050. Understanding the decision framework of policy-makers, the current EEC support 
programmes have been reviewed. The paper points to the challenges due to informational 
barriers from retrofit and EECs, which can be reduced through careful information policy. 
However, it must be pointed out that energy audits as a way of increasing the energy efficiency 
can only be used as an additional instrument due to the uncertainty caused by EECs themselves. 
To summarise the second part of this book – comprising case studies based upon the EEC sector 
– information asymmetries also play a major role for the EEC service in these chapters. In 
particular, the aim of policy-makers to increase the energy efficiency of the housing stock with 
public market interventions adds more information asymmetries. Information asymmetries at 
retrofit and uncertainty about EECs’ behaviour constitute a limited impact for reducing the 
emission of fossil energy in the residential sector, thus rendering EECs’ function of fostering 
innovation at energetic refurbishment measures complex. 
This book presents insights from KIBS and EEC expert markets. Although the services 
substantially vary, information asymmetry influences customers’ behaviour. In particular, the 
uncertainty on the demand side makes the distribution of information by experts complex and 
partially explains the low acceptance of these services. The customers’ uncertainty and its 
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Abstract: Knowledge-intensive business services (KIBS) constitute a major source of 
innovative knowledge for small- and medium-sized enterprises. In regional innovation systems, 
KIBS play a crucial role in distributing innovations and improving the region’s overall 
innovative capacities. While the specific properties and effects on client firms and sectors have 
been comprehensively discussed, the internal perspective of client firms, i.e. the processes and 
problems in selecting, using, evaluating and recommending KIBS, has been neglected to date. 
Using a qualitative approach, we describe the internal mechanisms and problems of SMEs 
cooperating with various KIBS and discuss the implications for regional innovation systems 
from a policy-making perspective. We find that all stages of cooperation of SMEs and KIBS 
are characterized by strong information asymmetries, distrust and uncertainty about the effects 
of using external know-how, which yields the interpretation that SMEs perceive KIBS as 
credence goods. While informal networks are used to reduce information barriers, they 
regularly prove counterproductive by disseminating worst-case examples. Regional policy 
aiming at developing instruments for fostering innovative cooperation could thus strengthen 
formal networks that primarily create trust between KIBS and SMEs to systematically reduce 
mutual suspicions and information asymmetries. 
 
Keywords: credence goods, knowledge-intensive business services, regional innovation 





Two major trends have substantially influenced the growth of advanced economies in the recent 
decades. Firstly, the increasing relevance of information and communication technologies 
(ICTs) has led to the restructuring of knowledge-based processes in the organization of 
information (Laursen and Meliciani, 2010; Papaconstantinou et al., 1998). In this development, 
the generation and diffusion of knowledge has become essential to modern economies (Cooke 
and Leydesdorff, 2006; Lundvall, 1992). Secondly, growing competitive pressure has 
substantially increased the quantitative and qualitative relevance of the service industry. 
Therefore, service innovations increasingly affect business processes and the growth dynamics 
of manufacturing and service sectors (Evangelista et al., 2013; Gallouj and Savona, 2009; Millar 
and Choi, 2011; Sakata et al., 2013). 
In this development, organizations serving as innovation intermediaries have a pivotal role 
(Howells, 2006), particularly those providing research based-knowledge, such as universities, 
research institutes (Pinto et al., 2012; Tether and Tajar, 2008) and knowledge-intensive business 
services (KIBS)4 (Strambach, 2008). The relevance of KIBS has been emphasized with regard 
to their positive effects on regional innovation systems (RIS) (Cooke, 1992; Doloreux, 2002), 
serving as innovative intermediaries with particular relevance for small- and medium-sized 
enterprises5 (SMEs) (Muller and Zenker, 2001). Consequently, a large number of studies have 
provided detailed results regarding KIBS’ specific capabilities and their impact on RIS (Muller 
and Doloreux, 2009), following a supply-side perspective in investigating KIBS’ economic 
functions, their mechanisms of adding value and modes of interaction with client firms (Miles 
and Boden, 1998; Muller, 2001). While this particular focus has substantially furthered our 
understanding of innovation intermediaries in RIS, we suggest a demand-side approach 
investigating KIBS’ impact on client firms to identify factors potentially complicating KIBS-
client interactions and thus hindering the efficient transmission of innovations. Rather than 
focusing on the cases of successful cooperation with clear innovation effects, an investigation 
                                                 
4 Miles et al. (1995) provided the seminal definition of KIBS as the part of the service sector with a higher share 
of academic employees (above 11 % of employees with academic degree or more than 4.5 % of employees with 
academic degrees in Science or Engineering) providing professional business-to-business services. KIBS 
constitute a rather heterogeneous sector, which can be divided into two subgroups: professional (p-), include 
marketing, legal and accounting services; and technological; while (t-) KIBS include information and 
communication technology services (ICT), engineering, architectural and technical consulting services. Both t- 
and p- KIBS actively influence knowledge-changing processes in client firms by transferring and implementing 
know-how (Strambach, 2008). KIBS thus play a major role in innovation processes, which has been broadly 
discussed in the literature, e.g. by Castaldi et al. (2013); Doloreux and Laperrière (2013); Muller and Doloreux 
(2009); Tödtling et al. (2006). 
5 In the following, we use the Eurostat definition of SMEs, i.e. below 250 employees overall, medium-sized 
between 50 and 250, small 10 to 49 employees, and micro firms below 10 employees. 
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of client firms’ incentives, motives and experiences in cooperating with KIBS can help to better 
understand reasons for success or failure of innovative cooperation within RIS. Drawing on 
firms’ issues in cooperating with KIBS thus enables the derivation of policy implications for 
the crafting of regional innovation systems that foster innovative cooperation between KIBS 
and firms. In this paper, we present a qualitative approach using in-depth interviews that focus 
on the demand for KIBS by client firms and their innovative impact within a specific RIS. We 
use a sample of 19 SMEs that have had business relations with KIBS and investigate their 
motivation for the cooperation ex ante, obstacles during the cooperation and the impact of their 
cooperation ex post. Three case studies highlighting different patterns of cooperation are 
presented. The results of our investigation are used to derive policy implications for peripheral 
RIS. 
We find that the decision processes leading to KIBS-SME cooperation are driven by a strong 
uncertainty about the potential outcomes. A general risk aversion or cost concerns hold little 
relevance to firms; rather, the trustworthiness and reliability of the cooperation partner is the 
primary concern. In all stages of the cooperation, firms perceive substantial information 
asymmetries, which limit cooperation ex ante as SMEs face uncertainty about the expected 
return of cooperation. Interestingly, this uncertainty exceeds the cooperation itself as firms are 
– ex post – regularly unclear about the gains of using KIBS. This yields the interpretation that 
the demand-side perspective for SMEs should be interpreted as a credence good situation, 
which tends to limit innovative cooperation. The lack or ineffectiveness of formal networks 
leads firms to resort to informal networks to reduce information barriers: while these reduce 
search costs, they tend to foster the diffusion of previous negative experiences and skepticism 
towards KIBS, thus precluding potential cooperation. The problems of credence goods and 
informal networks highlight the relevance of regional policy to systematically support 
cooperation structures and build trust between firms and KIBS to foster innovative cooperation. 
We suggest that formal network structures established, controlled and disseminated by regional 
public institutions, such as chambers of craft and commerce could best serve as a neutral 
intermediary fostering cooperation and disseminating information on specific KIBS. Their 
impartial role could succeed in gaining mutual trust between the actors and reduce the impact 
of negatively-biased stereotypes of KIBS in informal SME networks. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a review of the relevant 
literature. Section 3 introduces our methodology and section 4 presents the results and case 
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studies. The results are discussed and linked to regional policy in section 5, before section 6 
concludes. 
 
2. Literature review 
A large body of literature has evolved in recent years highlighting the substantial contribution 
of KIBS to the innovative capabilities of specific sectors, individual firms and RIS.  
Overall, KIBS have been emphasized as one of the most innovative sectors within Europe 
(Rodriguez, 2013; Tether and Tajar, 2008), fostering development by providing knowledge-
intensive inputs to client firms that consequently gain competitive advantages. By transmitting 
codified and tacit knowledge to their clients, KIBS influence the innovation process by 
producing, transferring and recombining innovations in cooperation with their client firms (den 
Hertog, 2000). Therefore, KIBS drive knowledge-changing processes and offer produced 
knowledge (Strambach, 2008), which is positively affected by customers with a high degree of 
formalized knowledge in the respective field (Koch and Strotmann, 2008). In comparison to the 
manufacturing sector, KIBS require networks to disseminate innovation due to the highly 
immaterial nature of KIBS and the requirement of human-intensive interactions (Koch and 
Strotmann, 2008; Koschatzky, 1999, p. 752). Potential difficulties in using KIBS involve the 
complexity of cooperation, caused by the high degree of human interaction and learning process 
required (Martínez-Argüelles and Rubiera-Morollón, 2006; Wood, 2002). Further, the use of 
KIBS has been described as problematic due to its credence good properties, particularly in the 
field of legal services and accounting (Kox and Rubalcaba, 2007a; Satzger et al., 2009; van 
Cruysen and Hollanders, 2008; Camignani and Giacomelli, 2010; Demski, 2007). 
The effects of KIBS on cooperating firms has been consistently described as positive, whereby 
the use of KIBS results in a higher sectoral productivity (Baker, 2007; Camacho and Rodriguez, 
2007; Kox and Rubalcaba, 2007b; Oulton, 2001), as well as innovativeness and growth 
Evangelista et al. (2013). On a company level, KIBS use results in the direct effects of higher 
R&D output and human capital stock, as well as indirect effects that include the adaption of 
new technologies and the diffusion of innovation (Miozzo and Soete, (2001). This effect is 
higher when KIBS are directly included in a firm’s innovation management (Doloreux and 
Shearmur, 2013). In particular, newly founded innovative companies profit from KIBS due to 
an increase in innovativeness and the provision of general support during the establishment 
stages (Mas-Tur and Ribeiro Soriano, 2014). 
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Different factors fostering a company’s willingness to use KIBS in their innovative activities 
have been discussed. García-Quevedo and Mas-Verdú (2008) state that the use of external 
knowledge-intensive firms is primarily dependent on the firm’s size. Furthermore, the 
likelihood of external cooperation increases when KIBS are located closer to the client firms 
(Martínez-Argüelles and Rubiera-Morollón, 2006) and when firms attempt to realize grow 
(Johnson et al., 2007). Further determinants of different patterns of KIBS use include the 
ownership structure, the technological complexity of products or services, the human capital 
stock and the market penetration (Martínez-Argüelles and Rubiera-Morollón, (2006). 
Regarding patterns of KIBS use in SME, a positive overall effect has been shown by Muller 
(2001), who also emphasizes the mutual gains in innovative capacities following an innovative 
cooperation. For the case of manufacturing SMEs, Shearmur and Doloreux (2013) show the 
diffusion of technological and managerial innovation through KIBS and the relative 
independence of KIBS’ proximity to the respective firm due to the extensive use of information 
technology in the course of the cooperation. In an early contribution, (Cohen and Levinthal, 
1990) suggest that SMEs have specific barriers to cooperation with KIBS, particularly a lack 
of resources, the frequent personal adversity of the decision maker and the lack of plans for 
growth.  
Another strand of literature discusses KIBS’ vital role in transferring knowledge from an 
international to a regional level within RIS (Kautonen, 2010). Following the seminal 
contributions by Cooke (1992) and Cooke et al. (1998) on RIS, KIBS have been shown to lead 
to competitive regional advantages (Probert et al., 2013; Strambach, 2002); whereby the 
majority of studies focuses on KIBS’ contributions to metropolitan RIS (Aslesen and Isaksen, 
2007; Doloreux et al., 2010; Simmie and Strambach, 2006; Wood, 2002), since a lower number 
of business services are present in peripheral regions (Camacho-Ballesta et al., 2013). Ferreira 
and Fernandes (2011) emphasize that KIBS spillovers primarily occur in metropolitan RIS. The 
overall innovative performance of RIS increases with a higher density of KIBS specialized in 
high-tech services (Rodriguez, 2013) when KIBS are located closer to client firms (Martínez-
Argüelles and Rubiera-Morollón, 2006) and with better regional network structures between 
KIBS (Bettiol and Di Maria, 2013). Disparities between RIS are explained by a lower level of 
interaction in the generation and diffusion of knowledge between KIBS and firms (Muller and 
Zenker, 2001). 
While few studies have been conducted for peripheral regions, a number of stylized facts have 
been presented. Peripheral regions are shown to lack the supporting infrastructure and access 
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to human and social capital to successfully establish cooperation, particularly for SMEs 
(Shearmur and Doloreux, 2009; Tödtling and Trippl, 2005). By contrast, existing KIBS adjust 
to the regionally predominant industrial sector comprising larger firms (Thomi and Böhn, 
2003). Overall, the knowledge transfer and the commercialization of knowledge is considered 
problematic and ineffective in peripheral RIS (Karlsen et al., 2011). Focusing on structural 
change in traditional industries, Varis et al. (2012) suggest knowledge-intensive firms as an 
instrument of regional policy to increase the level of innovativeness in peripheral regions. Thus, 
KIBS and universities are seen as the most important source of additional know-how in 
peripheral RIS (Pinto et al., 2012). 
We argue that while the literature on KIBS is at a mature state, it should be extended to two 
important domains. First, the current discussions are primarily focused on the innovation 
process within KIBS, often using qualitative methods, as well as concerning KIBS’ client firms’ 
characteristics and their contribution to subsequent business success, using quantitative 
measures. However, this emphasis on KIBS’ supply side has neglected the effects of KIBS 
within their client firms, yielding little evidence regarding how and why firms cooperate with 
KIBS and whether they profit or struggle with the external innovative input. We thus argue that 
a demand-side perspective can help to understand KIBS’ innovative impact by investigating in 
detail prior decision mechanisms and potential distortions before and after cooperation. While 
these mechanisms are fairly transparent for large firms with a routine cooperation with external 
partners, little evidence on the determinants of cooperation has been presented for SMEs. 
Second, by presenting detailed insight into the ex ante and ex post mechanisms of cooperation, 
we are able to comment on another aspect of KIBS’ impact with little previous research, namely 
explaining “the extent to which KIBS contribute to the success or failure of regional innovation 
systems” (Muller and Doloreux, 2009, p. 71). We argue that the capacity of RIS to innovate can 
be better explained when considering the specific mechanisms through which KIBS and firms 
cooperate within an RIS. Accordingly, we contribute to the existing literature in two distinct 
fields. First, we investigate the effect of KIBS on SMEs from a demand-side perspective, 
before, during and after cooperation. We can thus show the effect of ex ante information 
asymmetries, what obstacles to innovations occur during cooperation and the ex post effects 
for innovative activities. Second, we offer implications of our results for the functioning of 
peripheral RIS, characterized by a small number of KIBS compared to metropolitan areas. This 
contributes to the discussions aimed at providing policy implications to increase the 
performance of RIS.  
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3. Data and methodology 
We adopt a qualitative approach to more closely examine SMEs’ demand for KIBS and their 
actual influence during and after the cooperation. This allows us to contribute to theoretical 
considerations on KIBS and draw inferences regarding the role of KIBS in RIS. Since the 
response rate is - particularly for SMEs - rather low (Newby et al.,(2003) and CEOs in SMEs 
prefer human interaction rather than anonymous questionnaires (Bartholomew and Smith, 
2006), we use a semi-structured questionnaire answered in personal discussions. Furthermore, 
we argue that conducting in-depth interviews with experts helps to establish a broader 
theoretical understanding than comparable quantitative approaches in this area (Eisenhardt, 
1989; Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). Moreover, it also enables us to discuss theoretical 
concepts in detail without requiring prior knowledge by the CEOs interviewed. Since little 
theoretical and empirical research has been presented regarding the specifics of KIBS-SME 
cooperation (Edmondson and McManus, 2007), we follow an exploratory approach without the 
explicit testing of hypotheses. 
The selection process of companies for the participation in our interview procedure is based 
upon theoretical sampling to fulfill theoretical saturation (Glaser, 1965; Glaser and Strauss, 
2008). Participating SMEs were required to have experience in using KIBS and consider 
innovation as a relevant driver of their business model. The interviews were conducted from 
May to September 2014 with a sample size of 19 interviews, each with a length of 45 to 90 
minutes. Participants had the option to interrupt the recording. Only in one case did the 
interviewee refuse to record the interview. To develop a realistic understanding of the 
cooperation between KIBS and SMEs as well as their obstacles, anonymity was ensured to the 
interviewees. The interviews were transcribed, coded and combined with additional documents 
(published official company records, newspaper and online research) as a control for the 
reliability of the interviewees’ statements. 
The interviews were structured in three parts: first, some initial open questions were asked 
regarding the interviewees’ perspectives on the topic; second, a number of more specific 
questions were posed concerning the selection process of KIBS by the respective SME; and 
third, regarding the perceived innovative influence of KIBS on SMEs. 
The results were analyzed with the qualitative content approach of Mayring (2004) by reducing 
the content to relevant parts and conducting a cross-case analysis with inductive codes for 
aspects newly brought up by the interviewees and deductive codes derived from the literature. 
28 
 
To ensure a representative sample, a broad spectrum of companies in terms of number of 
employees, sectors, market penetration and company location in urban or rural setting was 
chosen (See Table 1). Finally, the respondents received feedback and preliminary results from 
the survey for further critique and validation of the results. 
Company 







A Service  Small Crafts Regional LCC Urban Family 
B Industry Micro Manufacturing Regional - Urban Family 
C Service Micro Trade Germany - Urban Family 
D Service Industry Small Biotech Worldwide RES Urban Family 
E Service Micro Health Regional LCC Urban Family 
F Industry Medium Engineering Regional LCC Rural Family 
G Industry Medium Casting Germany - Rural Local  Shareholders 
H Service Small Construction Regional LCC Urban Family 
I Service Small IT Worldwide RES Urban Local  Shareholders 
J Service Small Biotech Worldwide RES Urban Local  Shareholders 
K Service Small Medicine Worldwide RES Urban Local  Shareholders 
L Service Micro Publishing Worldwide - Urban Family 
M Service Industry Medium Steel Worldwide LCC Urban Family 
N Industry Medium Engineering  Worldwide LCC Rural Family 
O Service Micro Consulting Germany RES Urban Family 
P Industry Medium Car Industry Worldwide - Rural Local  Shareholders 
Q Industry Medium Engineering Worldwide - Rural Family 
R Industry Medium Crafts Worldwide - Rural Local  Shareholders 
S Service Medium Biotech Worldwide RES Urban Family 
Table 1. Overview of the sample of SMEs 
All firms are situated in a southern region of the German federal state of Lower Saxony, which 
represents a peripheral RIS characterized by SMEs and only few large companies. Small 
companies across Lower Saxony have been described as the least innovative across all German 
states (Berthold et al., 2009). However, the respective RIS comprises a considerably high 
density of research institutions with international reputation conducting basic research and 
applied research departments, although the network structure between these institutes and 
SMEs has been described as rather weak. A large share of the students and academic staff leave 
the region after graduation due to the lack of job opportunities in larger institutions and 
corporations (Süssberger, 2011). While Goettingen is part of the metropolitan area of Hanover, 
Brunswick, and Wolfsburg, the respective local RIS only have little contact.  
We initially used gatekeepers from the local chamber of crafts (LCC) and regional economic 
support (RES) to contact CEOs for the interviews. Later on, we continued using the 
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recommendations of interviewed CEOs to reduce the sampling bias, since the gatekeepers’ 
contact with the SMEs was often based upon publicly supported innovation projects (Probert et 
al., 2013, p. 1276). Most of the firms are family-owned, while some are owned by local 
shareholders. All interviewees were CEOs, with the exception of one case, where the chairman 
of the board was interviewed. The data set includes a broad range of SMEs from a one-man 
firm to medium-sized companies of 150 employees. Moreover, the level of qualification 
considerably varies among the companies. While no employee had an academic education in 
company H (crafts), the vast majority of employees in company D had academic degrees, since 
the firm operates in a research-oriented environment. The firms operate on a regional, national 
and international level, yet the national market remains central for the majority.  
In the following part, we present our findings regarding the specifics of SMEs’ demand for 
KIBS, as well as the influence that KIBS have on the innovative capability of SMEs and RIS.  
 
4. Cooperation between KIBS and SMEs 
The cooperation between KIBS and SME is based upon SMEs’ initial demand for external 
knowledge-intensive expertise, which mostly requires highly specialized service due to a lack 
of internal capabilities. This affects firms’ capabilities to innovate as the decision to cooperate 
with KIBS implicitly leads towards open or closed innovation models. Most of the cooperation 
starts project-based and potentially turns into a long-term relation. We focus on the initial phase 
of the cooperation and describe the ex ante selection and decision process within firms and the 
outcomes in terms of innovative gains from an ex post perspective. All kinds of cooperation are 
included, i.e. both t-KIBS and p-KIBS. We focus on the projects achieving outcomes that are 
new-to-the-firm, following the OECD manual’s definition. This excludes the large share of 
KIBS-SME contacts motivated by legal requirements and efficiency-seeking outsourcing. 
 
4.1 Pre-cooperation decision-making  
The decision to cooperate with KIBS involves substantial uncertainty for SMEs, since the 
outcomes of innovation processes are driven by external partners, whose contributions and 
effects cannot be fully anticipated, even if the service demanded closely matches the service 
offered. This uncertainty is particularly pronounced for knowledge-intensive firms looking for 
KIBS, as the high complexity of the product makes an ex ante evaluation of quality and impact 
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very challenging. In turn, KIBS are assumed to have specific information about their product, 
which firms expect to remain undisclosed to potential cooperation partners.  
In the decision-making process, the decision against cooperation with KIBS is often based upon 
prior stereotypical experiences drawn from the media or informal networks. P-KIBS are 
particularly shunned due to the conviction that they usually cause detrimental results for SMEs. 
Consequently, even when firms accept the necessity of using external sources of knowledge, 
they strongly hesitate to use KIBS due to their concerns about the asymmetric information 
situation potentially exploited by KIBS. Both non-users and experienced clients of KIBS 
repeatedly argued that they were “easy targets” due to their lack of know-how in the relevant 
area of expertise. Furthermore, it can be observed that negative experiences with KIBS of a 
specific sector quickly lead to the overall rejection of external cooperation. Accordingly, the 
probability of firms deciding against KIBS for innovative projects is rather high, as the potential 
risks are perceived as being high.  
Particularly for SMEs, the lack of financial resources and risk aversion could be expected to 
prevent cooperation with KIBS ex ante. However, the financial aspect was considered less 
problematic by firms, as planning was only conducted in the first place if financial gains from 
the cooperation were expected. Moreover, firms’ financial assets and access to credit were 
considered unproblematic. SMEs’ risk aversion played a significant role, although no general 
risk aversion regarding spending resources on external projects was observed. Instead, the risk 
aversion was high due to the perceived information asymmetries connected to the use of KIBS. 
Overall, the decision process by SMEs was primarily driven by strong uncertainty about 
potential outcomes of cooperation and previous dismal experiences with KIBS spread in 
informal networks. The general risk aversion and cost considerations were secondary aspects 
to firms. Firms emphasized that the trustworthiness of KIBS and the expected profit ultimately 
determined whether cooperation was sought.  
 
4.2 Pre-cooperation selection process 
The selection process of homogenous standard services is largely driven by prices as quality 
signals, whereby higher prices indicate a higher quality. By contrast, more complex b2b 
services tend to be experience goods, whose quality can only be assessed with substantial search 
costs or after the cooperation. The interviewed SMEs cope with the issues of high search costs 
and quality uncertainty by accessing informal networks. All firms emphasized that their 
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selection process was primarily influenced by informal contacts ranging from business contacts 
to close friends. In the SMEs, the responsibility for communication with KIBS mostly relied on 
few employees and in the small companies regularly on the CEO. Accordingly, the quality of 
the KIBS selection ultimately depended on the range of the CEO’s informal network. Typically, 
firms initially contact KIBS personally known to the CEO; otherwise, networks partners were 
asked for a recommendation of a suitable KIBS firm. Firms subsequently compared different 
recommendations and in some cases asked the respective KIBS’ previous customers for their 
advice. Finally, when meeting the potential cooperation partner, the decision-making was 
primarily based upon the perceived competence and trustworthiness, as well as personal 
sympathy for the representative. Ultimately, firms emphasized that the core requirement for a 
successful cooperation with KIBS was a sense of trust in the business partner due to the high 
degree of personal interaction required in the process. In the process of selection, the category 
of trust in the informal network was the core dimension for all interviewees and the information 
asymmetry connected to the cooperation was seen as the main issue. Thus, all firms attempted 
to establish personal communication and trust before agreeing to cooperate, whereby often 
more than one meeting was conducted to build up trust between ranking staff of the respective 
SMEs and KIBS. This approach was seen as the primary means of reducing the risk of 
cooperating with an external firm and ensuring a successful outcome. Due to the focus on trust 
and personal contact, the selection of KIBS is highly dependent on SMEs’ ability to establish 
or access informal networks. For smaller firms, the ability to cooperate with KIBS is thus 
narrowed to the personality and individual contacts of the CEO. 
This emphasis on personal characteristics of CEOs in SMEs is aggravated by the specifics of a 
peripheral RIS. Due to the lack of formalized support and cooperation within this RIS, more 
effort has to be devoted to the initiation of novel contacts with KIBS by firms. Therefore, both 
the initial search costs and the costs of establishing mutual trust to overcome informational 
asymmetries have to be borne by individual firms. This constitutes a major obstacle to 
additional innovative cooperation as the costs may be perceived or actually be prohibitively 
high. By contrast, a well-established formal or informal network reduces these costs and their 
perception by SMEs. In peripheral RIS, the cost of sharing information within networks is 
higher due to the lower number of network participants, which substantially reduces the 
likelihood of cooperation between KIBS and SMEs. Rather, ad hoc networks that depend on 




4.3 modes of cooperation – case studies 
Our interviews suggest that the strategies of coping with the uncertainties of cooperation with 
KIBS vary among SMEs, which results in different innovation strategies. We present three 
distinct cases that illustrate the different approaches to KIBS-SME cooperation. The first case 
demonstrates the use of KIBS limited to non-innovative purposes, as well as the application of 
a closed innovation business model to protect innovations. In the second case, a firm with only 
limited experience with KIBS provides an example of a disruptive innovative influence due to 
the first external cooperation. The third case describes a SME that frequently cooperates with 
KIBS and routinely deals with the uncertainty, whereby an incremental innovative influence is 
observed. 
 
4.3.1 Closed innovation model 
Company A was founded in 1979 as standard electrical service for households. Within its 
expansion, it first started providing home security equipment and subsequently extended its 
activities to renewable energy and energy efficient solutions for housing. The most recent 
addition to their products has been energy efficient lighting systems for houses. The small-sized 
firm’s new strategy was to focus on dynamic markets and adapt to the swiftly changing market, 
while their products and services are focused on the needs of demanding technology-friendly 
customers. 
The firm uses external KIBS for tasks related to accounting, legal consultancy and ICT, yet 
distinctly limits external cooperation to tasks that the CEO considered not to be crucial, i.e. 
unconnected to the firm’s ability to innovate. Furthermore, the use of KIBS is mostly 
involuntary to conform to external requirements, such as state regulations for legal services and 
specific demands by customers. The CEO deals with KIBS in person and relays the information 
to his employees. While he does not have experience with the use of KIBS for innovative 
purposes, he has a skeptical attitude based upon information provided by business partners, 
newspapers and friends, which have led to a general avoidance of KIBS. Furthermore, the 
interviewee emphasizes the fear of unwanted knowledge spillovers and the need to protect the 
firm’s existing innovative capabilities. Information required for innovations is thus obtained 
through various personal contacts and the internet. Regarding essential cooperation, the CEO 
underlines that his main goal is not to identify and select the best company with the most 
innovative ideas, but rather to find the most reliable one that causes the least effort for the SME. 
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For this reason, long-term relations are maintained, including some for 20 to 25 years. The 
barriers to changing the KIBS are considered high, and thus even disappointments with 
established cooperation partners are accepted.  
The innovation strategy of company A in using KIBS avoids the search costs and potential 
frustration with KIBS by refusing to open up to external services altogether. KIBS merely fulfil 
a supporting function for the firm, thus enabling the SME to concentrate on their core 
competences, which limits the function of KIBS to knowledge transfer. The considerations and 
strategy of company A illustrate the relation to external innovative service providers represented 
by a relevant share of SMEs in our sample.  
 
4.3.2 Initial experience in using KIBS 
The second case involves a family business, company H, operating since 1919 in the fourth 
generation, mainly on regional markets. After being launched as a small-sized low-tech craft 
and painters company with expertise in the housing sector, it began to look for new markets 
and ways to acquire new segments of customers around 2000. With competitive pressure 
increasing from companies in other EU states, its new strategy was to offer additional services 
to their traditional products and services. Similar to the first case, company H initially only used 
KIBS for outsourcing purposes such as IT services and legal consultancy. The decision to 
cooperate with KIBS for an innovative project was a consequence of the CEO’s goal of 
acquiring new markets. The cooperation was established with an engineering t-KIBS closely 
connected to the university, which resulted in a consultancy concept and a related publication 
serving as an extension to their traditional products. 
The impulse of initiating the cooperation has been motivated by the observation of unsecure 
future markets and the implication that changes in the business model were necessary. The CEO 
originally attempted to add services with a scientific background, yet soon realized that the 
firm’s level of know-how was insufficient and thus recognized the demand for external 
expertise. The selection process was based upon an informal network, although the CEO had 
already become familiar with KIBS through events of a formal network. Thus, prior information 
obtained through his informal network was the fundamental reason for starting the cooperation. 
Although the first contact with the KIBS happened within a formal network, the cooperation 
started on an informal basis after the CEO had already left the respective network. The CEO 
emphasizes that formal networks were only used to get in contact with potential business 
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partners, while the actual KIBS-cooperation was initiated on an informal level to reduce the 
risks associated with the first substantial cooperation with an external service provider. To 
ensure the cooperation’s success, a number of meetings were conducted with the employees 
engaged in the project, which generated a sufficient degree of trust in the KIBS from the firm’s 
perspective. Nevertheless, the CEO admitted that the cooperation generated risk that was not 
calculable for the firm due to the lack of experience in these specific forms of cooperation. It 
was assumed that these uncertainties and information barriers could be eliminated during the 
course of the cooperation. However, this has only partially fulfilled, as the assessment of the 
cooperation’s quality and success was not entirely possible ex post.  
The interviewee emphasized that the first cooperation with KIBS determined his subsequent 
cooperative behavior and strongly argued that a negative experience would have led to an end 
of cooperation altogether with this specific KIBS sector. The ex ante and ex post uncertainty 
and the firm’s inability to adequately assess the risks of using KIBS thus makes the results of 
the initial contacts crucial for the CEO’s future decisions. It also fosters a preference for KIBS 
connected to public institutions rather than fully private firms, in which the risk of knowledge 
spillovers is considered higher. Thus, while company H openly searches for additional contacts 
that enabled innovative cooperation, risk and uncertainty aversion substantially limits the scope 
and future potential for KIBS use. 
 
4.3.3 Routine in using KIBS 
Founded in 1936, company P is an established expert in the metalworking industry as a 
medium-sized supplier to car manufacturing with a focus on international markets, mostly 
highly qualified employees and a R&D department. Innovation is mostly driven by the 
requirements of the car industry and to gain competitive advantages on the process and 
organizational level.  
Since company P’s market is highly competitive, it regularly uses all fields of KIBS. The 
executive board supports the employees in their cooperation with KIBS and all parts of the 
company are subjects of the resulting optimization processes. The use of external knowledge is 
considered an inherent part of the routine in the innovation process. In the interview, the CEO 
wondered about the relevance of the topic, since KIBS were an essential part of the regular 
development of the firm’s products and services. 
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The primary internal driver for cooperation is the firm’s R&D unit. The financing of 
cooperation projects is regarded as an insignificant factor since it is acknowledged as 
substantially improving innovative capabilities. Negative experiences resulted in the change of 
partner KIBS, although this produced no doubts concerning whether cooperation with KIBS 
should be terminated indefinitely as it was continued to be seen as vital and indispensable. 
Long-term relations are considered optimal for research cooperation with KIBS, because 
switching costs are considered high. However, in practice, the cooperation of company P with 
KIBS reflects a mixture between project-based and long-term relations. The selection process 
of company P is strongly influenced by the use of informal networks. Additionally, formal 
networks are used to obtain additional contacts and extend the informal network. The intensive 
use of formal networks is explained as resulting from the company’s peripheral location. A high 
degree of external cooperation is thus seen as indispensable since innovation in their sector is 
driven by the demands of larger automotive firms. This creates another incentive to cooperate 
in formal networks and apply a cooperative research design.  
Intense human interaction is required during the cooperation with KIBS, even involving the 
CEOs of both project partners. On a technical level, the communication with KIBS is 
undertaken by the employees who run the respective project with the KIBS firm. The highly 
specialized knowledge in the firm’s field is a preliminary requirement for cooperation, which 
is only allowed if the KIBS’ representatives are considered trustworthy. For example, the 
cooperation with a private research institute lasted for more than 20 years, yet ended when the 
professor in charge of the cooperation retired. Due to the lack of trust, company P decided not 
to continue the cooperation, despite facing severe difficulties in finding a similar cooperation 
partner. Mutual trust is a prerequisite for cooperation and compensated the difficulty in 
estimating the quality level anticipated by its prospective cooperation with a KIBS. Thus, a 
general risk aversion does not hinder cooperation, since company P is confident that their 
experience in trust-building procedures ensures a good selection and cooperation, leading to 
incremental innovative progress. 
The case of company P demonstrates that frequent users of KIBS are similarly influenced by 
the difficulties of uncertain information at the different stages of cooperation with KIBS. 
However, cooperating with KIBS is indispensable to the firm, whereby measures to reduce 
search costs and uncertainty to build up mutual trust are taken. The respective firm makes 
extensive use of formal and informal networks to gain pre-cooperation information and 
distinctly aim at establishing reliable long-terms cooperation characterized by mutual trust. This 
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strategy results in incremental innovation due to the successful innovation transfer from KIBS 
and its indirect transformative influences on the firm.  
 
5. Discussion 
Our results can provide a better understanding of firms’ perceptions of KIBS and the specifics 
of their demand for cooperation. The role of KIBS differs between the use of KIBS with no 
innovative effects and those with direct innovative effects. All of the companies interviewed 
used KIBS for non-innovative purposes, such as the outsourcing of production processes or 
connected to legal requirements, which can have indirect effects on innovative capacity through 
a more efficient use of resources (Görg and Hanley, 2011; Martínez-Argüelles and Rubiera-
Morollón, 2006). In SMEs cooperating with KIBS for innovative purposes, the transfer of 
innovation was considered more important compared to the recombination of knowledge by 
KIBS. Therefore, the innovative influence on regular KIBS users appeared to be incremental 
and the result of a routine learning process. By contrast, the firms with only little experience in 
using KIBS perceived the cooperation as rather disruptive.  
Despite examples of successful cooperation with little frictions in all stages of the cooperation, 
our results suggest that the demand side is strongly driven by a credence good situation, 
particularly for SMEs. Three aspects concerning innovative projects with KIBS point to 
credence goods characteristics. Firstly, in the cases where cooperation did not yield a profit or 
even a loss, the respective CEOs were unable to explain why the positive expectation could not 
be fulfilled after the end of the cooperation. Secondly, the experience of the CEOs reflects that 
the contracts fail not guarantee control – neither overall nor partial – over the behavior and 
performance of KIBS during cooperative projects. A particular aspect of this was KIBS’ 
communication, which was criticized as being too theoretical and lacking understanding of the 
specific practical problems within SMEs. Furthermore, the immediate responsibilities for 
implementing proposed changes and the complexity of the measures were criticized as being 
hardly controllable, as was the danger of knowledge spillovers via KIBS. Thirdly, firms 
emphasized that they were unable to assess the quality of the measures taken and the exact gains 
from the cooperation ex post. The extensive asymmetry of information observed both before 
and during the cooperation warrants the interpretation that KIBS are credence goods. SMEs 
regularly struggle to cope with the situation of asymmetric information and a resulting lack of 
control when cooperating with KIBS, which has a substantial influence on the decision and 
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selection process, often leading to a general decision against seeking external innovative 
cooperation. The credence good situation thus shifts the demand for KIBS to non-innovate 
purposes or ultimately - in the case of prohibitive information barriers - precludes KIBS use 
altogether. This characteristic of KIBS use has been suggested theoretically and empirically 
(Kox and Rubalcaba, 2007a; Satzger et al., 2009; van Cruysen and Hollanders, 2008), with 
particular emphasis on legal services (Camignani and Giacomelli, 2010) and accounting 
(Demski, 2007). Our results lend support to these studies, providing qualitative evidence for 
this interpretation of KIBS-SME relations. 
A common reaction to the credence good problem is to resort to informal networks to reduce 
information barriers. While this reduces search costs and contributes to the effectiveness of the 
respective RIS, it also leads to the swift diffusion of negative experiences, which precludes 
future cooperation. Our results illustrate the crucial role of CEOs in smaller companies that 
often rely on stereotypes and skeptical attitudes regarding external innovation cooperation. 
Thus, the reliance on informal networks in peripheral regions might ultimately contribute to 
reduced innovative activities among firms.  
Another reaction to the lack of trust in KIBS - particularly for smaller companies - is to resort 
to public consulting. In the case of Germany, public institutions also offer knowledge-intensive 
services for SMEs in some KIBS sub–sectors like R&D, consultancy and education services. 
Djellal et al. (2013) show that public KIBS in fact contribute considerably to the capacity of 
innovation systems to innovate and act as gatekeepers in networks for private KIBS by 
promoting contacts. The choice of public or private KIBS is influenced by the credence good 
situation observed in our sample, since many SMEs place more trust in public services such as 
regional chambers of commerce or chamber of crafts. Interviewees emphasize that the fear of 
knowledge spillovers and the expectation of longer, more stable cooperation are the central 
reasons for the appreciation of public over private KIBS. For instance, company A generally 
refused to cooperate with private R&D consultancies for the fear of losing core innovations to 
competitors, yet worked with the public chamber of crafts on a regular basis due to its 
institutional and personal stability, which generated trustworthiness. However, this strong 
preference for public KIBS is limited to micro and small enterprises in our sample.  
These results have consequences for our understanding of the role of KIBS within peripheral 
RIS. The concept of KIBS in RIS is based upon the idea that an innovative distributor of 
academic knowledge fosters learning processes and thus provides long-term competitive 
advantages to client firms. The efficient distribution of knowledge subsequently increases the 
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innovative performance of all firms within the RIS. However, our results show that this 
mechanism cannot be universally assumed, particularly in peripheral RIS. Owing to a number 
of factors concerning increasing uncertainty, the systemic influence of KIBS on the innovative 
capability of the entire RIS is lower than expected from a theoretical perspective, which has 
also been suggested by Tether and Tajar (2008). While informal networks are used to gather 
information more efficiently, the reach of these networks is limited and also regularly works 
against further cooperation due to the spreading of skeptical attitudes and individual negative 
experiences. Smaller firms in particular shun the uncertainties of using KIBS and tend to either 
refuse cooperation altogether or stick to the established public service providers. Thus, the 
spreading of innovative ideas - particularly from academic sources - is severely limited by 
firms’ inability or unwillingness to cope with the risks and uncertainties of cooperation with 
KIBS.  
This leads to distinct policy implications for the design of regional innovative systems. The 
core function of regional policy would thus be to reduce the credence good situation for SMEs 
to foster cooperation with KIBS. The core requirement for reducing the issue of uncertain 
prospects of cooperation would be the provision of detailed information and best practice 
examples on available KIBS services to SMEs. This informational networking would need to 
be undertaken by public institutions, such as chambers of commerce or craft, as they are 
considered impartial institutions by SMEs. By providing a larger formal networks that aims at 
integrating SMEs in terms of information on KIBS, a formal approach could somewhat replace 
the informal networks that are often dominated by negative stereotypes and experiences with 
KIBS. The establishment and maintenance of a newly fostered formal informational network 
on KIBS would necessarily be state-funded in the case of peripheral RIS. The resources 
available for the gathering and provision of information are obviously limited in a business 
environment dominated by SMEs that are often skeptical of the prospects of innovative 
cooperation. Particularly when few larger international corporations constitute the center of a 
RIS, even higher competitive pressure will not lead to stronger innovative cooperation due to 
problems associated with the credence good situation. Thus, to overcome a cooperative 
stagnation in peripheral SME networks, the public funding of formal network efforts appears 
to be a core requirement to initiate a critical mass of successful KIBS-SME cooperation. Once 
a certain level of cooperation within both formal and informal networks has been achieved, 
cooperation might become self-supporting, although the initial reduction of uncertainty through 




Within the literature discussing the increasing relevance of ICT in the structure of modern 
economies and the growing relevance of external service industries for firms, KIBS research 
holds a prominent role. However, while the specifics of KIBS and their effects have been 
highlighted, the internal perspective of client firms has been neglected to date. This is 
problematic for policy-makers considering how to improve RIS by fostering innovative 
cooperation between SMEs and KIBS. We provide an internal perspective on SMEs’ decision-
making and cooperation patterns to further our understanding of KIBS from the demand side, 
as well as providing policy implications, particularly for peripheral regions. 
We find that cooperation at all stages is characterized by strong information asymmetries 
between KIBS and SMEs, which leads to the interpretation that KIBS use has credence good 
properties for SMEs. The uncertainties associated with using external knowledge for innovative 
purposes often lead to substantial distrust in KIBS, which manifests in informal networks and 
rather discourages future innovative cooperation. Thus, cooperation within peripheral regions 
can deteriorate due to the dissemination of worst-case examples and widespread skepticism of 
SMEs’ decision-makers. To alleviate the credence good difficulties for SMEs, regional policy 
should foster the dissemination of information by regional chambers of craft and commerce. 
These state institutions are perceived as neutral and disinterested in making a profit by 
exploiting information asymmetries. Consequently, such chambers should extend their efforts 
to maintain formal networks including smaller firms and KIBS to provide comprehensive 
information and experiences of previous cooperation. This could strengthen mutual trust 
between firms, which is been emphasized as the key prerequisite to successful cooperation with 
KIBS. Thus, drawing upon the interpretation of KIBS as credence goods to SMEs, policy-
makers in peripheral RIS should focus on establishing structures that succeed in the impartial 
provision of information and the building of trust.  
Obviously, there are a number of limitations to our study. Most importantly, our sample 
suggests fairly unanimously that KIBS are seen as a credence good by SMEs due to their limited 
experience and reliance on potentially biased informal networks. However, this might be a 
region-specific effect of the peripheral region that we investigated. Thus, our interpretation of 
the credence good problem requires additional empirical testing to exceed the exploratory scope 
presented in this paper. Furthermore, the distinct perception and trust in public and private 
support appears to be a fruitful field for future research. Given that trust is the core requirement 
for innovative cooperation and that informational asymmetries discourage the use of external 
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knowledge, publicly funded innovation support might be a viable alternative for specific RIS. 
However, other policy instruments that effectively build up trust between KIBS and firms and 
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Chapter 3  
Bad News travels fast - 
The role of informal networks for SME-KIBS cooperation 
 










Abstract: Based upon interviews with SMEs, we analyze the role of informal networks for 
innovative cooperation with knowledge-intensive business services (KIBS) in a peripheral 
regional innovation system in Germany. We focus on informal networks disseminating 
information, which compensate for SMEs’ lack of information about KIBS, but also foster the 
dissemination of worst-case examples. The resulting skepticism within their informal networks 
reduces SMEs’ inclination to conduct innovative cooperation. We argue that this reduces a 
region’s overall innovative capabilities and that, consequently, policy-makers should build trust 
between SMEs and KIBS by establishing formal networks maintained by institutions 
considered to be impartial by SMEs.  
 
Keywords: informal networks, knowledge-intensive business services, negativity bias, regional 
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Energy efficiency consultants as change agents?  
Examining the reasons for EECs’ limited success 
 










Abstract: Residential energy consumption has been increasingly singled out by public policies 
as a key area for potential emission reduction. The public implementation of energy efficiency 
consultants (EECs) as change agents aims at the diffusion of innovation in building efficiency 
and overcoming information asymmetries in the construction sector. However, the success of 
these measures has been described as low. We conducted a case study involving 17 in-depth 
expert interviews to examine the causes of this failure within the German institutional context. 
This analysis has important implications for EECs in general and other European countries. We 
show that credence good characteristics in the ECC market led to a low willingness to pay. 
Certification of EECs does not suffice to overcome information asymmetries. We also identify 
a mismatch between EECs and customer incentives. As top-down policies have failed to 
facilitate a viable EEC market, we recommend a greater role for private and private-public 
networks, the cutting of EEC subsidies and a closer alignment between climate policy goals 
and home owners’ economic efficiency considerations. 
 
Highlights: 
 Energy Efficiency Consultants have not increased the rate of energetic retrofits in 
Germany. 
 We show that credence good characteristics in the ECC market led to a low 
willingness to pay. 
 Certification of EECs does not suffice to overcome information asymmetries. 
 






One goal of environmental policy is to reduce carbon emissions, which requires an increase in 
energy efficiency. For example, the residential housing sector in Germany - accounting for 40% 
final energy consumption - has been targeted by energy policy (Friedrich et al., 2007). The 
German environmental agency defined the goal of doubling the full retrofit rate from one to 
two percent (UBA, 2014). In fact, many European countries have put policy measures in place 
to achieve related goals (see Friedrich, 2013).  
Nonetheless, retrofit activities often lag behind expectations (Bürger, 2013; Weiss et al., 2012). 
The stricter and more expensive energy efficiency criteria of environmental policies do not 
always translate into actual building-modernization as house owners are primarily motivated 
by a desire to minimize energy costs (Galvin and Sunikka-Blank, 2013; Kornhardt, 2014; 
Sunikka-Blank and Galvin, 2012). In response, a variety of subsidies have been put in place 
across European countries (Friedrich, 2013). On the other hand, there are a number of cases in 
which building-retrofitting is viable without financial assistance, especially if the building is 
old or heating and hot water systems are not up-to-date (DENA, 2012).  
A second set of obstacles identified by public officials (BMWi, 2014, 4) as well as the academic 
literature revolves around information diffusion. The market of energetic retrofit displays a high 
degree of uncertainty due to its complexity and informational barriers. The German Federal 
Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy states that home owners are frequently ignorant of 
the potential savings of retrofitting (BMWi, 2014, 4).  
Since innovation and its diffusion play a key for sustainable development, the role of innovation 
intermediaries has gained attention in recent years (Howells, 2006). In particular, policy 
instruments regarding the diffusion of innovative solutions in environmental goods markets 
have been critically discussed and evaluated (Jaffe et al., 2005; Vollebergh and Kemfert, 2005). 
According to Rogers (2003), ‘change agents’ foster the diffusion of knowledge.  
Construction companies may be providers of relevant information, i.e. serving as change agents. 
By suggesting and implementing retrofit activities, they diffuse available technological know-
how. However, the aforementioned strategy paper by the German government as well as other 
official documents and regulations indicate that a reliance on market forces (i.e. construction 
firms) will remain insufficient because the market for retrofit construction displays credence 
good characteristics, i.e. customers are unable to evaluate the quality characteristics of the 
obtained good or service (see Akerlof, 1970; Dulleck and Kerschbamer, 2006; Spence, 1973; 
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Stigler, 1961). Home owners are less knowledgeable than constructors and they may find it 
difficult to evaluate quality ex-post. The Ministry of Economic Affairs and Energy states that 
construction mistakes and architectural failures as well as the focus on single efficiency 
measures (as opposed to longer term road maps) has reduced home owners’ confidence in 
retrofit activities. This line of reasoning reflects the possibility of the misuse of expert 
knowledge. In the absence of reliable information and quality control, builders may either 
suggest the implementation of too many efficiency measures or they may provide lower quality 
than agreed ex-ante. In both cases, home owner trust will deteriorate and demand will decline, 
thus directly thwarting environmental policy goals.  
In order to overcome these problems (and increase transparency, information flows and ex-post 
quality controls), energy efficiency consultants (EECs)6 have been promoted as key actors of 
energy policy in Germany (Feser et al., 2015) and elsewhere (e.g. Sweden: Mahapatra et al., 
2011; Finland: Virkki-Hatakka et al., 2013; Belgium and Denmark: Gram-Hanssen et al., 2007; 
USA: Gillich, 2013; UK: Palmer et al., 2013) for over a decade. EECs in Germany provide 
energy audits for buildings and suggest possible routes of modernization. These road maps 
include estimated cost-effectiveness calculations and they are supposed to pay attention to the 
specific resources and requirements of each household. Audits are required to be independent 
assessments. As such, an individual who holds an energy consultancy certificate must not work 
as an EEC if he/she also runs a construction company, to avoid the temptation of biasing reports 
toward his/her own line of business. In order to be listed as an EEC expert, training at one of 
several educational institutions (e.g. universities, educational centers of the crafts organization) 
must be undertaken. Only certain individuals in certain occupations (architects, engineers, 
master craftsman) are eligible (see Henger et al., 2015).  
The role and impact of EECs has been discussed in the literature. Initial results are presented 
by Bartiaux (2008), Gram-Hanssen et al. (2007), Gillich (2013), Mahapatra et al. (2011), Owen 
et al. (2014), Palmer et al. (2013) and Virkki-Hatakka et al. (2013). Being in an exploratory 
phase, the influence of EECs on customers’ decisions to implement energy efficiency measures 
has been described as low.7 Furthermore, customers’ willingness to pay for EEC services is also 
low (see Feser et al., 2015). The puzzle of why the EEC impact on energy efficiency measures 
is weak remains unresolved in the literature. 
                                                 
6 In the literature, a variety of different names are given to the energy efficiency adviser, e.g. energy adviser 
(Mahapatra et al., 2011), energy auditor (Palmer et al., 2013), retrofit adviser (Owen et al., 2014). 
7 By contrast, Achtnicht and Madlener (2014) find evidence of a positive association between EECs and 
implementation. However, their results are based upon hypothetical scenarios. 
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In this paper, we present evidence from interviews with 17 experts in the residential sector in 
Germany, whereby we aim to understand why EECs currently fail to play the role of change 
agents. Our results suggest that the problem of asymmetric information in the market for retrofit 
construction might have been overemphasized. Residential constructors are mostly small 
businesses who operate locally. Reputation effects may partially mitigate the temptation to “sell 
lemons”. As constructors usually provide more than one service (roofers also install PV 
equipment; carpenters also insulate building envelopes and floors, etc.), they hope to acquire 
follow-up business by providing acceptable quality. 
In addition, the introduction of EECs has de facto replaced one asymmetric information 
problem with another. We cautiously suggest that the asymmetries in the market for EECs are 
potentially worse than those in the construction sector that they seek to overcome. The 
consultant interviewees in our sample complain about competition from construction 
companies. Home owners prefer unsubsidized advice from local craftsman who they know - at 
least to some extent - rather than seeking out EEC services. EECs operate in a wider 
geographical area, which reduces the effectiveness of reputation-building mechanisms. They 
do not strive to gain follow-up business as retrofit activities will be undertaken in 30 to 50 year 
intervals at best.  
Our interviews suggest that EECs do not succeed in signaling their quality to potential 
customers, i.e. they cannot overcome information asymmetries regarding quality. 
Consequently, they face a lack of trust and a low willingness to pay. In fact, most EECs’ income 
is generated through subsidized audits mandated to receive government funding for retrofit 
activities. We find that mandatory training does not suffice to overcome information 
asymmetries.  
We also identify a mismatch of incentives between house owners - who are mostly interested 
in economic efficiency - and EECs, who have an incentive to maximize technological 
efficiency. 
While we focus on the case of Germany in this paper, this analysis has important implications 
for EECs in general and other European countries with a similar stock of buildings ( Murphy, 
2014; Rosenow and Galvin, 2013). In particular, the paper strives to highlight the potential 




The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section two, the literature on credence 
goods, energy performance certificates (EPCs) and EECs is reviewed, followed by a description 
of the methodology and the sample. Section four presents the findings of the interviews. We 
conclude by highlighting policy implications, limitations and future research recommendations 
in section five. 
 
2. Asymmetric information in the market for energy-focused home refurbishments  
Credence good characteristics of expert markets - in which customers cannot evaluate the 
quality of the product or service obtained - is fundamental for the analysis of the EEC market. 
Based upon Akerlof’s (1970) seminal paper about uncertainty in markets and Darby and Karni’s 
(1973) contribution in the classification of search, experience and credence goods, the literature 
on credence goods has evolved extensively and deals with the fraudulent behavior of experts. 
Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006) offer a formalized theoretical framework, emphasizing 
overcharging, under-treatment and over-treatment as main problems arising from the 
informational asymmetry between expert and customer. Some empirical evidence has shown a 
market breakdown or a reduced demand for credence goods driven by experts’ fraudulent 
behavior; for example, in the case of car repairs (Beck et al., 2014; Schneider, 2012), taxi drivers 
(Balafoutas et al., 2013) and online reviews (Latzy, Shannon et al., 2014). Overcoming these 
problems with expert services, d’Andria (2013) suggests sharing information on a broader basis, 
engaging in advertising, building reputation and assuming liability and certification.  
The discrepancy between climate policy goals and home owner behavior regarding energetic 
retrofits fostered the idea of providing additional public information through EPCs. The 
European parliament implemented the Directive on end use energy efficiency and energy 
services (Directive 2006/32/EC), which requires the member states to provide information on 
energy efficiency measures and values the role of advice (European Union, 2006).  
Current research focuses on the perspective of house owners. EPCs provide information on the 
energy efficiency level of specific buildings. Ideally, they reduce search costs (Gilmer, 1989). 
EPCs have been found to produce price premiums (Kahn and Kok, 2014), although a number 
of downsides have been discussed in the literature. The certificates have been found to weakly 
affect home owner decisions since the customers failed to remember the EPCs (Amecke, 2011). 
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In the pre-purchase phase, house owners do not perceive a reduction of informational hurdles 
(Murphy, 2014).  
Effects on the energy efficiency of the housing sector are hardly visible in the short and medium 
run (Stavins et al., 2013). Furthermore, the lack of customer understanding of EPCs is discussed 
as a barrier for the establishment of EPCs in the literature. The function and effect of EPCs 
remain somewhat unclear for the user (Backhaus et al., 2011). Moreover, adding house-specific 
information is costly but more general information is less useful for home owners (Stavins et 
al., 2013). In particular, experimental evidence showed that economic information is valued 
more than information on carbon emission and real energy use (Newell and Siikamäki, 2013). 
However, the latter information is mostly displayed on European EPCs. Belgian and Danish 
customers interpreted the additional information of EPCs critically, questioning its content 
(Gram-Hanssen et al., 2007). Furthermore, Christensen et al. (2014) have found that EPCs 
hardly offer reliable information for house owners since the majority lack trust in the content 
of EPCs. 
EECs have been implemented as change agents to issue EPCs and advise customers about the 
possibilities for innovative retrofits. Change agents support the diffusion of innovation and 
reduce uncertainty in the innovation process. They provide knowledge about the application 
and implementation of innovative technologies (Rogers, 2003). Change agents may foster 
technological progress (Backhaus, 2010; van Lente et al., 2003). Implemented as a top-down 
policy (Backhaus, 2010), EECs are intended to support the technological progress of retrofits 
in the residential sector. 
The literature concludes that the introduction of EECs has yielded mixed results, pointing at 
various obstacles for change agents, which - according to Owen et al. (2014) - are “beyond the 
reach of current policy interventions”. The heterogeneity of professional backgrounds leads to 
uncertainty concerning the outcome of audits (Virkki-Hatakka et al., 2013). The subjectively 
perceived success of energy consulting depends on the motivation and job satisfaction of the 
EECs (Mahapatra et al., 2011). While the dependency of EEC markets on public intervention 
is part of the discussion (Gillich, 2013; Gillingham and Palmer, 2014), the weak effect of EECs 
on rates of home modernization has been analyzed, referring to credence characteristics of 




The policy intended to reduce information asymmetries concerning the planning, 
implementation and execution of energetic retrofits by politically implementing a market for 
EECs (Feser et al., 2015). EECs may support customers in understanding the complexity of the 
retrofit and apply innovative solutions. Moreover, access to public subsidies is granted via 
EECs who have to monitor and certify the retrofit, aiming to improve the efficiency of the 
housing stock.  
The regulatory framework permits EECs to offer EPCs. House owners can only receive public 
retrofit funds if they have hired an EEC. In order to bear the label of an EEC, the individual 
must complete training provided by a university or an organization in the field of architecture, 
engineering or crafts, or a host of other institutions (see Henger et al., 2015). The occupation is 
open to most actors in the building sector, which explains the heterogeneous educational 
backgrounds of the EEC sector. However, the EEC can only access public retrofit funds if 
specific certificates are obtained from an educational institution such as a university, 
architectural or crafts organization.8  
To increase the visibility of EECs’ quality, a web portal with a public EEC list has been 
established, which is accessible online and registration is administrated from the national 
energy agency (DENA). DENA grants access to the list and evaluates the prerequisites of being 
listed by checking the individuals’ certification. Most federal subsidy programs demand that 
house owners hire an EEC who is listed. Currently, there are about 13,000 individuals on that 
list.9  
In order to prevent fraudulent EEC behavior, subsidies can only be received if an independent 
consultant is hired. The EECs are obliged to consult customers without providing specific 
product recommendations and they are prohibited from profiting from the actual retrofit 
implementation. The owner of a construction company thus cannot be hired as an EEC and 
subsequently implement the suggested measures. There is one exception at the federal level, 
namely the subsidy program for single energy efficiency measures - in contrast to 
comprehensive measures - of the KfW. Given that this one program already covers 82% of all 
                                                 
8 The certificates are structured as follows: According to different building types, different certificates are required 
to conduct energy efficiency consulting in the specific programmes. For example, in order to apply for public 
funds for retrofitting historic buildings, courses with specialization in this subject need to be attended. Higher 
quality retrofits require higher quality standards. The certificates usually cannot be combined, which means that 
for every certificate a new number of courses needs to be attended. Due to the technological progress and dynamic 
changes in retrofit, the certificates need to be renewed every two years. 




subsidies (KfW, 2014b), the neutral position of EECs is only effective for a small proportion 
of all subsidies.  
 
3. Methodology and sample  
Case studies and qualitative research is a recognized approach to discover theoretical insights 
(Edmondson and McManus, 2007; Eisenhardt 1989; Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). Case 
studies support the development of abstract concepts (Ben and Steemers, 2014; Muench et al., 
2014; Rogers et al., 2012). Based upon the grounded theory (Glaser 1965; Glaser and Strauss, 
2008), our observations are used to develop an understanding about why EECs have such a low 
impact on the implementation of energetic retrofitting (Edmondson and McManus, 2007). 
The selection of experts follows the logic of the theoretical sampling (Glaser and Strauss, 2008). 
Our sample aims at theoretical saturation, while we are oriented by the different requirements 
that a certified EEC needs to meet. First, we analyze access paths to becoming a certified EEC, 
which is limited to architects, civil engineers and craftsmen in the construction sector in the 
German case. We interviewed stakeholders in all three groups, as well as individuals in related 
political associations and institutions. An overview of the interviewed experts and their 
professional background is provided in table 1. All experts were working in Germany at the 
time of the interview. We refer to the experts in our paper by using IDs - which can be found 
in the first column of table 1 - to provide anonymity and reduce social desirability biasing when 
answering. 17 interviews were conducted personally and via phone between February and May, 
2015. The interviews lasted between 40 and 70 minutes. 
Our semi-structured questionnaire is separated into three sections (see table 1) following the 
approach of Muench et al. (2014). First, we asked about the role of EECs in home energy 
refurbishing. Only the legal framework of the certified EECs provided orientation for the 
definition, while the details about the job description remained unclear. Second, we asked about 
obstacles that EECs face in their daily work. Finally, recommendations about the consulting 
process and the policy changes concluded the interviews. Within each section, we began by 
asking open questions, followed by closed questions derived from the EEC literature. The 
questionnaire was discussed and reviewed with academics with an economic, legal, 
architectural or engineering background to assure theoretical fit and comprehension. Finally, 
the questionnaire was double-checked with a cognitive pre-test using thinking-aloud and 




Describe the activities of energy consulting. 
Which are the most important elements of energy consulting? 
Characterize barriers for the success of energy consulting. 
Which problems arise from the certified energy consulting? 
What can you recommend to overcome the mentioned barriers? 
Which recommendations can you identify as central? 
Table 1 
Based upon Mayring (2004), a qualitative content analysis was conducted focusing on the 
reduction of content, followed by the analysis of the relevant content. After recording, the 
interviews were transcribed and cross-checked with press material and online research. 
Furthermore, the material was first inductively coded (Glaser and Strauss, 2008). Beginning 
with open coding, we marked the relevant content that was connected to our research question. 
Subsequently, we created categories and sub-categories, defined by the collection of related 
codes. Categories were revised with deductive codes from the literature (Mayring, 2004). In the 
case of misleading categories, categories were adjusted and newly defined. These categories 
and sub-categories were described in a coding manual to assure the comparison of the codes. 
For preventing critique of subjective coding - which appears as a major disadvantage (White 
and Marsh, 2006) - memos for the codes were written and the codes were discussed between 











EEC Coding Research and 
Education 




#A X    Architecture 
#B X    Engineering 
#C X   Craft 
#D X    State Regulation 
#E  X   Craft 
#F  X  Craft 
#G  X   Engineering 
#H  X   Architecture 
#I  X   Architecture 
#J   X Regional Energy Agency 
#K   X  National Energy Agency 
#L   X  Innovation support coordination 
#M   X Innovation support bank 
#N   X  EEC Journal 
#O   X Architect Professional Association 
#P   X EEC Association 
#Q   X EEC Association  
Total 4 5 8  
Table 2 
The following chapter discusses the results of our interviews in detail concerning the 
willingness to pay for EEC, the public certification system and a mismatch between customers 
and EECs owing to the phenomena described above. 
 
4. Results 
The analysis of the interviews has revealed a variety of impediments to the smooth functioning 
of the EEC market. A large number of interviewees criticized the discrepancy between ideal 
energy efficiency consulting and its practical implementation within a dynamic environment 
characterized by the heterogeneity of its actors. Another central argument for problems in the 
EEC market was the long amortization duration of retrofit measures and the low willingness of 
the polity to pay for increasing the rate for retrofit to fulfill energy-reducing goals. In the 
following section, we analyze the informational asymmetries of retrofits, whereby our research 




4.1. Complexity and credence goods characteristics in the market for energy consulting 
Willingness to pay reflects a customer’s expectation of benefiting from buying a product. In 
markets with perfect information, prices signal differences in quality. In particular, the 
customers’ willingness to pay reveals demand for a certain quality level and attributes a 
subjective value for a good or service. All interviewees aside from one mentioned a low 
willingness to pay as a barrier for offering high-quality services. Therefore, there is a need to 
understand the information asymmetries and how they contribute to a lower willingness to pay. 
According to the interviewees, the costs of energetic retrofits are too complex for customers to 
fully understand (#D, #F, #H, #I, #K, #M, #N, #P): Ex-ante, the energy-related costs have not 
been noticed as relevant; indeed, the energy costs incurred are often unknown (#K, #P). 
Additionally, the current low energy prices and the uncertainty about the future prices affect 
customers’ decisions to renovate their houses (#A, #B, #G, #L). After the retrofit, the evaluation 
of outcomes remains difficult due to user-driven rebound effects (#I, #P) and the limited 
observability of hired companies’ behavior, which can lead to lower savings than expected 
(#D). In addition to the technical complexity, renovation is a once-in-a-lifetime decision for 
most homeowners (#M) since the retrofit cycle ranges from 30 to 50 years (#A, #P). Thus, 
owners cannot rely on past experience and knowledge.  
Since the future costs of energy use are unknown, the estimation of the additional benefit of 
using EECs in relation to the outcome of the retrofit appears difficult (#A, #P). The low 
willingness to pay for EECs is interpreted by the interviewees as a lack of interest in EECs due 
to the complexity of retrofit (#D, #F, #H, #I, #K, #M, #N, #P). One interviewee described the 
case of acquaintances who had planned on retrofitting to save energy and reduce their personal 
emissions. The couple started to obtain information on regulations, subsidies and innovative 
opportunities for energy efficiency solutions, but ultimately they decided to postpone as the 
complexity of the retrofit was perceived as too high and the contribution to their 
environmentally-friendly way of living was only indirectly visible (#N). 
In addition to retrofit-related information asymmetries, the EEC service itself suffers from 
information asymmetries. EECs have more information about their service than the customer. 
While the majority of the interviewees stated that finding an economically efficient solution is 
important, information deficiencies regarding economic efficiency were confirmed by all 
interviewees and represent a main problem for EECs. Interviewee #K characterized the poor 
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information state as a “key problem” for the low acceptance of retrofit. There are different 
possibilities for consultants to measure economic efficiency depending on the methodology as 
well as assumptions about the customers’ consumption and future behavior.  
Furthermore, non-monetary arguments - namely providing better living conditions after the 
retrofit - are promoted by EECs (#B, #J). In part, EECs do not present reduced energy 
consumption as a main outcome of retrofit, but rather they emphasize better living standards in 
renovated houses. However, the result can hardly be measured or objectively evaluated ex-ante; 
rather, this additional factor adds further complexity to customers’ decisions and the visibility 
of the benefit of using EECs decreases (#A, #M). The use of non-monetary arguments thus 
creates a higher degree of uncertainty since the ex-post success of a high-cost decision relies on 
an additional non-monetary aspect. 
The information asymmetries between experts and customers lead to the perception of EECs as 
being prone to fraudulent behavior (#A, #B, #G, #J). In particular, the uncertainty about 
possible benefits makes customers fearful about paying for a service without receiving tangible 
benefits in return (#A, #G). This critique has particularly arisen since the experience in using 
EECs is low (#I, #P): in its current market size, it has only existed for about seven years.  
Two other developments in the EEC sector contribute to a lower willingness to pay. The 
informal supply of low-cost and low-quality EECs is problematic. First, the competition with 
EECs from non-certified experts was mentioned by 11 interviewees. This means that other 
companies like construction businesses and craft companies offer informal energy consulting 
with the goal of selling their product or service and receiving additional contracts from the 
retrofit. Moreover, due to EU regulation, energy suppliers are obliged to offer a certain number 
of EECs (Directive 2012/27/EU). The effect of competitive non-certified EECs is described by 
the interviewees as lowering the general quality level of EECs. In particular, the existence of 
low-quality offers has increased the difficulties for customers to differentiate them from high-
quality EECs (#F, #K, #N). Second, numerous low-cost public EECs have increased the noise 
to signal ratio in the market. There are a variety of public EECs, often not coordinated between 
different state authorities (#J, #L, #Q). Public services provide so-called “entry” energy 
consultancies aiming to lower the level of complexity of retrofit. While the low-price public 
consulting intends to communicate basic knowledge about the energetic status of a building, it 
is difficult for the customer to understand whether the entry consulting offers sufficient 
knowledge for a retrofit (#H, #J, #O, #P). Therefore, it is difficult for the customer to understand 
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the difference between a public low-cost EEC and a complete high-quality EEC offered on the 
market.  
Dealing with the information asymmetries, customers’ trust in the competence of EECs is a 
prerequisite for a successful relation and the basis for cooperation with EECs (#D, #H, #I, #F, 
#Q). Since customers can hardly base their judgments on solid facts, a high degree of 
uncertainty is observable (#D, #F, #H, #K, #P). The complexity of retrofits and the difficulties 
of EECs in translating the technical circumstances into a language that customers understand 
fosters problems with EECs (#L, #O, #P). Therefore, potential customers search for EECs via 
informal networks comprising family, friends and business partners, based upon 
recommendations (#D, #H). In particular, EECs know about the sensitivity of the relation to the 
customer and value the success of retrofit as being important for their own reputation. The 
majority of the interviewees emphasized the negative publicity due to fraudulent experts and 
its consequence for future demand.  
Prices for EEC are not regulated and can be chosen freely by the EEC (#C), in contrast to other 
consulting services in the building sector (#G). Therefore, price differentiation contingent on 
quality may ensue (#C, #D, #Q). However, the price for EECs fails to signal quality due to 
information asymmetries. Even in cases of business customers, it appears difficult to 
differentiate between different offers (#C). EECs in training courses organized by the craft 
chamber are often surprised by the variety of the offers, despite having several years of 
experience in this sector (C#). Specifically, the connection between EECs’ quality and the 
willingness to pay a higher price is questionable due to ex-post difficulties to verify the received 
quality.  
Overall, the market for EEC is characterized by a low willingness to pay. An analysis of 
information asymmetries has shown that retrofit activities display information asymmetries 
while energy consulting itself also has credence characteristics. Consequently, a lack of 
customer trust is observable. Quality signals in the market for energy consulting are hardly 
credible and the correlation between prices and quality is not inherent.  
 
4.2. Entry requirements and licensing as solutions to information asymmetries 
Regardless of educational background, anybody can offer their services as an EEC (#E, #G, 
#H, #I, #K, #N). The existence of unqualified EECs creates uncertainty in the EEC market since 
negative reports have been published in the media, negatively affecting the perception of EEC 
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markets, which are often described as “lemon” markets (#N). Due to regulatory barriers from 
the EU and the federal level, entry regulation of the profession is not likely, in contrast to other 
professions such as car mechanics or medical doctors in Germany (#H, #N). The market is 
characterized by unrestricted entry and an inability to credibly signal quality.  
In order to overcome these problems, the German government has implemented a system of 
certificates, an online EEC listing for improved transparency and independency regulation for 
EECs (as described in section two). However, these interventions have only been partially 
successful. At present, the publicly sponsored EEC market remains sluggish (Henger et al., 
2015). As laid out above, the majority of interviewees state that mistrust about the quality of 
the EEC service has been generated by fraudulent EECs in the market.  
The interviewees evaluated the role of the state for the EEC sector critically, but mostly 
considered it was necessary to assure a quality minimum. The value of the certificates was seen 
as mixed as they provide little quality information for customers (#A, #G, #P, #Q). In order to 
receive the certificate, a certain number of course credits have to be obtained. In particular, to 
become listed in subsidy programs, a minimum of 70 hours of lessons need to be attended. In 
addition, 16 class hours are required every second year (KfW, 2014a). According to 
professional EEC associations, this prerequisite is evaluated as too little and they have 
demanded up to 25% of the working hours being devoted to attending courses to keep up with 
the technological change (#P, #Q). The EEC associations expect their members to take up 
additional courses since the public requirements do not guarantee a sufficient quality standard 
(#P, #Q). Different quality levels can be observed in the courses (#A, #K). 
The number of classes attended counts toward receiving the certificates. Qualitative differences 
in the courses are imperfectly mirrored by the certificates, whereby public authorities rely on 
the information provided by the educational institutions themselves. Thus, relevant stake holder 
associations are permitted to evaluate the courses that they offer without external validation 
(#B, #L).  
Educational institutions are somewhat autonomous in creating course content. Some 
educational institutions have tried to make the courses comfortable for EECs neglecting the 
quality of the courses (#A, #B, #C, #D). The interviewees confirmed that this situation has 
improved, although the incentive to attract EECs with easy courses remains present. According 
to the interviewees, there is an incentive for EECs to participate in low-quality courses (#I, #P). 
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Interviewee #P described a low-quality course as follows: “I remain seated the whole day, have 
good food, have good drinks, speak with colleagues and have 8h of certified courses.” 
Furthermore, the regulatory system requires home owners to employ EECs as monitors for 
ongoing construction projects if they receive public retrofit subsidies. Thus, EECs spend a 
considerable amount of time as monitors rather than consultants (#G, #M). To some extent, 
EEC courses are designed to teach participants to understand the details of public grant 
regulations. This necessarily subtracts from the courses’ potential to teach technical and 
consulting skills (#M, #Q). The ability to explain technical processes to home owners is rarely 
addressed by the courses. Moreover, relevant skills of the EEC profession are not always 
considered in certified courses (#G, #M). In particular, marketing and financial issues are 
neglected (#A, #E, #N). 
Interviewees stated that the market intervention has been partially successful since a 
minimum quality has successfully been established. “It’s an improvement”, stated interviewee 
#B. The introduction of certificates has been successful to the extent that unqualified 
consultants can be excluded from receiving grants (#K, #N). Nonetheless, despite the 
introduction of certificates, signalling high quality still seems impossible. 
It should be noted that EEC training only pertains to one aspect of a broader information 
asymmetry problem. If EECs had the ability to signal high-quality training via certificates, 
customers would nevertheless remain ignorant about the level of actual consulting effort that 
they receive, just as a highly qualified doctor may still underprovide screening effort or suggest 
too many medical interventions. While the current certification scheme assures a minimum 
quality level, it does not improve the quality (signal) of EECs beyond that standard. 
Due to the complexities of the certification system, the information benefit for customers is 
small, according to the majority of the interviewees. The certificates are not understood as a 
quality signal for consulting since there are more than 15 different subsidy programs at the 
federal level requiring different certificates.10 The programs are only known by a small share 
of home owners who potentially conduct a retrofit. 
Furthermore, reduced awareness of high-quality EECs is also caused by bureaucratic 
circumstances. New programs lead to further differentiation of certificates, whereby every new 
subsidy program requires additional certificates with slightly different prerequisite and 
                                                 
10 Due to frequent regulatory changes, the federal government has implemented a webpage 
(www.foerderdatenbank.de) to collect all the possible subsidies for retrofit. 
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monitoring reports (#A, #D, #H, #I, #J, #L, #N, #P). There have been frequent policy changes 
regarding EEC certificates in recent years, excluding some groups of EECs11 or demanding 
extra attendance of additional courses (#A, #B, #C). Due to frequent changes, it is difficult for 
customers to understand the meaning of certificates. Interviewee #A commented on the 
visibility: “I am not even sure if the public knows that there are certified EECs.” Consequently, 
the awareness of certificates as a signal for qualification is low (#E, #F).  
The introduction of a public list of approved EECs was evaluated somewhat positively as it 
enhances transparency for customers. According to the interviewees, the list has made it easier 
for customers to contact EECs (#D, #H, #N). Nonetheless, other interviewees stated the list is 
hardly known to homeowners (#A, #C).  
The aforementioned emphasis on the monitoring function of EECs affects customers’ trust in 
the certificates as a quality signal (#M, #G). In addition, negative press about EECs and their 
monitoring function has created a reserved attitude among customers, as mentioned by the 
majority of the interviewees. Consequently, home owners discount the informational content 
of certificates (A, #C). According to the interviewees, trust in certified EECs is perceived as 
low (#A, #H). In its current design, the certification does not lower information asymmetries 
(#H, #N, #K). The design of the certification adds little in the way of new information about 
EECs’ quality for home owners, while retrofit monitoring by EECs lowers the trust in receiving 
high-quality consulting. 
The majority of interviewees valued the independence of EECs and construction companies. 
Interviewees pointed to fraudulent expert behavior such as heating contractors recommending 
new heating systems, painters recommending insulation, etc. (#A). However, the alleged 
problem of information asymmetries in retrofit construction - reflecting one of the reasons for 
government intervention and support for home energy consulting - starkly contrasts with actual 
customer behavior and opinions. Since owners deal with construction companies on a 
somewhat regular basis, they are often contacted first (#B, #F). According to a recent survey, 
the most trustworthy source of advice - second to acquaintances - is craft companies (Amecke, 
2012). Since retrofitting is an uncertain and costly decision for the home owner, trust is 
important (#D, #H, #I, #Q). Accordingly, home owners consult known and trusted experts, 
conducting their search via small and informal networks (#C, #D, #F, #H, #N) where reputation 
                                                 
11 New regulation excluded EECs with craft companies from the KfW subsidy program in March 2013. From 




mechanisms work well. Interviewee #C describes a typical conversation in his neighborhood: 
“How was it [the retrofit] for you? Who did you cooperate with? Was he [the expert] 
competent?” 
According to the interviewees, customers find it appealing to deal with construction companies 
directly as it does not involve the bureaucratic hurdles of applying for public EEC subsidies. In 
addition,  home owners are required to contract with consultants when they apply for 
publicly subsidized low-interest loans. Due to the availability of low-interest loans in the regular 
credit market, customers no longer see the need to acquire EEC services (#A, #C, #E, #H). 
Additionally, larger construction companies employ their own EECs to inform customers and 
evaluate the outcome of the retrofit (#N).  
The intervention’s aim was to guide home owners, diffusing innovative solutions by assuring 
the quality level of EECs. The low willingness to access EECs is largely caused by the EECs’ 
function as retrofit monitors, which distracts from their role as advisors. Home owners search 
for energy consultants via informal networks, whereby they appear to favor local constructors 
as consultants with whom the more frequently interact compared with EECs. 
 
4.3 Mismatch between user preferences and experts’ incentives 
We have identified a mismatch between EEC incentives and home owner demand. The size of 
the proposed retrofit project correlates with the consultant’s revenue.12 Regulation requires that 
after the project exceeds a specified size, the certified consultant must observe and monitor the 
construction phase. According to several interviewees, there is an incentive to increase the size 
of the retrofit project beyond what is economically feasible as the EECs benefit from a more 
costly planning and implementation phase (#A, #B, #D, #I). Interviewee #A identified a 
“hardcore” energy-saving attitude among EECs, leaving economic arguments aside, 
contributing to the mixed reputation of EECs. The customers possibly know about the incentive 
of EECs to enlargen the project size but they cannot ascertain what amount of consulting and 
retrofitting would be optimal for them (#A, #G). 
EEC subsidies also facilitate an incentive to suggest efficiency measures that are more than 
optimal (#B, #F, #I). EECs must write a final report. The stated goal is to achieve a high energy 
                                                 
12 The size of Kf subsidies depends on the efficiency level of the house achieved after the retrofit. The funds vary 
from 15,000 Euros for the lowest energy efficiency level up to 30,000 Euros per apartment unit in the highest 
energy efficiency level. A higher retrofit budget means more EEC involvement. Additional subsidies for EEC are 
granted up to 8,000 Euros (KfW, 2015).  
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efficiency level, which only translates into economic efficiency for houses with specific 
preconditions (old building with few previous renovations) (#Q). Therefore, it is difficult for 
customers to know whether the suggested measures are economical or if it is aimed at the 
optimum in energy savings.  
The regulatory framework aims at energy saving rather than economic efficiency (#A, #O). The 
socio-economic circumstances of the home owner are rarely considered, particularly their age, 
financial situation and the state of the regional economy (#D, #E, #H, #I). There is a tension 
between everyday behavior and the technological requirements to reach technical efficiency. In 
an exemplary case described by an interviewee, one homeowner demanded to receive funds for 
the highest energy efficiency standard. In order to achieve this standard, the EEC had to plan 
for an automatic ventilation system. However, after the retrofit, the system only worked 
efficiently if the windows remained closed. Since the home owners were unwilling to change 
their behavior, this retrofit resulted in a lower de facto efficiency status (#I).  
According to all interviewees, the demand for certified EECs is largely driven by public 
subsidies. Customers only acquire EEC services to receive public subsidies (#A, #D). The 
available evidence indicates a minor influence of EEC on retrofit decisions. Most customers 
plan retrofits with the support of non-certified EECs before they access funds through certified 
EECs. The impact of EECs on the choice of technology and innovative solutions is perceived 
as low (#B, #E, #H). 
EECs only profit from retrofits that fulfill subsidy regulations (#B, #C, #E, #N). EECs’ profit 
maximization depends on the overall retrofit project size. The incentive to enlargen the project 
size results from the structure of the regulation emphasizing energy saving rather than economic 
efficiency. The interviewees described EECs as being environmentally-conscious and 
supportive of energy-saving regulations (#A, #B, #O, #Q). Customers’ incentives for 
economically efficient consulting and the EECs’ incentives to enlarge the project size causes a 
mismatch between demand and supply. 
The diffusion of innovative technologies and solutions are hardly observed in EECs’ activities. 
The regulation hinders EECs from selecting economically profitable and innovative solutions 
(#B, #C, #H, #I, #O). One interviewee described a customer who considered various scenarios 
for the retrofit. The customer only stayed in his house at night. A particular technology was the 
economically efficient solution but was not publicly funded, meaning that the EEC could not 
offer his service (#I). Moreover, unusual solutions are not of interest to EECs, since they are 
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also responsible for monitoring customers following strict regulations (#B, #P). The consulting 
report - which is a prerequisite to receive public funds - follows a standardized guideline (#L). 
Non-mainstream solutions are hardly offered by EECs, given that the monitoring rules are not 
sufficiently flexible and they preclude some innovative proposals (#I).  
In particular, the final EEC evaluation of the finished retrofit project does not examine the 
achieved efficiency level of the retrofit but rather the formal standards that are often approved 
by administratively - rather than technically - trained staff (#L, #M). Consequently, the 
monitoring of retrofits mainly evaluates whether the implemented retrofit fulfils the regulatory 
standards, while ex-post energy saving is not monitored. The EEC has strong incentives to 
comply with the regulation since the home owner receives direct feedback about whether he/she 
will receive public funds. However, the outcome of the retrofit and the EEC cannot be directly 
evaluated by customers due to its credence characteristics. Additionally, the regulatory 
framework for obtaining funds for higher energy efficiency levels hardly supports innovative 
solutions because the regulation prescribes a fixed set of specific technologies (#A, #I). 
There is a mismatch between customers’ demand and EECs’ supply based upon conflicting 
incentives. Customers’ trust in EECs suffers from this mismatch and consequently leads to 
EECs’ low impact on the diffusion of innovative ideas. The customer searches for trusted 
experts who are recommended by local informal networks. EECs do not act as change agents. 
Economic policy may have generated an information asymmetry problem in a publicly-created 
EEC market, intended to solve information asymmetries in retrofit construction. Accordingly, 
customers appear to partially prefer construction companies over EECs in terms of energy 
advice.  
 
5. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
Public policy has generated a market for home energy efficiency consulting. Consultants were 
intended to serve as change agents - i.e. to facilitate innovation diffusion - while EECs were 
also intended to resolve problems of asymmetric information between construction companies 
and home owners. The former have more technical expertise than the latter and thus they are in 
a position to suggest too many efficiency measures. However, the success of public policy is - 




Based upon semi-structured expert interviews, we have found that the EEC market is 
substantially affected by credence goods characteristics, i.e. there is a lack of customer trust as 
EECs find it difficult to signal their level of quality. Customers’ willingness to pay for the 
service is low. In order to overcome the sluggish market conditions, publicly-introduced 
educational certificates have led to the establishment of a minimum standard. However, EEC 
services remain largely driven by the demand for public funds - which cannot be obtained 
otherwise - rather than a genuine desire to acquire consulting services.  
We have also identified a mismatch between EECs’ supply and customers’ needs. Guided by 
state regulation, EECs aim at lowering emission and energy use while customers require energy 
efficient solutions that are also economically efficient.  
Our results show that the EEC market is affected by credence characteristics leading to a market 
with a low quality offered, comparable to results in the literature (Balafoutas et al., 2013; 
Dulleck et al., 2011). Government intervention has not established a higher quality level, thus 
supporting the preliminary results discussed in the EPC literature (Amecke, 2012; Gram-
Hanssen et al., 2007). 
We cautiously suggest the following policy recommendations. First, the current certification 
scheme is implemented as a top-down regulation, leading to a widespread perception of low-
quality certificates. Therefore, we propose strengthening private or public-private networks that 
benefit from market feedback and associated knowledge signals. A bottom-up certification 
could be realized by the support of professional organization in formal networks. It would offer 
incentives for members to upgrade their own knowledge level in a competitive environment 
and thereby increase the share of high quality in the EEC market. For example, in Spain and 
Germany, craft and commercial chambers have supported knowledge diffusion for many 
professions affected by credence characteristics, supporting higher quality levels with their 
educational institutions. These organizations lower information asymmetries because they 
support the acquisition of quality signals for their member firms. 
Additionally, cutting public EEC funds would lead to a clearer quality signal on the EEC market 
by reducing low-cost public EEC offers and fostering the acceptance of EEC as market services, 
as opposed to being entirely subsidy dependent. Consequently, the use of EECs in public 
support programs should be more strongly focused on economic efficiency criteria rather than 
the energy- saving paradigm, since the current support of non-efficient solutions has lowered 
the public’s approval of energy efficiency measures in the residential building sector. Our 
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results exemplify the difficulties of intervening in a market influenced by credence 
characteristics. 
Given its exploratory approach, our study has certain limitations. Further research on economic 
policy in credence goods markets requires a more in-depth analysis to test our hypotheses with 
quantitative data. Additionally, while our research was carried out in Germany, analyses of 
expert markets from different sectors and other countries would offer the opportunity to develop 
a more diverse picture about the possibilities and limits of public intervention in markets 
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Asymmetric information as a barrier to knowledge spillovers in 
expert markets 
 









Abstract: This paper investigates barriers to effective knowledge spillovers for markets in 
which the product can be characterized as a credence good, i.e. its complexity impedes the 
evaluation of quality by customers both ex-ante and ex-post. We focus on the German market 
for energy efficiency consultants, as an emerging and subsidized sector in which the service 
offered has strong credence good properties. Based upon in-depth interviews with stakeholders, 
we analyze the determinants and barriers to knowledge spillovers. We find that the incentive to 
foster spillovers to increase suppliers’ knowledge is limited by the difficult commercialization 
of additional capabilities. The implementation of a public certification scheme has failed to 
increase the sectoral knowledge spillovers. By contrast, the participation in formal knowledge 
networks has been more effective in prompting companies to foster knowledge spillovers, 
which has also led to a higher degree of specialization. We conclude that access to certification 
schemes should be further restricted to increase market transparency and private networks 
should be supported to achieve the aim of increasing knowledge spillovers.  
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Innovative activities occupy ever-increasing importance for economic growth (Cooke and 
Leydesdorff, 2006). Knowledge spillovers have been introduced as a core element driving 
growth within the endogenous growth theory (Romer, 1986, 1994) and subsequently 
emphasized by countless studies. The development of modern knowledge economies has led to 
substantial global, national and regional competition for the creation of new knowledge, 
whereby the use of knowledge has become a crucial aspect of entrepreneurial thinking (Aghion 
et al., 2005; Tang, 2006). This development has increased the relevance of external sources of 
knowledge to increase firm-specific knowledge to a central strategic question (Howells, 2006). 
Various knowledge-intensive institutions such as universities, private research institutions and 
business services have thus been established as channels for knowledge spillovers, challenging 
companies to improve their internal innovative capacities (Tether and Tajar, 2008; Thomä and 
Bizer, 2013). Responding to this trend, researchers have investigated the determinants and 
optimal management of knowledge integration and spillovers as a strategic element within 
companies.  
Initially, the focus was placed upon large enterprises and their innovative capacities leading to 
knowledge spillovers (Acs and Audretsch, 1988). However, following the seminal work by 
Audretsch (1995), the knowledge spillover theory of entrepreneurship (KSTE) has substantially 
broadened the concept of knowledge spillovers to better explain the contributions made by 
smaller companies to economic growth (Acs et al., 2012; Braunerhjelm et al., 2010; Huggins 
and Thompson, 2015). Within the KSTE, knowledge spillovers are considered the central driver 
for companies’ success and thus a core element of strategic entrepreneurship (Acs et al., 2012). 
Knowledge spillovers have been operationalized using e.g. codified knowledge – which can be 
easily transferred in written form (Acosta et al., 2011; Audretsch et al., 2005) – or tacit 
knowledge sources, incorporated in human capital (Klepper, 2007). In particular, the case of 
innovative knowledge disregarded by incumbent companies and research institutions yet turned 
into entrepreneurial opportunities for newly established competitors has been emphasized (Acs 
et al., 2013; Audretsch and Keilbach, 2007).13 The concept of knowledge spillovers thus helps 
to better understand the long-term success of companies as entrepreneurial opportunities arise 
from new knowledge and result in competitive advantages (Agarwal et al., 2007).  
                                                 
13 For recent extensive literature reviews on the results of the KSTE, see Acs et al. (2013) and Ghio et al. (2015).  
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Overall, the KSTE has established that the knowledge intensity in firms and sectors is the 
central predicator for the likelihood of knowledge spillovers and thus competitiveness in 
companies and sectors. However, it can be impeded by knowledge filters, a concept introduced 
by Acs et al. (2004) after observing regional and sectoral differences in spillover effectiveness. 
These filters constitute barriers to spillovers from established firms and research institutions 
(Bonaccorsi et al., 2013; De Silva and McComb, 2012). We suggest that the role of knowledge 
filters in reducing companies’ incentives for increasing their knowledge basis has not been 
sufficiently investigated and that the focus on knowledge intensity in the KSTE should be 
extended accordingly. In particular, we hypothesize despite high sectoral knowledge intensity, 
information asymmetries are central knowledge filters preventing an effective transfer of 
innovative knowledge.  
To investigate this hypothesis, we conduct a case study based upon expert interviews within the 
German energy efficiency consultant (EEC) sector14, in which homeowners are offered 
consulting services towards implementing energy efficiency measures. This expert market has 
grown substantially after several large government programs – including large subsidies – have 
been put in place to reduce Germany’s energy consumption in private residences. The supply 
side of this consulting market is very heterogeneous: along with customers’ inability to evaluate 
the service quality both before and after the transaction, this leads to a partial market failure 
due to distrust in expert services (Beck et al., 2014; Dulleck et al., 2011; Dulleck and 
Kerschbamer, 2006). The credence good properties of the service impede experts’ ability to 
signal higher service quality and thus they also act as strong knowledge filters precluding 
spillovers among suppliers. Thus, despite its high sectoral knowledge intensity, the EEC market 
is rather dysfunctional in terms of an efficient knowledge spillover of new technologies and 
services. This problem can be traced back to the missing link between suppliers’ capabilities 
and the quality observed by the customer: owing to the complexity of the product, additional 
firm-specific knowledge in most cases fails to increase revenues. Thus, no structural incentive 
is provided to actively seek knowledge spillovers within the sector.  
We argue that these issues are not limited to the EEC market but rather apply to a large share 
of service markets to some degree. Thus, understanding the working mechanisms of knowledge 
filters in markets with information asymmetries can substantially add to our understanding of 
knowledge spillovers in general, as well as enabling more specific policy measures to foster the 
                                                 
14 To our knowledge, EECs have been only analyzed according to their function as an economic policy instrument. 
The results highlighted the low effectiveness of increasing the rate of retrofit (e.g. Mahapatra et al., 2011; Palmer 
et al., 2013; Virkki-Hatakka et al., 2013). 
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intra-sectoral flow of knowledge. In our case study, we focus on two specific policy options 
aiming to reduce the issues associated with the consulting market: first, the effects and 
shortcomings of a public certification scheme are described and evaluated; and second, 
voluntary knowledge networks are investigated, in which the membership itself can be used to 
signal higher quality. We find that through establishing informal communication among their 
participants, these specific networks foster knowledge spillovers to a certain degree, with a 
focus on commercialization. Both certification and network-building are assessed as policy 
options in terms of their ability to support knowledge spillover and increase sectoral growth. 
We can thus contribute to the understanding of knowledge spillovers in expert markets and 
provide policy implications for decision-makers.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In the second chapter, we review the 
literature on the KSTE concentrating on the operationalization of knowledge spillover, 
knowledge filter and the role of networks. Furthermore, we describe our methodology and 
explain our sample in detail. In section four, we present our result, followed by the discussion 
with economic policy implications in section five. Finally, we conclude in section six. 
 
2. Literature review 
The KSTE literature has furthered our understand concerning the role of knowledge for 
companies (Acs et al., 2009a; Audretsch et al., 2006; Audretsch and Keilbach, 2007). It has 
primarily focused on testing different aspects of the theory empirically (Acs et al., 2009b; 
Agarwal and Shah, 2014; Audretsch and Keilbach, 2008; Audretsch and Lehmann, 2005), 
whereby the effective use of knowledge has been identified as the key determinant for 
sustaining competitive advantages in companies. Following Arrow’s (1962) seminal paper on 
the allocation of knowledge and its role for companies, several difficulties for the effective 
entrepreneurial management of knowledge have been identified. Since knowledge has the 
properties of a public good – i.e. by being non-rivalrous and non-excludable in many cases 
(Audretsch and Stephan, 1999) - companies are aware that their internal knowledge cannot be 
completely protected from unwanted spillovers. The uncertainty associated with the potential 
risks of losing competitive advantages determines several difficulties in estimating the outcome 
of knowledge commercialization. This “knowledge paradox” (Audretsch and Keilbach, 2008) 
comprises entrepreneurs deciding to use external knowledge, despite being aware that they will 
only partially profit from the additional knowledge. Since the value of knowledge is perceived 
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differently among individuals (Acs et al., 2009a), high transaction costs result when initiating 
knowledge diffusion due to the heterogeneity of the user of knowledge (Braunerhjelm et al., 
2010).  
Attempting to operationalize the abstract concept of knowledge spillovers, several empirical 
measures have been adopted. Initially, spillovers were analyzed using codified knowledge, by 
counting the number of patents and other forms of registered intellectual property rights 
between companies and sectors (Acs et al., 2002; Plummer and Acs, 2014). Another measure 
is the change of employees to explain spillovers of tacit knowledge. This measure can be 
extended to small and medium-sized companies that refrain from registering patents (Thomä 
and Bizer, 2013) but still transfer new-to-the-firm knowledge (Klepper, 2007). Karnani (2013) 
has criticized an overemphasis on codified knowledge in the literature, which disregards tacit 
knowledge, particularly in the highly relevant sector of university spin-offs. In this domain, the 
creation of start-ups using knowledge provided by non-commercial institutions such as 
universities (Acosta et al., 2011; Audretsch et al., 2005) or research institutions (Cappelli et al., 
2014) has been identified as an important source of knowledge spillover. As new employees, 
university graduates often transfer knowledge to spin-offs in the vicinity (Acosta et al., 2011). 
Especially in peripheral regions, universities have thus been identified as an important source 
of innovative knowledge (Pinto et al., 2012; Tether and Tajar, 2008). In this regard, the 
specialization of academic institutions influences the emergence of knowledge spillovers with 
applied technological sciences fostering the creation of new firms most effectively (Bonaccorsi 
et al., 2013). Besides knowledge spillovers from universities, the regional level of 
competitiveness complementarily supports innovative companies (Audretsch et al., 2012). Two 
new approaches to operationalize knowledge spillovers have recently been introduced that 
measure entrepreneurial creativity (Audretsch and Belitski, 2013) and the entrepreneurial 
activities of employees (Stam, 2013), which can help explain the commercialization of new 
knowledge. Overall, various factors based upon codified and tacit knowledge have been 
suggested as reasons for knowledge spillovers; however, the quintessential result remains that 
the degree of knowledge intensity within companies and sectors is the main factor driving the 
likelihood of knowledge spillovers. 
To explain differences in the effectiveness of knowledge spillovers between sectors and 
companies, Acs et al. (2004) introduced the concept of knowledge filters, thus describing the 
barriers of transformation from new to commercialized knowledge. The literature builds upon 
the observation that companies decide not to commercialize their entire knowledge (Hayter, 
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2013). Most prominently, the transmission channel of knowledge spillovers between incumbent 
firms or universities and new companies constitutes the decisive factor potentially blocking the 
commercialization of knowledge (Mueller, 2006). Knowledge filters have been analyzed with 
respect to geographical characteristics (Acs et al., 2009a; Acs and Plummer, 2005), institutions 
(Stenholm et al., 2013) and social norms (Guerrero and Urbano, 2014). Concentrating on the 
regional level, new companies more successfully cope with knowledge filter than incumbent 
companies (Acs et al., 2009b). Interpreting the age of companies as a knowledge filter, it has 
been shown that R&D expenses are predominantly conducted by newly established companies 
(Carlsson et al., 2009), whereby the exploitation of knowledge becomes more difficult for new 
firms in regions with an already high degree of knowledge commercialization (Acs et al., 
2009a). Overall, it has been shown that knowledge filters can explain the regionally and 
sectorally different exploitation of non-commercialized knowledge. 
Knowledge networks can offer an opportunity to reduce the impact of knowledge filter, which 
has only recently been addressed by a smaller number of studies discussing the role of networks 
as a transmission channel facilitating knowledge-based entrepreneurship (Hayter, 2013; 
Huggins et al., 2012; Huggins and Thompson, 2015; Shu et al., 2014). Integrating the role of 
networks in the KSTE thus offers the opportunity to more comprehensively explain successful 
entrepreneurial decisions (Hayter, 2013). The initial results are that knowledge spillovers in 
inter-firm networks improve the overall performance, with mixed effects on the individual firm 
level (Shu et al., 2014). However, network capital and its spatial distribution – particularly 
network relations between companies and other knowledge-producing institutions – account 
for regional differences in innovative capabilities (Huggins and Thompson, 2015). Moreover, 
a strong positive impact of regional policy has been shown for regions with a low density of 
networks fostering knowledge spillovers (Huggins et al., 2012). 
The literature on KSTE to date has yielded a broad strand of research. In our paper, we add to 
this literature in two distinct dimensions. First, the KSTE values knowledge and emphasizes its 
significance for companies’ growth. Limitations to the effectiveness of spillovers have been 
described as resulting from knowledge filters that pose barriers to commercializing. However, 
markets characteristics – particularly the issue of asymmetric information between buyers and 
sellers – have not been considered despite their potential role as a filter hindering the 
commercialization of knowledge from established firms and research institutions. Therefore, 
we argue that barriers to knowledge spillovers have not been sufficiently investigated, 
particularly regarding markets for services that rely on tacit knowledge, which reduces 
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incentives for increasing firms’ knowledge basis. We add to the literature by discussing the 
problems associated with the commercialization of tacit knowledge in markets with asymmetric 
information. Second, networks and their effect on knowledge spillovers are discussed as an 
important aspect of the KSTE. Nevertheless, the role of networks as knowledge filters has not 
been investigated thoroughly in the literature and it has not been shown in detail how knowledge 
spillovers are affected by different network specifics. Our research can add to this aspect by 
offering detailed insights into the determinants of and barriers to network-related knowledge 
spillovers in a market for services with credence good properties. Furthermore, the results from 
our expert interviews enable us to formulate policy implications for the design of networks that 
foster knowledge spillovers.  
 
3. Data and methodology 
Since the role of knowledge spillovers in markets with credence characteristics has not been 
explored to date, a qualitative research framework that analyzes a case study is used to obtain 
initial theoretical insights (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). This extends the 
methodological choice in prior studies on knowledge spillovers that have frequently been 
conducted using qualitative research techniques (Schiller and Diez, 2010; Schmidt, 2015; Yang 
and Steensma, 2014). Due to the lack of prior empirical and theoretical contributions, we apply 
our exploratory research design without testing an explicit hypothesis (Edmondson and 
McManus, 2007). 
Following the logic of theoretical sampling, we selected our interviewees to reflect various 
perspectives regarding the EEC sector, thus assuring theoretical saturation for our sample 
(Glaser, 1965; Glaser and Strauss, 2008). We conducted the interviews between February and 
June 2015 in person or via phone. The interviews lasted 40-70 minutes. To preclude sociable 
desirable responding patterns, anonymity was guaranteed to the interviewees. All interviews – 
except one15 – were recorded, transcribed and codified. To assure the quality, the content of this 
interview was summarized in an extended memo with the relevant content. After the interviews, 
the reliability of the answer was cross-checked with online publications, press articles and 
published official company records.  
                                                 
15 In one case, recording was not possible due to technical problems. Therefore, an extensive memo was written 
immediately after the interview. 
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We structured our questionnaire according to common practice in qualitative research, starting 
with open questions followed by more detailed questions. Our questionnaire comprised three 
sub-sections. In the first sections, we discussed the definition and characteristics of the EEC 
market. Subsequently, the interviewees were asked to describe impediments in the EEC market, 
concentrating on the relevant stakeholder (customer, EECs and policymaker). The interviews 
concluded with recommendations to overcome barriers in the EEC market. 
The interviews were analyzed according to the content analysis proposed by Mayring (2004), 
which aims at reducing the content to the relevant statements. In the beginning, we used the 
open coding technique. Collecting the relevant material, we condensed the open codes with 
similar coding and ordered it according to categories and sub-categories. Assuring the relevance 
of the categories, we revised the codes with relevant literature and newly defined codes. We 
wrote memos for the categories and sub-categories and discussed the codes between the authors 
to assure the reliability of the collected material (White and Marsh, 2006). The interviewed 
experts received preliminary results and were given the opportunity to discuss critical aspects. 
All experts are stakeholders, thus maintaining an internal perspective of the EEC sector. The 
EEC sector is a dynamic developing sector that is predominantly influenced by public 
interventions. The German federal government promotes EECs as advisors in the residential 
sector to save energy and – ultimately – fulfil international climate goals. EECs offer consulting 
services for homeowners – mostly for private homeowners living in their own houses – and 
they act as advisors in undertaking building alterations. Homeowners thus receive support from 
EECs from the beginning of the planning until the end of the retrofit of their residence. 
The interviewees were selected according to gatekeepers from the crafts training institution and 
the EEC associations. Furthermore, we asked for recommendations from the interviewees to 
sample relevant stakeholders in the field. Additionally, considering the impact of the public 
intervention, stakeholders from the innovation support and regulatory authorities participated 
in the interviews. Our sample thus reflects the heterogeneity of the EEC market, with various 
relevant private, public and public-private institutions. This enables us to take into consideration 
the existence of diverse actors within the market to gain insights into the different opinions and 
perspectives on discussions within the field. The experts had a diverse educational background 
(technical, legal and administrative). To understand the various incentives in the market, we 
used stakeholders from research and education, EECs and political and professional 
associations to achieve theoretical saturation of the different perspectives (see Table 1), 
following a similar approach to Muench et al. (2014). Table 1 provides an overview of our 
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#A X   Architecture 
#B X   Engineering 
#C X   Crafts 
#D X   State Regulator 
#E  x  Crafts 
#F  x  Crafts 
#G  x  Engineering 
#H  x  Architecture 
#I  x  Architecture 
#J   x Regional Energy Agency 
#K   x National Energy Agency 
#L   x Innovation support coordination 
#M   x Innovation support bank 
#N   x EEC Journal 
#O   x Architect Professional Association 
#P   x EEC Association 
#Q   x EEC Association 
Total 4 5 8 17 
Table 1. Overview of the sample of experts 
 
4. Knowledge spillovers in an expert market 
4.1 Signaling of knowledge and quality 
The German EEC sector has a considerable size – with more than 13,000 publicly listed experts 
– and it has developed based upon knowledge spillovers through spin-offs originating in the 
architectural, engineering and crafts sectors. The demand for retrofit in the residential sector 
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has increased due to the establishment of massive public support programs and the age structure 
of the German housing stock, a large share of which were built in the 1970s. Thus, the processes 
of acquiring and implementing knowledge in EEC companies rely on political decisions 
regarding the specific design of retrofit subsidies. However, compared to other expert markets, 
the German EEC market has flexible prices and is hardly regulated. Consequently, unlike other 
expert professions, the profession of EECs is not protected by the German law. The largest 
shares of EEC are trained in the fields of architecture, engineering and crafts, whereby the 
knowledge basis significantly varies along the degree of training by EECs. The level of training 
ranges from a completed traineeship with additional training on energy efficiency to academic 
degrees. The term “Energy Efficiency Consultant” (EEC) can be freely used, which has led to 
substantial heterogeneity in the sector, consequently fostering a negative public image due to 
quality concerns.  
The EEC firms are mostly owner-led micro and small-sized companies. EEC companies have 
often switched their traditional focus from architectural, engineering and crafts business to EEC 
services. In the interviews, the entrepreneurial decision to use the companies’ knowledge to 
concentrate on retrofit resulted from the expectation of arbitrage profits. The EECs’ decision to 
enter the market typically starts as a part-time job and subsequently develops into a full-time 
position with a complete focus on energetic renovation. Overall, the EECs’ market has 
experienced a difficult situation, after a promising sectoral growth has slowed down in the past 
six years.  
The interviewees stated that the commercialization of their service is the main problem for 
EECs, which results from customers’ low willingness to pay. In turn, this is driven by the 
credence good characteristics of the EEC market, as a company’s knowledge intensity is hardly 
perceptible for customers. This information asymmetry leads to a strong sentiment of 
uncertainty among customers regarding the actual quality provided by EECs. According to the 
respondents, the largest share of customers is private homeowners who have only limited 
experience with retrofit, which is typically a once-in-a-lifetime decision due to 30-50 year 
refurbishment cycles. Additionally, the outcome of the retrofit and its monetary benefit for the 
customer depends on various factors. The implementation of the retrofit involves different 
companies, including EECs, whose behavior can hardly be monitored by the customer. 
Furthermore, the reduction in energy usage following the retrofit relies upon the customers’ 
behavior. Consequently, the EECs’ specific knowledge is hardly perceptible to customers due 
to the technical complexity and thus it cannot be used as a strong marketing argument.  
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This issue constitutes a substantial filter for knowledge spillover. Overall, the immediate 
benefits from creating or acquiring additional knowledge are difficult to evaluate for 
companies. While up-to-date knowledge is a prerequisite for the technical analysis required for 
retrofits, the heterogeneity of the market – in combination with the issue of asymmetric 
information – inhibits the commercialization of knowledge. Therefore, the monetary profits 
from fostering knowledge spillovers are limited in the EEC sector, since new knowledge cannot 
be effectively signaled to customers. Thus, the positive correlation between a firm’s knowledge 
intensity and its revenues is weak if non-existent in a service market with credence good 
properties, as signaling is predominantly dysfunctional.  
 
4.2 Certification and signaling 
To counter the issues of information asymmetries and the resulting low-quality offers on the 
EEC market, the German federal government introduced a certification system to improve the 
quality of EECs, which requires attending training courses on EEC-specific knowledge.16 EECs 
are required to have this permission to apply for public funds, which account for more than half 
of transactions in the EEC market (Prognos et al., 2013). All the interviewees highlighted the 
relevance of the certification scheme due to the financial incentives and an improved visibility 
of public quality standards for customers cooperating with EECs. Setting a minimum quality 
standard, the certificate system regulates access to the EEC market. 
The certificates are used to verify the acquisition of a minimum standard of codified knowledge 
with a focus on technical aspects of the EEC services, such as building regulations, energy 
efficiency standards and calculations of energy usage. By contrast, the interviewees emphasized 
the relevance of tacit knowledge, highlighting that the translation of expert to customer 
knowledge is neglected in the courses. The interviewees thus stated that the certification scheme 
only has a very limited ability to signal quality to customers and other EECs. The low quality 
of some courses within the EEC sector is widely acknowledged; consequently, the certificates 
are assumed to be merely a minimal quality standard. Additionally, the inability to efficiently 
signal quality and knowledge intensity is driven by the complexity of the certification system, 
                                                 
16 Upon receipt of the certificate, the access to subsidies is granted via a public web list. To be included in the web 




with different certificates for each subsidy program and regular changes to the certification 
scheme. 
Consequently, companies have the sole incentive to attend the courses and receive the 
certificates to participate in the subsidy programs. Addressing the problem of the low 
dissemination rate of new knowledge, the state intervention has aimed at improving the 
knowledge basis of EEC companies to ensure a certain level of quality to customers. It was 
hoped that knowledge-based competition would incentivize companies to create knowledge 
spillovers, commercialize the newly acquired knowledge and drive the companies with the 
lowest knowledge basis out of the market. Nevertheless, the certification system has only had 
a minor impact on the sectoral knowledge level due to its low standards and the focus on 
codified knowledge. Additionally, the interviewees emphasized that particularly smaller 
companies have a low willingness to participate in the training courses due to a lack of 
capacities for extensive training courses. Nevertheless, training courses are appreciated as 
networking events that enable informal knowledge exchange among colleagues. Especially 
market information and marketing strategies are highlighted as positive unintended outcomes 
of the courses, which can be considered knowledge spillovers among the participants. 
Nevertheless, the systematic organization of knowledge spillovers through public certification 
schemes can be considered as having failed. Due to the asymmetric information in the relevant 
market, no strong incentive exists to foster the broad exchange of innovative knowledge; 
indeed, the policy intervention has been unable to solve this issue.  
  
4.3 The role of knowledge in networks 
EEC companies mostly originate from strictly regulated sectors with existing network 
structures provided by architectural, engineering and craft chambers. These semi-public 
organizations assure quality standards for their sector with the training of employees and they 
define sectoral business rules. Membership is mandatory for all companies in the respective 
sector and the network structure is partially organized by the members. The EEC sector does 
not have such developed network structures at present. There are two professional 
organizations, which together have organized around 25% of the EECs listed online. The 
German energy consultant network only accepts university graduates as members, while the 
EEC Engineering Craft Association has organized mostly companies with crafts background. 
Both professional organizations confirmed in the interviews that they aim to establish a higher 
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quality standard for their members on a private basis by promoting their members’ level of 
knowledge. 
 
4.3.1 Barriers to entry 
Both professional organizations have created barriers to entry for prospective members that 
assure the quality level of their organization, including a selection process before a prospective 
company can become a member of the professional organization. In particular, discussions with 
active members are part of the application process, since other EEC experts are more considered 
more capable of evaluating the quality of the EECs’ services. Thus, a prospective member’s 
knowledge basis with respect to codified and tacit knowledge is checked. According to the 
interviewees, the barriers to entry limit the network access to EECs with a high-quality 
knowledge basis. This constitutes the network’s attempt to preclude free riding behavior from 
low-quality experts gaining reputation without contributing to the maintenance of the high 
quality of the professional organization. The networks aim to establish membership as a quality 
signal on the EEC market; thus, the barriers to entry are used to level information asymmetries 
between companies and customers as well as policy-makers.  
A strong focus is placed upon learning about a prospective member’s qualifications regarding 
tacit knowledge. Interviewees emphasize that their main concern is the admission of fraudulent 
experts, which could further worsen the negative public image of EECs and similarly damage 
the professional organizations’ public image. A thorough interview is seen as a partial solution 
to this issue, whereby the networks try to maintain certain standards since state regulation has 
not succeeded in ensuring that tacit properties of knowledge are included in the mandatory 
courses. This barrier to entry ensures the exclusive acceptance of members with a common 
knowledge basis, which constitutes a prerequisite for a broader exchange of knowledge. 
Overall, this network structure is considered more stable since low-quality EECs are 
successfully excluded. 
The close monitoring of the knowledge level among participants leads to a higher level of 
transparency within the organization concerning the variety of competences. A common 
understanding about the purpose and means of the organization constitutes a strong prerequisite 
for knowledge spillovers. Members can more easily access certain aspects of the professional 
sectoral knowledge, which leads to the intended and unintended exchange of knowledge. The 
members’ openness to sharing knowledge is higher, as they can expect a certain level of 
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competence among newly admitted members. Overall, the networks successfully provide a 
common professional platform, which enables high-quality signaling to a certain degree and 
fosters the sharing of tacit and codified knowledge. It can thus be considered a partial remedy 
to the market failure due to asymmetric information and the regulatory failure of a common 
level of training among EECs. 
 
4.3.2 Knowledge sharing activities in networks 
Upon entering the networks, companies have access to a variety of offers to increase their 
knowledge basis. This includes formally organized events comprising lectures, conferences and 
regional meetings. The courses are taught by internal professionals and external experts 
teaching about new regulations, technical innovations and customer relationship management. 
Moreover, informal meetings with other EECs are an important incentive for companies to 
participate in the networks. The formal platforms are often the basis for an informal exchange 
of knowledge. Participation in the events is not mandatory for the members, although there is 
an informal expectation to regularly participate at the network meetings. 
In contrast to publicly organized training courses to receive the certificates described above, 
the content of the network events is oriented towards members’ demand, which is inevitable 
given that participation is voluntary. Therefore, the events need to provide knowledge that 
actually provides additional value to the participants. Receiving updates on close-to-the-market 
knowledge is important due to the dynamic environment of the EEC sector, with frequent 
regulatory and technological changes. The courses are thus selected by professionals working 
in companies in the EEC sector. This internal perspective provided by market participants 
enables a more accurate anticipation of sectoral problems and future developments than the 
external perspective provided in the certification courses.  
The interviewees attributed a positive impact on the knowledge flow within the EEC sector to 
the informal contacts established in the networks. Most importantly, the application of 
technological knowledge concerning retrofit-specific situations is discussed among network 
members. Additionally, the transmission of tacit knowledge takes place within informal 
meetings, e.g. detailed market information and prospective developments in the retrofit sector 
or customer relationships and dealing with problematic customers. The exchange also includes 
non-public information about future political trends being disseminated by the members, since 
the networks are involved first-hand as stakeholders in the policy-making processes.  
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However, despite these distinct advantages, the interviewees involved in the knowledge 
networks complain about the low participation of members, since active involvement is very 
time-consuming. The knowledge transfer of tacit knowledge is characterized as an experience 
good by our interviewees, i.e. members cannot precisely estimate the potential monetary gains 
from engaging in knowledge exchange. Only after investing time and energy into the exchange 
can members acknowledge whether the engagement has yielded a benefit. In deciding whether 
to engage in knowledge exchange processes, members regularly weigh the costs as being higher 
than the uncertain gains and consequently they decide against the time-consuming engagement 
in network activities. This issue makes it difficult for network officials to motivate companies 
to participate in network activities. 
Despite these difficulties, participation in networks offers entrepreneurs the opportunity to 
overcome the low knowledge spillover level on markets with credence good characteristics. It 
supports members in increasing their knowledge basis with codified and tacit knowledge. 
Knowledge spillovers are fostered due to a better visibility – experts knowing other experts and 
a higher degree of trust – due to similar interests within the association’s goals. Knowledge 
spillovers regularly take place on an informal level at network meetings and the official 
propagation of knowledge exchanges fosters the mutual willingness to share knowledge. 
Nevertheless, the experience good character of networking efforts inhibits the acquisition of 
new active members and thus limits knowledge spillovers. 
 
4.3.3 Effects of knowledge spillover in networks 
The entry barriers of admitting only qualified member increase the knowledge intensity of the 
networks. Moreover, the knowledge activities of the network offer opportunities for the 
members to increase their knowledge basis with specific expert knowledge. Taking both aspects 
into consideration, the networks offer more opportunities for knowledge spillovers when 
compared to EEC market participants without membership. The interviewees confirmed a high 
willingness to cooperate with member companies due to the familiarity with the knowledge 
basis of member experts and the reputation of high quality offered by network partners. In 
particular, the information barriers regarding the knowledge basis of other companies are 
perceived as being lower in comparison to non-network members. Regardless of existing formal 
forms of cooperation, informal cooperation is predominant in the networks. In particular, 
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flexible and time-saving solutions are assumed to be advantages of cooperation within the 
network. 
This enables an increased inter-firm cooperation, largely driven by the sectoral structure of the 
EEC market, with a large share of micro and small-sized companies. The flexibility of these 
companies is limited by their low production capacities. Cooperation with other companies is 
thus used as a means of conducting additional projects without substantially increasing the staff. 
This reduces the risk of costly overcapacities that cannot be quickly adjusted according to 
current demand due to the strong employment protection in Germany. In the EEC market, this 
is particularly important since alternating phases of fast growth and sectoral recessions have 
occurred in the past decade. This volatility is caused by the uncertainty caused by inconsistent 
policy-decisions regarding the volume and specifics of subsidies for energetic renovations, 
which impede an accurate preparation for future sectoral developments. Therefore, inter-firm 
cooperation replaces short-term hiring of new staff, which is problematic due to the 
employment protection and the costs of training new employees in EEC services. A prerequisite 
of the cooperation is the trust in the cooperating partner, which is – to a certain extent – 
guaranteed by the network. Especially the reputation of EECs plays a predominant role since 
the credence characteristics of negative results of the customer relationship can have a large 
impact, given that the customer can hardly ascertain the reasons for failures.  
The willingness to cooperate enables companies to specialize since the acquisition of additional 
technical knowledge is costly and time-consuming. The large number of potential technologies 
– combined with heterogeneous customers – contributes to the complexity of energy consulting. 
Cooperating with member companies enables experts to further specialize in specific 
technologies and services within the market, which reduces competition between EECs and 
increases profits. The acquisition of specialization knowledge is supported by the network 
through organizing knowledge transfer meetings and specific courses for niche specialization. 
While a higher degree of cooperation has fostered knowledge spillovers thus far, a further 
specialization could also reduce knowledge spillovers since a higher degree of specialized 
knowledge makes the commercialization of additional pieces of specialized knowledge more 
difficult and relevant for fewer companies. Overall, however, the increasing specialization 
provides a competitive advantage to network members due to the more efficient exploitation of 





Our findings contribute to the KSTE, providing an additional perspective on knowledge 
commercialization by describing the problems associated with knowledge spillovers on an 
expert market. The occurrence of knowledge spillovers in the EEC sector strongly hinges on 
companies’ incentives to increase their knowledge basis, which is difficult as signaling higher 
quality to customers regularly fails. This dilemma leads to a low demand for training courses 
and other educational programs despite knowledge-intensive requirements for conducting 
retrofit. This issue is related to the market structure, with asymmetric information precluding a 
more effective commercialization of knowledge, thus making the retrofit a credence good. 
Indeed, this conclusion is supported by previous studies investigating problems associated with 
credence goods in service markets (Feser and Proeger, 2015; Schmidt, 2015; Howden and 
Pressey, 2008).  
Despite positive effects of knowledge spillovers for both older and newly established firms, our 
case study shows that knowledge spillovers in the EEC sector are principally influenced by the 
credence characteristics of the service. The difficulties in signaling high quality on the market 
imply a lower incentive for companies to enlarge their own knowledge basis since more 
knowledge does not necessarily contribute to a better commercialization. This leads to a 
situation where prices in the EEC sector are not related to the quality and thus cannot provide 
a quality signal to customers. Therefore, firms have very little incentives to protect their 
knowledge basis, which enables knowledge spillovers to a certain degree. Nevertheless, 
knowledge spillovers rarely result in additional profit for other firms since only a small share 
of the knowledge transferred – mainly specific aspects of tacit knowledge – is actually of use. 
Overall, the competition with low-qualified experts was characterized by interviewees as a 
major factor that strongly influenced EEC firms’ strategic decisions. They identified the open 
access to the EEC market as the core problem precluding innovations and knowledge 
acquisition due to the credence good characteristics of their service. This result is in line with 
previous studies pointing to a low demand for expert services and market breakdowns due to 
customers’ fear of fraudulent expert behavior in markets with strongly asymmetric information 
(e.g. Dulleck et al., 2011; Dulleck and Kerschbamer, 2006). 
The regulatory intervention as a reaction to the problem of low quality on the EEC market has 
added an incentive to acquire additional knowledge. To receive the certification enabling the 
application for subsidies, firms gain a low standard of knowledge. Apart from this function, the 
newly acquired knowledge can hardly be commercialized and customers correctly do not 
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assume that the certification is a quality signal. Thus, overall, the limit to the market through a 
certification system has only provided a low incentive to improve quality through knowledge 
spillovers. This result is in line with the literature on certification in the energy sector (Brounen 
and Kok, 2011; Gram-Hanssen et al., 2007; Stieß and Dunkelberg, 2013). Previous studies have 
found a low acceptance of certificates among customers due to the complexity caused by the 
indirect link between quality and the certificates. Therefore, the knowledge level of companies 
is maintained to merely fulfil the minimum certificate requirements and no additional resources 
are invested in knowledge acquisition.  
The marginal role of knowledge on the EEC market has changed as networks have introduced 
a signal of high quality through their selection processes. This has the effect that cooperation 
between member companies can be realized more easily and that specialization through 
knowledge spillovers makes the enlargement of the firm’s knowledge basis a more profitable 
strategic decision. Networks thus lower the information asymmetries between suppliers and 
customers, which can make knowledge spillover and specialization profitable. This result 
resonates with past discussions about networks that foster knowledge exchange and innovation 
(e.g. Amara and Landry, 2005; Feldman, 1999; Rogers, 2004). This particularly applies 
regarding companies’ ability to exchange internal and external knowledge, which has been 
characterized as a successful variable to benefit from the use of networks and increase the 
innovative capability (Vega-Jurado et al., 2008). The mechanism of signaling expert knowledge 
within an intra-sectoral network produces trust between member companies and is thus a 
prerequisite for cooperation, which leads to knowledge spillovers. 
Overall, we can explain insufficient knowledge spillovers as resulting from information 
asymmetries in a given market, serving as a substantial knowledge filter. This adds to the KSTE 
by showing that sectoral differences regarding the market structure and product specifics are a 
relevant category for the efficient working of knowledge spillovers. We argue that the current 
focus of the literature – which primarily views knowledge intensity as the exclusive driving 
force for entrepreneurial activity – is incomplete, given that it neglects market specifics. Rather, 
firms and products in a market may be knowledge-intensive, yet its properties effectively 
preclude knowledge spillovers and innovative cooperation. Once the commercialization of new 
knowledge is complicated by product, customer or market specifics, companies no longer have 
incentives to conduct knowledge exchange. Accordingly, we would argue that knowledge 
filters such as the ex-ante and ex-post asymmetric distribution of information can significantly 
contribute to our understanding of knowledge spillovers within the KSTE.  
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These results enable us to derive policy implications that can help to improve innovation policy 
aiming at increasing knowledge spillovers in sectors with credence good characteristics. We 
have found that the core problem of a low knowledge spillover rate is the lack of an additional 
competitive advantage and corresponding monetary benefits from gaining additional 
knowledge. Accordingly, regulators need to establish a situation in which customers demand 
and perceive higher quality services, which can only be achieved by increasing market 
transparency. In a more transparent market, companies’ investments in knowledge intensity are 
more likely to lead to increased profits, which in turn would foster the competition for quality 
among firms. Countering asymmetric information on a regulatory basis can be achieved by 
intensifying the requirements for the certification of firms. Accordingly, access to the supply 
side of the market would be strongly restricted, excluding all firms that fail to meet a certain 
knowledge standard. While this measure would not reduce information asymmetries per se, 
customers’ trust in the quality of the service could be improved. While restricting the market 
would naturally have a trade-off with higher prices charged by the remaining firms, it would 
likely stimulate the further specialization and increases in knowledge intensity by the firms 
remaining on the market. In the specific case of the EEC market in Germany, regulators have 
avoided this measure thus far, in order to protect smaller companies unable to afford the costs 
for additional training. Instead, the certification approach is to be extended over a longer period, 
slowly improving the requirements and quality of mandatory training. From a political 
perspective, this approach appears reasonable and suitable to – at least slowly – improve 
knowledge intensity in this sector.  
Networks constitute a second-best solution to the issues associated with asymmetrical 
information. They can establish quality signals on a voluntary basis for knowledge-intensive 
businesses and thus establish and maintain a certain level of trust among customers and 
participants. In turn, this increases the incentive to foster knowledge spillovers, specialize and 
cooperate with other trusted members. While these positive effects are provided by voluntary 
private cooperation, policy-makers could contribute to these knowledge networks. Potential 
ways of supporting private networks include providing additional funding for improved training 
among members or fostering a closer cooperation between the public institutions offering 
training and know-how and the private networks. Particularly an exchange of training personnel 
and materials could improve knowledge spillover and thus improve the sectoral knowledge 
intensity in the medium run. More thorough public support to the private network initiatives 
could also increase their attractiveness to other firms in the sector by increasing the value of 
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their quality signal, which might permanently increase incentives for firms with a low 
knowledge intensity to acquire the network’s quality standard. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Generating innovations occupies ever-growing importance to maintain national, regional and 
sectoral competitiveness. In this development, companies are increasingly required to use 
external knowledge to improve their knowledge intensity and succeed in global markets. The 
KSTE describes and analyzes the influence of knowledge spillovers, particularly regarding 
newly established companies using non-commercialized knowledge. While knowledge 
intensity is generally considered the main determinant of knowledge spillovers between firms, 
we suggest that properties of the markets should be increasingly drawn upon to explain the lack 
of spillovers. Understanding market properties as a knowledge filter can explain discrepancies 
in knowledge spillovers between different sectors. Apart from gaining another perspective of 
the dynamics and barriers to knowledge spillovers, identifying and analyzing market specifics 
enables more precise policy implications that can alleviate barriers to knowledge sharing. To 
illustrate this point, we presented a case study of the German EEC sector, which is a knowledge-
intensive expert market with asymmetrical information between customers and firms, in which 
the services have credence good characteristics. We argue that the specific problems and 
solutions identified for this sector are applicable to other markets with similar characteristics, 
in which knowledge spillovers are sub-optimal.  
In this regard, we pointed to asymmetrical information as the central problem precluding 
knowledge spillovers. We showed that companies hesitate to invest in acquiring additional 
knowledge, since they know that it cannot be commercialized at present. Customers distrust 
service providers, since they cannot effectively evaluate the quality of the services due to the 
lack of signals of high quality. Given that customers do not demand higher quality, the existing 
firms engage little effort to specialize and improve their knowledge basis. Regulators have tried 
to solve this problem by introducing a mandatory minimum training; however, since the 
requirements are fairly basic, the ensuing certification does not serve as a quality signal that 
could foster quality competition. Private knowledge networks with a mandatory testing before 
granting membership have provided a partial remedy to the problems associated with 
asymmetric information. Membership in these organizations can be used to signal quality to a 
certain degree; additionally, knowledge events – both formal and informal – contribute to 
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additional knowledge spillovers, a higher willingness to cooperate with other member firms 
and an ensuing specialization. However, despite these positive effects, the general problem of 
a market with heterogeneous qualities that are non-transparent to customers is not solved by 
private networks, given that customers’ inability to correctly perceive knowledge-intensive 
providers with high-quality services still precludes strong incentives for knowledge spillovers. 
We argue that regulatory efforts to increase market transparency and a step-wise increase of 
mandatory quality standards are indispensable to foster quality competition and knowledge 
spillovers.  
We argue that knowledge spillovers are problematic in non-transparent markets with credence 
good properties, based upon a case study on a specific German sector. Obviously, while we are 
convinced that this is a valid point, additional evidence – both qualitative and quantitative – is 
required to support this result. Further research should thus focus on other expert markets that 
face similar problems of asymmetrical information hindering the efficient spillover of new 
information. Furthermore, the sector explored here is rather new and with few formal network 
structures, when compared to established markets for expert services. For this reason, studies 
on more traditional sectors with well-established professional networks could further our 
understanding of barriers to knowledge spillover. For instance, studying the medical sector – 
which is a classical credence good market run by knowledge-intensive experts - could help us 
to understand how to better overcome the structural issues in these markets to foster knowledge 
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Heterogeneous professional identities as an intra-sectoral 
knowledge filter 
 









Abstract: We investigate the relevance of knowledge filters for knowledge spillovers. Our 
study focuses on the effect of heterogeneous professional training among members of the same 
sector, which we find precludes knowledge spillovers. Vocational differences lead to different 
professional identities among entrepreneurs of the same sector, which in turn severely limits 
cooperation and exchange among firms. Based upon a sample of energy efficiency consultants 
(EEC) in Germany, we conduct expert interviews providing evidence concerning the role of 
professional training and the resulting sub-sectoral identities in fostering or impeding 
knowledge spillovers. We explain our findings using evidence from the field of behavioral 
economics, which offers insights into the impact of group identities on cooperative norms. 
Following these findings, we offer policy implications, arguing that policy-makers and 
professional associations should make efforts to create a “common ground” among firms of the 
respective sectors. Specifically, common professional associations and training courses should 
be established that create a sectoral level of knowledge and thus bridge diverging professional 
identities. In turn, this could foster a common sectoral identity and promote sectoral knowledge 
spillovers.  
 
Keywords: knowledge filter, knowledge spillover theory of entrepreneurship, professional 
identity, professional training 
 







Energy audits in a private firm environment - 
Energy efficiency consultants’ cost calculation for innovative 
technologies in the housing sector 
 













During recent international climate negotiations like in Paris 2015, the European Union agreed 
to reduce the emissions of greenhouse gases. Policy-makers target the residential sector as a 
major user of fossil energy because potential to improve the energy efficiency in existing houses 
is observable. Energy audits have been implemented to offer information to homeowners within 
the aim of reducing the complexity and uncertainty concerning energetic refurbishment. 
Nevertheless, the impact of energy efficiency consultants (EECs) on retrofit measures is 
described as low in the literature. We conducted an online survey on German EECs, 
emphasizing their personal attitudes and contextual conditions, analyzing the implementation 
of an exploratory energy audit and providing recommendations for improving energy audits. 
The EECs answered the questions regarding the personal factors in a highly confident way. 
More specifically, almost all respondents agreed to fulfill the customers’ expectations. We 
explain this using the market framework in Germany, which requires a high-level performance 
due to the competition on the EEC market. The contextual conditions are evaluated more 
critically, with about 49% expressing concerns about acquiring and managing financial 
resources for energy audits. The case study showed that EECs only recommend innovative 
technologies to a limited degree, while the upfront costs are estimated very low. Finally, in the 
survey, the respondents prioritized an information policy improvement, which could influence 
the contextual conditions for energetic refurbishment. 
 
Highlights:  
 Energy Efficiency Consultants are highly satisfied with the personal factors due to the 
private firm framework. 
 We show that EECs assess the contextual conditions critically, particularly customers’ 
willingness-to-pay for energy audits. 
 EECs support innovative solution in energetic refurbishment while the cost calculation 
are very optimistic 
 EECs recommend to foster information policy while improvements in economic 
efficiency is evaluated less important. 
 




In late 2015, the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP 21) for the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change took place in Paris, within the aim of discussing effective and 
best practices policies. One central actor - the European Union - had already agreed beforehand 
to lower their greenhouse gas emissions to 20% by 2020 based upon 1990 levels, followed by 
further reductions up to 95% by 2050 (da Graça Carvalho, Maria 2012). Since the housing 
sector contributes substantially with about 20% to 40% of the end-energy use in the member 
states, policy-makers agreed to target effective energy efficiency measures to fulfill the agreed 
goals (Pérez-Lombard et al. 2008). In Germany, with about 40 Mio. residential buildings, the 
stock of buildings has great potential to reduce energy consumption, since 75% of the buildings 
that were built before the first heating regulation in 1978 have not been renovated (Diefenbach 
et al. 2010). Hence, since the rate of complete energetic retrofit currently only constitutes about 
1%, German energy policy aims to double the retrofit rate to achieve an almost climate neutral 
stock of residential buildings by 2050 (UBA 2014). 
The energy efficiency gap has been used as an explanation why people invest inefficiently in 
energy-saving measures due to a lack of complete information (Jaffe and Stavins 1994; Jaffe et 
al. 2005). While the effect of informational impediments on energy policy has been 
controversially discussed (Allcott and Greenstone 2012; Gillingham and Palmer 2014), it has 
had a substantial impact on the design of information policy (Bartiaux 2008; Ek and Söderholm 
2010; Ramos et al. 2015). Based upon the Directive on Energy End-Use Efficiency and Energy 
Services (Directive 2006/32/EC), member states are encouraged to adopt energy audits and 
energy-related services.17 In particular, the complexity of retrofit (Galvin and Sunikka-Blank 
2013; Owen et al. 2014) combined with uncertainty about the outcome due to customer-related 
rebound effects (Madlener and Hauertmann 2011) has led to a high degree of informational 
uncertainty, which attributes a central role for the homeowner’s decision (Palm 2010) to energy 
efficiency consultants (EECs). 
The seminal paper on EECs by Gram-Hanssen et al. (2007) analyzed the effectiveness of energy 
performance certificates (EPCs) for comparative Belgium-Danish cases focusing on the 
provision of additional information. The authors critically evaluated the benefit of EPCs since 
the new information transferred with the energy labels led to interpretation and questioning of 
the additional knowledge. The customers’ trust in the EPCs depended on individual everyday 
                                                 
17 For further discussion on the naming of EECs, see Feser and Runst  (2015). 
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life situations and the personal attitudes towards the energy advice. Bartiaux (2008) argued that 
the social norms need to comply with the new information, otherwise the customers do not react 
to the provision of new information. Additionally, EECs lack information about homeowners’ 
behavior and everyday situations, which influences the success of their service (Palm 2010; 
Revell and Stanton 2015). The education and profession of EECs has been identified as leading 
to heterogeneous information for customers (Virkki-Hatakka et al. 2013). 
The institutional framework for energy audits and related energy services significantly differs 
across the EU member states (Mahapatra et al. 2011b). While in Sweden and Finland, EECs 
are partially employed as public servants (Mahapatra et al. 2011b; Virkki-Hatakka et al. 2013), 
Germany has established a subsidy scheme organized by mandatory energy audits from 
certified EECs in private companies (Prognos et al. 2013). For the case of the UK, Owen et al. 
(2014) emphasized the impact of informal advice given to the customers about retrofit measures 
by installers. In the US, the EEC market appears separated in two groups: utility companies and 
construction companies; and independent EECs only focusing on energy audits (Palmer et al. 
2013). 
To contribute to the international climate goals, policy-makers rely on the quality of EECs 
(Rosenow and Galvin 2013), since the latter are largely subsidized to act as change agents 
endorsing a sustainable reduction of energy use in the residential sector. Change agents are 
those actors in markets who increase the technological progress and offer assistance to 
customers to limit their uncertainty (Rogers 2003). Implementing a system of experts for 
guiding homeowners towards energy efficiency measures has been discussed in the literature, 
finding a low impact of experts on customers’ decisions to conduct energetic retrofit (Gram-
Hanssen et al. 2007; Palm 2010; Palmer et al. 2013; Mahapatra et al. 2011b; Gillich 2013; 
Virkki-Hatakka et al. 2013). Especially the low acceptance of EEC services (Gram-Hanssen et 
al. 2007; Mahapatra et al. 2011b), the public policy orientation as well as the public subsidies 
of experts (Palmer et al. 2013; Gillich 2013) have been identified as barriers for EECs in terms 
of substantially increasing the retrofit rate. Nevertheless, given hypothetical choices, customers 
request support from EECs during the retrofit (Achtnicht and Madlener 2014), while the 
empirical evidence of using EECs has brought mixed results (Weiss et al. 2012; Gaspar and 
Antunes 2011; Murphy 2014a). Although the literature is rich with conceptual and qualitative 
insights, large-scale and quantitative evidence is rare. The literature has insufficiently discussed 
the impact of EECs on the diffusion of innovative technological solutions and homeowner-
friendly solutions. In particular, research on German EECs is relevant, since the German 
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building renovation program is one of the largest in Europe (Murphy 2014b; Rosenow and 
Galvin 2013). 
Thus, in this paper we analyze the sample of an online survey conducted with German EECs in 
2015, analyzing EECs’ performance during energy audits. The evaluation of service quality has 
created a broad strand of literature reflecting upon the impact of the offered service on 
customers’ demand (Wilson and Frimpong 2004). Mahapatra et al. (2011b) offered a first 
framework measuring the performance of EECs used in different sectors, based upon the 
assessment of interviewed EECs evaluating their own work (Netemeyer and Maxham 2007; 
Eva and Regehr 2005; Sarikaya et al. 2010). Mahapatra et al. (2011b) used the perception of 
EECs about the customer satisfaction as the dependent variable to explain EECs’ impact on 
energy audits. Our approach builds upon the Swedish survey (Mahapatra et al. 2011b) focusing 
on EECs as private firms. However, the adaptation of innovative technological solutions in its 
political and social environment is crucial for the acceptance and energy efficiency of retrofit 
in the housing sector (Ravetz 2008). Therefore, we follow Owen et al.’s (2014) approach to 
analyze the technical and adaptive skills as a prerequisite for understanding the performance of 
EECs. 
We find that EECs have a positive perception about their own performance, while contextual 
factors - including the institutional framework - are critically evaluated. Specifically, only about 
half of the EECs perceive their payment as fair. This perception significantly relates to the 
contextual factors of workload, subsidies, technical support from public authorities and a clear 
job description, which affect the EEC’s success on markets. The trade-off between positive 
personal factors and mixed evaluated contextual factors also appears in our case study about 
the diffusion of innovation at energy audits. The EECs proposed to some extent innovative 
measures, except disruptive measures, while the respondents systematically underestimate the 
upfront costs in case of ambitious energy goals.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we review the situation of 
EECs in Germany, including the current situation and the legal framework. Subsequently, we 
present our theoretical framework in section 3, while in the fourth section the methodology used 
is explained. We discuss our results in section 5, followed by recommendations for the 
prospective framework of energy audits in section 6, before concluding with policy implications 




2. Energy efficiency consultants in Germany 
The task of EECs is to support homeowners with technical support during the retrofit of their 
residencies targeting the service to private homeowners, as well as public and private housing 
companies. This support is mostly focused on scenarios about which customers lack 
information (Novikova and et al. 2011). Essentially, what is foremost expected from EECs is 
the distribution of innovative solutions to improve the energy efficiency (Madlener and 
Hauertmann 2011). Informational barriers before and during the retrofit create uncertainty 
about the outcome of energy efficiency measures. In particular, the technical complexity, the 
uncertainty about the quality of the building companies and inhabitant-related rebound effects 
after the retrofit influence the anticipated benefit through the retrofit (Feser and Runst 2015).  
There is no regulation that obliges homeowners to consult EECs for refurbishment measures. 
Nevertheless, from a public policy perspective, the development of the EEC market is based 
upon the low energy efficiency of the housing stock. Therefore, publicly supported energy 
audits attempt to support the diffusion of innovation, which has to be organized by change 
agents (Rogers 2003; van Lente et al. 2003). The market intervention drives the EEC market in 
two ways. First, the Energy Saving Regulation (EnEV) organizes the implementation of EPCs 
and limits its energy audits to consultants with a professional background in the building sector. 
Customers have to hire certified EECs to receive EPC, which has to be presented in case of 
selling a residential house or renting a house to new tenants (Amecke 2012). Second, 
homeowners need to consult an EEC to receive subsidies for energy audits and subsidies for 
energetic retrofit. Particularly the subsidies from the building rehabilitation program organized 
by the public KfW bank are an important incentive for homeowners to access EECs (Schroeder 
et al. 2011). In order to apply for subsidies for retrofit, specific training with a minimum of 70 
hours of certified courses is mandatory, in addition to the prior completion of training or studies 
in engineering, architecture or a craftsmen business (KfW 2014). More than 13,300 publicly 
listed EECs have the permission to participate in the subsidy programs. 18 The EEC certification 
scheme has been reformed several times to guarantee the quality of energy audits and increase 
the demand for EEC services (Feser et al. 2015). 
Despite the efforts of the German government, EECs’ role for energetic retrofit has been 
critically evaluated. Galvin and Sunikka-Blank (2013) presented evidence for the urgent need 
of change in the retrofit market. The ambitious aims for 2050 to reduce the greenhouse gas 
                                                 
18 The web list is publicly accessible at https://www.energie-effizienz-experten.de. 
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emissions by 80% can solely be achieved with further improvements. Under the current 
conditions, the housing sector contributes to a reduction of emissions by only about 25%. In a 
theoretical choice experiment, German customers revealed the need for support by EECs 
(Achtnicht and Madlener 2014). Especially the promotion of EECs since 2007 has brought 
improvements in the quality of retrofit, albeit with no noticeable effect on the retrofit rate (Stieß 
and Dunkelberg 2013). Moreover, the demand for energy audits has been characterized as low 
and decreasing in recent years (Prognos et al. 2013). In particular, the variety of actors offer 
low-quality and low-cost energy audits, leading to little transparency and a low willingness to 
pay for energy audits (Prognos et al. 2013).  
In the following section, we provide our framework to comprehend EECs’ impact on retrofit, 
specifically concerning the diffusion of innovative technologies via energy audits. 
 
3. Evaluation framework 
3.1. Influence of personal and contextual factors 
From a public policy perspective, subsidized EECs have to contribute to reduce emissions in 
the residential housing sector. EECs’ impact on diffusion of innovative measures for retrofit 
depends on the fulfillment of homeowners’ expectations (Michelsen and Madlener 2012). Most 
importantly, the interaction with customers affects the quality of the energy audit and is decisive 
for the buying decision (Taylor and Baker 1994). Hereby, EECs’ performance can be explained 
by personal and contextual factors (Stern 2000). We look at the personal and contextual factors 
with the self-perception of EECs. Consequently, this can be highly subjective and may differ 
from the customers’ perspective, thus requiring careful interpretation (Wilson and Frimpong 
2004). 
Based upon Mahapatra et al. (2011b) seminal approach to conceptualizing the personal factors, 
we include job satisfaction, attitude towards the job, age, gender, level of education and 
educational background, perceived level of knowledge and working experience asan EEC as 
personal factors. In addition to the Swedish example of Mahapatra et al. (2011b), the active 
exchange of knowledge in networks has been described as an influencing factor for the 
performance of services, especially in terms of highly specialized expert services (Muller and 
Zenker 2001; Probert et al. 2013). 
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Besides the personal factors, EECs’ capability to diffuse innovation can explain the way in 
which EECs manage the contextual conditions that cannot be immediately influenced by the 
individual EEC (Backhaus 2010). This includes the form of occupation (conducting part or 
fulltime energy audits), the clarity of job description, payment for energy audits and the 
workload, which have proven  to have a strong impact on the performance of EECs, measured 
by the customers’ satisfaction with EECs’ service (Mahapatra et al. 2011b). In addition, the 
institutional framework depends on the innovative capability of the regional (Bettiol and Di 
Maria 2013; Cooke et al. 1998) and national innovation system (Lundvall 1992; Castellacci and 
Natera 2013). Consequently, energy audits are affected by the legal dimensions, the public 
subsidizing scheme and the technical know-how provided by the public authority (Weber and 
Rohracher 2012).  
 
3.2. Evaluation of retrofit measures 
The suggestions of technologies during energy audits influence the diffusion of technologies, 
thus affecting the role of EECs as change agents. The mechanism of selecting the technology 
for energetic retrofit has been discussed in an acknowledged strand of literature based upon the 
seminal paper of Jaccard and Dennis (2006). Research has focused on homeowners’ decision 
process about energy efficiency measures in various countries; for example, in Sweden (Nair 
et al. 2010), Germany (Achtnicht and Madlener 2014) and Switzerland (Banfi et al. 2008). It 
was proven that energetic refurbishment measures depend on the homeowners’ willingness to 
pay (Grösche and Vance 2009; Kwak et al. 2010). In particular, the willingness to pay for 
improved energy efficiency concerning investments in insulation, heating and under-floor 
insulation differs between landlord and tenant (Phillips 2012). While homeowners’ intention to 
conduct retrofit measures has been revealed, the willingness to pay for energy efficiency 
measures is insufficient to compensate for the higher costs for renewable technologies 
compared with standard technologies (Scarpa and Willis 2010). Economic efficiency has been 
identified as key for homeowners to decide in the first place whether to conduct retrofit 
measures, followed by the volume of the project (Popescu et al. 2012; Achtnicht and Madlener 
2014). Besides the economic profits, the customers value any environmental benefits of energy 
saving (Banfi et al. 2008; Achtnicht and Madlener 2014), regardless of the criticism about the 
outcome of retrofit measures - especially insulation - in the public discussion in Germany, 
attributing it to low additional environmental and energy efficiency profits (Holm et al. 2014). 
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To understand EECs’ impact on diffusion of innovative technologies advising homeowners’ on 
retrofit measures, the EECs had to choose for one case study from different insulation material 
(Phillips 2012; Kwak et al. 2010), heating technologies (Michelsen and Madlener 2012; 
Madlener and Hauertmann 2011) and renewable energy applications (Scarpa and Willis 2010; 
Claudy et al. 2011). Mirroring the willingness of homeowners to pay, EECs can have a strong 
impact on the discussion about the economic efficiency due to the provision of technical 
knowledge and information regarding the upcoming costs for the customer (Ryghaug and 
Sørensen 2009). We followed an approach from the literature to estimate the upfront costs of 
energetic retrofit, including the costs of the suggested measures (Wilson et al. 2015). The 
information on upfront costs is important for homeowners’ perceptions of economic efficiency 
since the development of prospective energy costs is always based upon risky assumptions 
(Alberini et al. 2013; Jaccard and Dennis 2006). Due to uncertainty during the construction 
process, EECs had to estimate for the case study minimum and maximum upfront costs for the 
measures to create an indicator concerning how innovative technology suggestions affect the 
retrofits’ cost calculation. 
The estimated EPC level contributes to demonstrate the influence of energy audits on the 
general energy efficiency level in the housing sector. The impact of labeling with transparent 
information has been analyzed using a discrete choice experiment, leading to the preference 
towards environmental-friendly technologies (van Rijnsoever, Frank J. et al. 2015). We 
conceptualized the labeling using the energy level for receiving subsidies from the KfW bank, 
since the EECs’ proposal is decisive in terms of making the energy level transparent for 
homeowners from the legally required minimum standard until the passive house standard, 
which is the basis for EECs to plan the refurbishment. 
 
4. Methodology 
4.1. Structure of the questionnaire 
Modeled following Mahapatra et al. (2011b), we developed a questionnaire tailored for energy 
audits in Germany elaborated based upon 17 expert interviews discussed in detail in Feser and 
Runst (2015). The questionnaire was structured in four sections as follows. First, general 
demographic and business-related topics were discussed, including questions about the 
educational background, participation in public subsidy programs and membership in networks. 
Second, the respondents received information about a detached house provided with relevant 
117 
 
information to conduct energy audits. The respondents had to select the EPC level, EPC level 
calculation and decide upon insulation material, heating technology and renewable energy 
technology (see Table 1). Subsequently, the EECs were asked to estimate the minimum and 
maximum upfront costs of the proposed measures. The third section asked about attitudes 
connected to personal and contextual factors influencing the work of EECs. Fourth, 
recommendations about public interventions in the future were evaluated by the respondent. 






















Condensing boiler Photovoltaic system Maximum 
costs 
KfW 70  Organic (e.g. 
cellulose) 





  Heat pump using 
geothermal source 
Transparent cover 
for hot air 
 
   Heat pump using air as 
source 
  
      
Table 1 
In sections three and four - as given above - a five-point Likert scale (1=strongly disagree, 5= 
strongly agree) was used to test EECs’ attitudes regarding the personal and contextual factors 
as well as the ranking of proposals for prospective energy audits. The questionnaire was created 
and discussed within an interdisciplinary research group comprising experts from the field of 
architecture, civil engineering, economics and law. The energy audit case was selected from a 
team of architects in cooperation with a real estate manager. The questionnaire was pre-tested 
and reviewed by three experienced EECs. 
 
4.2. The survey 
The survey took place on the online platform SurveyMonkey. We followed suggestions of 
Sauermann and Roach (2013) to increase the response rate combining various activities. For 
instance, before the opening of the survey and within the aim of making our survey known to 
the broader public, we contacted the two largest professional EEC organizations, whose 
members constitute about 25% of the web-listed EECs. The EEC engineering craftsmen 
association (GIH) mostly comprises members coming from the craftsmen and engineering  
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sector, while the energy consultants network (DEN) only accepts in its auspices members with 
a graduate background, specifically architectural and scientist backgrounds. The professional 
background on the certified EEC market can also be found in both organizations (Prognos et al. 
2013). Additionally, we offered a monetary incentive for the respondents to participate by 
donating 2€ to a charity organization19 for every completed questionnaire, as suggested by 
Smith et al. (2015). Based upon the email addresses of GIH and DEN members found in the 
public domain, we composed two emails addressing the EECs in person. These emails were 
distributed around as a call to participate and a reminder of our survey. We sent the first email 
on the third day and the second on the tenth day. Approximately 1,800 personalized emails 
were sent20, which resulted in 459 incomplete and 339 complete responses. 
 
Gender (N=459) Age 
(N=454) 




Share over energy 
audits of total 
turnover 
(N=320) 





18.63% Less than 
30%  
44.69% 





  50-59 Years  44.27% Master  64.54% Craftsmen  22.39% More than 
70%  
40.94% 




7.76%   
 100%  100%  100%  100%  100% 
Table 2 
The majority of the respondents were male and on average 51 years old, holding a master’s 
degree. Furthermore, the majority were graduates in the field of engineering and the sample is 
almost equally distributed between EECs with a major focus on energy audits with a share of 
more than 70% of the turnaround and a minor focus with a share lower than 30% from energy 
audits (see Table 2). 
                                                 
19 The participants could choose among three different charity organizations: BUND with 228€ (environmental 
purpose), Aktion Mensch (general welfare) with 310€ and Aktion Deutschland hilft! (support for refugees) with 
140€. 
20 We selected the publicly available email addresses found on the homepages of the DEN and GIH, although not 




The respondents agreed with a high degree of uniformity with most of the statements. For 
example, about 49% fully agreed while the same percentage agreed with the statement “I have 
state-of-the-art knowledge for conducting energy audits”. In addition, more than 95% of the 
respondents agreed/fully agreed with the statement “I think that EEC is an interesting 
profession”. As the analysis of the remarks of the respondents in the open comments section 
showed, the order of the questionnaire sections influenced the self-perception of EECs. To 
explain, placing the case study before the self-perception statements framed the answers 
positively due to the self-affirmation that the respondents felt in the first place after solving the 
case study (Tversky and Kahneman 1981). 
Following Mahapatra et al. (2011b), we summarized the fully disagree, disagree and the neutral 
category as a neutral/negative category. Furthermore, the fully agree and agree category were 
merged into a positive category. In questionnaires without neutral options, respondents tend to 
answer negatively while positive answers remain clearly positive (Graeff 2002; Mahapatra et 
al. 2011b). Consequently, we tabulated independent variables with the rest of the variables from 
sections 1, 2 and 3. This facilitated conducting a chi-square test to analyze correlations of EECs’ 
personal and contextual factors.  
In the case study, we analyzed the coherence between the choice of EPC level and the calculated 
costs focusing on the selection of different technologies, which varied from standard to 
innovative technologies. Experts evaluated these beforehand to measure the impact of EECs on 
the diffusion of innovation. Due to the complexity of retrofit, the data on upfront costs are 
scarce. In a meta-study, Henger and Voigtländer (2012) showed the range of possible costs for 
different EPC levels in Germany. The costs are based upon real data after the retrofit comprising 
a sample with more than 10,000 retrofit projects. A lower bound for the upfront costs is recalled 
in DENA (2012), which has been criticized for presenting low costs having selected only a 
profitable lighthouse project and representing minimum costs for energetic retrofit (Simons 
2012). Due to increasing costs, the average costs in the building sector have increased by about 
7% since 2011, the date when the last costs are estimated.21 The minimum and maximum 
upfront costs were compared with retrofit costs described in Henger and Voigtländer (2012) 
                                                 




and DENA (2012) using t-statistics to ascertain whether the costs estimated by EECs match the 
reviewed costs. 
 
5. Discussion of results 
5.1. EECs’ perception of personal and contextual factors 
The customers’ acceptance is central for the success of energy audits, which influence the 
implementation of energetic refurbishment measures (Mahapatra et al. 2011a). About 95% of 
the respondents agreed/fully agreed with the statement “I fulfil the expectation of the 
homeowner who is in renovating process”, while only 15 of 348 respondents answered neutral 
or disagreed/fully disagreed. In contrast to our survey, only 52% in the Swedish survey agreed 
to the latter statement (Mahapatra et al. 2011b). Regardless of the efforts of Germany and 
Sweden towards energy efficiency in the residential sector, the institutional framework 
substantially varies between the two countries (Kiss et al. 2013). While the Swedish EECs are 
mostly employed as public servants offering information for homeowners about energetic 
retrofit (Mahapatra et al. 2011b), in Germany there are foremost independent energy services 
offering energy audits. In this case, the satisfaction of customers has a direct impact on EECs’ 
profit. In recent years, a considerable number of EECs have had to leave the EEC market since 
it has become no longer possible for them to offer energy audits in a sufficient quality (Feser et 
al. 2015). 
The market structure requires that EECs orient themselves carefully to homeowners’ demand 
for energy audits. Consequently, EECs positively evaluate personal factors, since - as it is 
observed - the respondents believe that they fulfill the quality standards on the EEC market. 
Especially complaints of EECs about unfair competition indicate the necessity to offer an 
optimal service to customers (Feser and Runst 2015). About 98% agreed/fully agreed to the 
statement of having up-to-date knowledge concerning their service, while about 86% confirmed 
using networks to receive new knowledge. The aforementioned positive answers can explain 
why 95% of the respondents agreed/fully agreed to the EEC profession being an interesting 
profession. Additionally, about 81% of the EECs confirmed that being an EEC satisfied them. 
We thus recognize a positive self-evaluation of knowledge- and personality-based attitudes on 
the market framework, which means that EECs must adapt to the general quality level to benefit 
from energy audits. About 47% of the respondents work in micro-sized companies with only 
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one or two employees, whereby this high degree of personal involvement can justify the 
positive perception of personal factors. 
The answers regarding the contextual factors are assessed more heterogeneously in comparison 
to the personal factors. Specifically, the consent from the respondents is weaker for the 
questions regarding the contextual factors, even though about 72% agreed/fully agreed with 
facing no problem working with the current legal framework. The improvement of the general 
retrofit level and the support of energy audits can explain the high level of confirmation for the 
German regulation (Galvin and Sunikka-Blank 2013).  
A major barrier for EECs is the low willingness to pay for energy audits, with about 49% of 
them answering neutral or disagreeing/fully disagreeing to this topic, which is consistent with 
previous surveys on German EECs (Prognos et al. 2013). Nonetheless, only about 42% fully 
agreed with the statement “I get a fair compensation for the offered energy audits”, which 
indicates disparities of payment in the EEC sector. The problems of the low willingness to pay 
was also emphasized in the open comments, highlighting problems in financing energy audits, 
which have been discussed in the exploratory interviews (Feser and Runst 2015). 
We found significant correlations with the perception of fair payment at p<0.05 in the chi-
squared statistics exclusively in the contextual factors, which is consistent with the description 
of the German housing sector substantially driven by public interventions (Galvin and Sunikka-
Blank 2013). There are the four key variables. First, the workload is significantly correlated 
with fair payments for the energy audit (approximately 73% of the EECs agreed/fully agreed 
with having a high workload). This may be especially the case in publicly-promoted energy 
audits, since the subsidies payments often comprise fixed payment contracts that include only 
a short time framework to conduct an energy audit. Extra work thus does not result in 
additionally paid work for EECs (Feser and Runst 2015). Second, the administration of 
subsidies (about 62% agreed/fully agreed to having problems with the administration of 
subsidies) has a significant correlation, while the permission to grant subsidies is not 
significantly correlated, since a vast majority of about 93% of the EECs have it. Especially in 
recent years, dynamic changes and the low interest rate have reduced the motivation of 
customers to include EECs in the retrofit measures (Henger et al. 2015). Third, the support from 
public authorities supplying technical and non-technical expertise significantly correlates with 
fair compensation. In particular, the regional and national energy agencies appear as major 
actors to deliver information to customers and EECs (Feser et al. 2015). The quality of 
information from public institutions has been criticized since the information partially 
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contradicts EECs’ recommendations and is not tailored towards homeowners’ needs, which is 
perceived to hamper the willingness to conduct retrofit measures. The mixed results of general 
information policy in the residential sector support our results. (Bartiaux 2008; Ramos et al. 
2015). Fourth, the job description (about 64% agreed/fully agreed to having a detailed job 
description) is significantly correlated to the fair compensation for EECs. The quality of 
descriptions varies depending on the customer and the complexity of the retrofit. The 
description of the project is decisive for the EEC’s outcome since it affects the time of planning 
and implementing the refurbishment measures. The rest of the contextual factors are not 
significantly correlated with the payment of EECs. 
The customers’ satisfaction and personal attitudes sections gather a high degree of agreement 
from the EECs. We explain this with the confidence of the respondents who survive the 
competition on the EEC market. The situation in the contextual factors is different, whereby 
especially the payment for energy audits is an impediment for EECs’ work. This could indicate 
the relevance of the institutional framework, particularly concerning the economic and regional 
conditions. The requirements from the legal framework are evaluated positively, since it affects 
the EECs in the same way. However, the customers’ individual characteristics, the 
circumstances of the retrofit project, access to subsidizes and support from public institutions 
influence EECs’ profit and can result in a competitive disadvantage. 
 
5.2. Case study on energy audits 
The case study illustrates the influence of EECs on energy efficiency in the housing sector 
during energy audits. Due to the limited choice of technologies, this exemplary energy audit 
has exploratory character but can offer useful insights into the role of EECs in the diffusion of 
innovation. The focus is on the suggestion of refurbishment measures and the evaluation of the 
proposed retrofit. In the following section, we show EECs as partially supporting the diffusion 
of innovation while the respondents systematically undervalue the costs. 
 
5.2.1. Implementation 
The selection of the method for the energy calculation determines the choice of the technical 
solution. The component method approach calculates the energy level based upon the energy 
use of each component. Only about 27% of the respondents admitted to applying this method 
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to calculate the energy efficiency from the refurbishment measures, while the rest showed a 
preference for the reference building method. The reference building method compares the 
energetic status of the entire house with a reference housing fulfilling the desirable EPC level. 
This method allows EECs to combine the measures in a more innovative way. By contrast, the 
component method is a more standardized approach. 
Only about 16% selected foamed plastic to insulate the house in the case study. However, about 
80% of the insulation in German houses is made from synthetic material. The partially desirable 
response behavior of the respondents explains the disparity between choice and the use of 
material in reality. German media has strongly discussed ecological problems and possible 
security risks in recent years (Sprengard et al. 2012). About 46% suggested using mineral 
material for the insulation, while approximately 37% selected organic material. The latter 
offered an innovative and economic alternative, which the description of the case study 
explained in detail. 
Only about 4% proposed maintaining the existing condensing boiler, while about 37% 
suggested replacing it with a modern condensing boiler. About 29% recommended a pellet-
fired system, which has the advantage of being an energetic system with renewable energy. The 
geothermal energy in combination with a heating pump was only selected by about 14%. 
However, the preconditions for the implementation of the geothermal technology were 
described as positive in the case description. About 12% of the respondents advised to install a 
heat pump using hot air as source, which was ex-ante evaluated as the most innovative 
technological choice.  
Comparable to the heat generation technologies, almost all respondents proposed to integrate 
renewable energy technologies on the roof. In particular, about 41% consulted to add a 
photovoltaic system and 54% a solar thermal system. However, the respondents neglected the 
collector facades (only three proposed it). This option was evaluated in advance as disruptive, 
when tested in publicly-promoted research projects (Rudolph-Cleff and Pfeifer 2014). 
To carefully interpret the results, desirable answering behavior needs to be considered, which 
cannot be precluded due to the evaluation character of the hypothetical energy audit and missing 
monetary incentives. Nevertheless, the contribution to the diffusion in retrofit is observable 
since EECs prioritize innovative measures, while disruptive innovations are scarcely suggested 
and not recommended for this case study. In particular, according to EECs’ comments, energy 
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audits are oriented intensively towards the socio-economic characteristics of homeowners and 
regional market conditions.  
 
5.2.2. Contribution to the energy efficiency in the residential sector 
The majority of the respondents (about 93%) offer certified energy audits where more energy-
efficient retrofits receive higher monetary incentives. The energy level of renovated houses 
determines the energy efficiency of the housing stock in the long-run until 2050, since the 
renovation cycle is estimated from 30 up to 50 years (Feser et al. 2015). The contribution to the 
energy efficiency of the retrofit is measured with the EPC level. The homeowners’ decision is 
crucial in the retrofit of residential houses (Stieß and Dunkelberg 2013). For customers, the 
EECs’ calculation of upfront costs forms the basis for assessing the benefit from the energetic 
retrofit. 
The respondents suggested that higher EPC levels require more expenditure (see Table 3). This 
goes in line with the literature, which claims higher investment costs for more efficient EPC 
levels (Steinbach and Schultmann 2015; Henger and Voigtländer 2012). This observation 
shows that the offered exposé included the necessary information to offer a reliable estimation 









Henger and Voigtländer (2012) 355.00 630.00 736.00 
DENA (2012) - 400.00 470.00 

















a) t-test is significant at the 5% level for Henger and Voigtländer (2012). 
b) t-test is significant at the 5% level for DENA (2012). 
Table 3: Retrofit costs per square meter 
 
The largest group of EECs (about 49%) advised the KfW 100 standard fulfilling the legally 
required energy standard for new built residences, which is consistent with the statistics on 
publicly-promoted houses (Diefenbach et al. 2014). The reported maximum costs are 
significantly lower than the costs described by Henger and Voigtländer (2012). The respondents 
seem to prefer the lower bound of expenses since the average and minimum costs are closer to  
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the costs of DENA (2012) than Henger et al. (2015). Interestingly, the minimum costs are even 
significantly lower than in the case of DENA (2012). Furthermore, we find similar 
characteristics in the second largest group of EECs (about 35%) proposing the KfW 70 standard 
(30% less end-energy use in comparison to new residences). The only exception is the 
maximum estimated upfront costs, which are significantly higher than DENA (2012) and 
significantly lower than Henger and Voigtländer (2012). In our example, the respondents 
underestimated the upfront costs by more than 25% in comparison to Henger and Voigtländer 
(2012) for the KfW 100 and KfW 70 standard.22 
Only about 13% aimed towards the legally required minimum standard comprising no more 
than 140% of the end-energy use of new residential houses. One explanation is that certified 
EECs tend not to aim towards this standard because subsidies for it are only granted for historic 
buildings and thus they do not reflect the core of EECs’ business model (only 16% are registered 
for this specific renovation program). The reported average costs are slightly higher (not 
significantly) in comparison to Henger and Voigtländer (2012).  
The EECs emphasized the difficulties concerning the calculation of costs, particularly because 
the energy audit had been conducted virtually. In particular, details about the specification of 
applied technologies have a considerable impact on the range of retrofit costs. For example, a 
group of EECs commented that they would decline estimating costs for customers in the first 
meeting due to the high level of uncertainty. Moreover, both the evaluation and announcement 
of the costs have been recognized as problematic due to regional and socio-economic 
differences. 
Since about 62% of the respondents selected the minimum and KfW 100 standard, energy 
audits’ contribution to the energy efficiency goals in the housing sector is questionable due to 
the support of lower energy standards than required to fulfill the energy-related climate goals. 
Furthermore, the systematic underestimation of the costs in the KfW 100 and KfW 70 standards 
is problematic and answered too optimistically, particularly with the recommendation of 
innovative measures. Due to the increasing general price level in the building sector, the 
calculation of the prices for the exemplified case appears risky. The lower estimated costs reveal 
the results from Scarpa and Willis (2010), which found a lower willingness to pay for innovative 
retrofit measures from the customer side. The uncertainty with reference to the regional and 
                                                 
22 We excluded the evaluation of the passive house standard in the analysis since only nine respondents suggested 




For example, changing the focus from the economic benefit to environmental benefits has been 
discussed as a possible solution based upon environmental-friendly and energy-saving 
preferences of homeowners (Ek and Söderholm 2010; Zundel and Stieß 2011). However, the 
provision of additional environmental information has brought mixed results in the literature 
(Gram-Hanssen et al. 2007; Bartiaux 2008). Closely related to the diffusion of new arguments 
is the statement of delivering more general information to customers about retrofit measures, to 
which 80% agreed/fully agreed. In the case of Germany, Galvin and Sunikka-Blank (2013) 
criticize the missing ex-post information, which can explain both success and barrier factors of 
retrofit, providing information for prospective customers. 
In the second most agreed statement, about 85% recommended strengthening network 
structures in the EEC sector. Although the EEC sector has only been present for the last ten 
years, it has considerably grown. Nonetheless, the network structures have developed weakly 
in comparison to the originating sectors of EECs (Feser and Proeger 2015). Networks can 
influence the supply side of knowledge diffusion, supporting the EECs’ role as change agents 
(Feser and Runst 2015). From a systemic perspective, intermediate organizations are necessary 
in the energy transition process to ensure the quality of knowledge processes in return (Hodson 
et al. 2013). Regardless the positive self-evaluation of the service quality and the personal 
knowledge basis, about 76% agreed with the need for quality improvement in the EEC sector. 
Additionally, this was expressed in the comments, complaining about the low level of quality 
observable during the energy audits. Information asymmetries between EECs and customers 
make the knowledge diffusion for retrofit rather complex (Feser and Runst 2015). 
In the literature, the German subsidy scheme is positively evaluated as a role model for other 
comparable European states (Murphy 2014b; Rosenow and Galvin 2013). Nevertheless, our 
survey showed that about 78% demanded improvements in the administration of the programs. 
These are often influenced by dynamic changes and the variety of programs (Feser and Runst 
2015). In the comments, the responsibilities for EECs raised critique since the EECs have to 
guarantee the quality of the subsidized retrofit while the public administration only monitors 
the formalities (Feser and Runst 2015). 
The two factors characterized by the least agreement are first, the improvement of monetary 
incentives, and second, dealing with the economic efficiency, both of which affect the 
customers’ monetary decisions. About 71% of EECs agreed/fully agreed with the demand for 
more financial incentives for customers through public funding. The second lowest degree of 
agreement can be explained by respondents’ experience in recent years with improved 
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incentives. The demand for subsidies was partially too low to distribute the complete funds 
while the budget for subsidies has been increased in recent years. Furthermore, a reform with 
integrating tax incentives in the building rehabilitation program has been proposed (Neuhoff et 
al. 2011) yet has failed to be implemented due to political controversies in 2015 (Süddeutsche 
2015). Therefore, it seems unrealistic to implement this measure in the near future. 
Consequently, the discussion about the calculation of the economic efficiency was evaluated as 
least important, with only about 55% agreement. This goes in line with the result of the cost 
estimation of our case study providing hints about the difficulties in calculating the upfront 
costs, which results in a very different perception of economic efficiency (DENA 2012; Henger 
and Voigtländer 2012). 
The section with recommendations is consistent with EECs’ attitudes towards personal and 
contextual factors. While the EECs evaluate the contextual conditions critically, the 
recommendations emphasize the need for institutional changes to conduct energy audits more 
effectively. In particular, the decision process of customers appears central for EECs since new 
arguments and information could influence homeowners to conduct energetic refurbishment 
measures. By contrast, the economic efficiency seems not to positively influence customers to 
conduct retrofit, as stated by the EECs. This could be explained by the difficulties concerning 
energy audits to present liable data on the amortization duration of retrofit measures. 
Nevertheless, homeowners consider the economic efficiency as crucial to estimate the effect of 
the retrofit measures (Galvin and Sunikka-Blank 2013). 
 
7. Conclusion 
Our paper focuses on the contribution of EECs to improving the energy efficiency and diffuse 
innovative technologies in the residential housing sector. We identify personal and contextual 
factors influencing EECs’ performance and explore the role that EECs play in the diffusion of 
innovation during retrofit, conducting a choice analysis based upon a hypothetical energy audit. 
The aim of this analysis is to evaluate the range of selected choices from mainstream to non-
standard measures and their costs.  
Our results identify differences between EECs’ self-evaluation regarding personal and 
contextual factors. On the one hand, the responding EECs mainly answered positively 
concerning the ability to fulfill homeowners’ expectations at an energetic renovation. 
Consequently, the knowledge basis and attitudes towards self-perception are also seen 
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positively. On the other hand, contextual factors were evaluated more critically. Especially the 
payment for energy audits was perceived as problematic by 49% of the respondents. Further 
speaking, EECs’ financial resources are significantly correlated with factors that offer 
competitive advantages for only some EECs, including the administration of subsidies, job 
description, workload and knowledge support from the public sector. The differences in 
perception between Swedish EECs (Mahapatra et al. 2011b) and our surveyed EECs can be 
explained by the different institutional frameworks. The competitive structure in Germany 
creates the positive perception concerning the personal factors since EECs can only operate 
successfully by fulfilling customers’ expectations and adapting to the market conditions. 
In our case study, the respondents suggested applying innovative measures aside from the 
disruptive ones. To evaluate the proposals for energy efficiency measures, the suggested EPC 
level clearly missed the targeted climate goals. Furthermore, the costs of retrofit were 
systematically underestimated in the case of higher EPC standards. A gap between intention to 
implement innovative solutions and to calculate the upfront costs realistically was also revealed 
by the analysis of Scarpa and Willis (2010), focusing on homeowners’ perspective. 
Consequently, the uncertainty of costs in the retrofit could explain the negative self-evaluation 
of the fair compensation. EECs attributed their problems to the contextual factors. 
The Swedish and German frameworks of conducting energy audits seem to have different 
effects on the diffusion of innovation. In the Swedish example, the EECs can recommend 
innovative solutions within the energy efficiency goals set by policy-makers regardless of the 
realization of retrofit measures by customers, while German EECs have to orient towards the 
customers’ needs. 
Since the energy audits still have not led to a substantially higher retrofit rate, we propose three 
policy implications for reforms in the EEC sector. First, policy needs to focus on the 
institutional framework for retrofit since the public sector influences the framework for retrofit 
and particularly innovation. In particular, the subsidy scheme should be changed into targeting 
to save fossil energy, allowing more flexible innovative solutions that could support the role of 
EECs as change agents. Second, the information on costs and the reduction of energy 
consumption needs to be part of an ex-post evaluation. The problem with the payment of EECs 
could be partially solved since the customers could assess the additional benefit from the 
retrofit. The forecasts based upon simulation prognosis could be replaced with real data since 
it has only little value for the concrete energy audit case (Sunikka-Blank and Galvin 2012). The 
monitoring should ideally be executed not by the EECs but rather by a neutral actor - for 
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example, the funding authority - to ensure a reliable comparison of ex-ante and ex-post energy 
consumption from residences. Finally, policy intervention needs to address the entire EEC 
market. In recent years, interventions have prompted some groups to establish a higher level of 
quality in the EEC market. This survey showed that EECs have a homogenous attitude towards 
energy audits, despite the restructuring caused by institutional reforms that required the 
adaptation of EECs to the market conditions. Respondents seem confident about this adaptation. 
One suggestion could be to shift from the subsidy scheme to a carbon tax, which would allow 
more innovative solutions for the customers. Such solutions based upon the aim of reducing the 
use of fossil energy would make the component specific regulations obsolete, while the 
emission reduction would be at the center of the regulation. 
In our explorative analysis, we focus on energy audits exemplified in only one case study. To 
deepen the understanding of EEC’s impact, a comparison of energy audits could offer new 
insights into the planning of energy measures in the retrofit sector. In particular, the question 
of whether EECs offer coherent consulting in terms of the advised technology and the estimated 
costs requires further research. Therefore, a vignette survey with evaluating different cases 
would identify key variables based upon a robust dataset. Furthermore, a similar questionnaire 
could be established as panel survey to show dynamic developments in the EEC sector to 
support policy-makers in improving the energy efficiency in the residential sector. Last but not 
least, the certified EECs represent only a small share of experts in the German retrofit market 
offering energy audits. Therefore, a comparison with other professional EECs and constructing 
companies offering informal EEC services seems necessary to fully understand the impact of 
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Die Energieberatung als der zentrale Akteur bei der energetischen 
Gebäudesanierung? 
 











Die Sanierungsrate bei energetischen Gebäudesanierungen im Wohnsektor ist mit nur einem 
Prozent sehr niedrig und stagniert seit einigen Jahren. Um die Ziele der Bundesregierung in 
Bezug auf die Reduktion des CO2-Ausstoßes, zu erreichen, die einen annähernd klimaneutralen 
Gebäudebestand im Jahr 2050 erfordern, müsste die Sanierungsrate mindestens verdoppelt 
werden. Für dieses Ziel wird die Energieberatung als möglicher zentraler Akteur angesehen, 
indem sie Informationshindernisse für potenzielle Sanierer abbauen kann. In diesem Aufsatz 
wird der Frage nach Chancen und Herausforderungen der Energieberatung im 
Wohngebäudesektor nachgegangen. Hierbei wird untersucht, wer die relevanten Akteure der 
Energieberatung sind und welchen Einfluss der Gesetzgeber auf die Entwicklung der 
Sanierungsrate durch die Energieberatung aktuell nimmt und künftig entwickeln könnte. Die 
Energieberatung kann dabei durch die Vertrauensgutsituation beschrieben werden, in der es für 
(potentielle) Sanierer sowohl ex ante, als auch ex post schwierig ist, die Qualität der erhaltenen 
Beratung zu bewerten. Zwar soll die staatliche Förderung die Informationsbarrieren bei 
energetischen Gebäudesanierungen ausgleichen, trotzdem haben die Programme teilweise mit 
einer schwachen Nachfrage zu kämpfen. Als größte Herausforderungen erweisen sich dabei 
Komplexität und Rentabilität der Energieberatung. Potenziale zur Verbesserung der Wirkung 
von Energieberatern ergeben sich bei der Ausbildung, insbesondere im Bereich der staatlichen 
Zertifizierungen. Die wichtigsten Ansatzpunkte für die Entwicklung einer zukunftsfähigen, 
qualitätsorientierten Energieberatung sind folglich die Verbesserung der staatlichen 
Zertifizierung und eine stärkere Orientierung an Koordinations- und Netzwerkaufgaben. 
Nichtsdestotrotz kann die Förderung der Energieberatung immer nur ein unterstützendes 
Instrument sein, die nicht geeignet ist, allein eine deutliche Erhöhung der energetischen 
Sanierungsrate zu bewirken. 
Schlüsselwörter 
Energetische Gebäudesanierung, Energieberater, Staatliche Zertifizierung, 
Vertrauensgutsituation 
Abstract 
The German government’s goal of turning the German housing sector almost CO2 neutral by 
2050, requires a twofold increase of the current renovation rate of one percent p.a.. Energy 
consultants play a major role in this as a policy instrument for increasing the renovation rate. 
This paper analyses the challenges and opportunities of energy consulting in the housing sector. 
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Based on expert interviews and literature research, we evaluate the role of energy consultants 
in the housing sector. Energy consulting can be described as a credence good situation, as 
potential renovators can rarely evaluate the obtained quality both ex ante and ex post. Since 
there are information barriers, energy consulting is publicly subsidized, yet the programs 
struggle with weak demand. The high degree of complexity and low profitability appear to be 
the biggest challenges for energy consulting. In contrast, the training of energy consultants via 
certificates required for receiving state subsidies can be used to improve the quality of energy 
consulting. These should be the starting points of further development of energy consulting, 
along with an increased awareness of coordination and networking tasks. Overall, state 
certificated energy consultancy remains a key instrument to increase energy efficient 
renovations. . Nevertheless, the promotion of energy consulting can only be a supportive tool 
and needs to be accompanied by other policy instruments.  
Keywords 
credence good situation, energetic renovation, energy consultants, state certificates  
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1. Einleitung  
Bei der Erreichung der Ziele der Bundesregierung zur Reduzierung des CO2-Ausstoßes spielt 
der Gebäudesektor eine entscheidende Rolle, da für rund 40 % des Endenergieverbrauchs in 
Deutschland verantwortlich ist. Der vor der 1. Wärmeschutzverordnung von 1977 errichtete 
Altbaubestand bietet dabei ein großes Sanierungspotenzial, denn rund drei Viertel dieser Häuser 
sind unsaniert und -gedämmt. Diese sanierungsbedürftigen Objekte können eine entscheidende 
Rolle bei der Reduzierung des Endenergieverbrauches spielen. Um im Jahr 2050 einen nahezu 
klimaneutralen Gebäudebestand in der Bundesrepublik zu erreichen, müsste die Sanierungsrate, 
die bislang mit ca. einem Prozent ausgesprochen niedrig ist, auf mindestens zwei Prozent 
gesteigert werden (KfW Research 2011, IW Köln 2012, Adolf und Bräuninger 2012). 
Die regulatorische Einflussnahme auf die Sanierung des Gebäudebestandes ist eine komplexe 
Aufgabe, da die Nachfrage nach Sanierung von Wohngebäuden die Heterogenität im 
Wohngebäudesektor widerspiegelt. Die Bandbreite reicht von Eigenheimnutzern, privaten 
Vermietern, Wohneigentumsgesellschaften bis hin zu gewerblich profit-orientierten bzw. 
genossenschaftlich und öffentlich organisierten Wohnungsunternehmen. Die Nachfrage nach 
energetischen Gebäudesanierungen ist durch kontinuierliche Verschärfungen in der EnEV 
(2004, 2009, 2014) in den Fokus von Immobilieneigentümern geraten, sodass in zweierlei 
Hinsicht ein hoher Informationsbedarf für (potentielle) Sanierer besteht, bei der die  
Energieberatung den zentralen Intermediär darstellt. Erstens ist mit der energetischen 
Gebäudesanierung ein hoher Koordinierungsaufwand verbunden, da bei einer Sanierung die 
unterschiedlichsten Akteure (u.a. Handwerker verschiedener Gewerke, Architekten, Mieter) 
aufeinandertreffen. Zweitens gibt es, bedingt durch technologischen Fortschritt und die 
Möglichkeit, herkömmliche Sanierungsmaßnahmen mit erneuerbaren Energien zu 
kombinieren, eine Vielzahl technischer Lösungen, die selbst bei erfahrenen Fachleuten 
Beratungsbedarf hervorrufen. 
Eine ökonomische Perspektive auf diese Koordinations- und Beratungsfunktion ist es dabei, 
energetische Gebäudesanierungen als Erfahrungsgut bzw. als Vertrauensgut zu interpretierten. 
Das heißt, dass die Qualität der energetischen Sanierung sowohl vor (ex ante), als auch nach 
der Sanierung (ex post) nur mit hohem Informationsaufwand zu bewerten ist, was ein 
Erklärungsansatz für die niedrige Sanierungsrate sein kann. Wenn diese Informationsprobleme 
in Bezug auf energetische Gebäudesanierungen abgebaut werden sollen, kommt der 
Energieberatung als unabhängigem Intermediär zwischen Anbieter und Nachfrager eine 
zentrale Rolle zu. Die niedrige Sanierungsrate könnte folglich erhöht werden, wenn es der 
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Energieberatung gelingt, Unsicherheiten, die während der energetischen 
Sanierungsmaßnahmen auftreten und die zur Entscheidung gegen die Sanierung oder sogar zum 
Abbruch der Sanierungsarbeiten führen können, beseitigen kann. Neben 
Informationskampagnen für die Nutzung von Energieberatung und der direkten finanziellen 
Förderung der Energieberatung stellt die Qualitätssicherung der Förderung durch 
Energieberater eine wichtige Rolle im Förderregime. 
Das Konzept der Energieberatung als neutrale Instanz wurde in der Vergangenheit kontrovers 
diskutiert, wobei deutlich wurde, dass der Energieberaters als „innovationsoffener 
Energieffizienzerhöher“ lediglich ein Idealbild darstellt. Schon aus der Komplexität der Materie 
ergibt sich, dass jeder Energieberater einen eigenen fachlichen Schwerpunkt setzt, wobei die 
Berufsgruppe, aus welcher der Berater stammt, diesen Schwerpunkt entscheidend prägt. Die 
meisten Energieberater kommen dabei (Stand: BAFA-Liste: 31.12.2011) aus dem Handwerk 
(ca. 30 %) bzw. sind Architekten (ca. 30 %) oder (Bau)ingenieure (ca. 40 %) (Deutscher 
Bundestag 2012). 
Die vorliegenden Ergebnisse basieren auf explorativen Experteninterviews23 und 
Literaturauswertungen und zeigen die Rahmenbedingungen für die Energieberatung auf. Die 
Rolle der Energieberatung bei der Erhöhung der Sanierungsrate und aktuelle und künftige 
Herausforderungen für die Gebäudeenergieberatung standen dabei im Zentrum der 
Gespräche.24 
 
2. Energieberatung bei energetischen Gebäudesanierungen – Ausgangslage und 
Charakteristika 
Die Berufsbezeichnung des Energieberaters ist nicht geschützt, sodass sich in Deutschland 
jeder als Energieberater bezeichnen kann. Um jedoch eine Förderung für die Tätigkeit als 
Energieberater zu erhalten, muss man (abgesehen von der BAFA „Vor-Ort-Beratung“) auf einer 
                                                 
23 Es wurden 10 Experteninterviews mit Energieberatern, Finanzintermediären, Unternehmen aus dem 
Baugewerbe, Handwerkskammern, einer kommunalen Energieagentur, Wissenschaftlern und Sachverständigen 
von Haus und Grund e.V. geführt. 
24 Der vorliegende Aufsatz basiert auf den Ergebnissen des Verbundprojektes „iENG – intelligente Energienutzung 
in der Gebäudewirtschaft“ im Rahmen der BMBF-Fördermaßnahme „Umwelt- und gesellschaftsverträgliche 
Transformation des Energiesystems“. Innerhalb des Projektes werden die beteiligten Akteure der energetischen 
Gebäudesanierung und die Bedingungen, unter denen die Akteure handeln, untersucht. Dabei wird der 




von der deutschen Energieagentur geführten Energieeffizienz-Expertenliste stehen. Im Januar 
2015 standen ca. 12.500 Experten auf der Liste.25 
Die Beratungstätigkeit eines Energieberater lässt sich in vier Phasen einteilen: Sie beginnt mit 
der Diagnose und der Analyse des Objekts. Danach kann die Erstellung von Konzepten einen 
Bestandteil der Beratung ausmachen. Es folgen die Initiation der Maßnahmen und die 
Baubegleitung. Schließlich können noch die Erfolgskontrolle und das Management der 
Inbetriebnahme zur Energieberatung gehören (Brunk et al. 2010). Daraus ergibt sich, dass die 
Dienstleistung der Energieberatung sehr stark von der Interaktion zwischen Energieberater und 
Kunden geprägt ist, sodass die Realisation der Energieberatung stark durch die Interessen des 
Kunden definiert und an seinen Bedürfnissen ausgerichtet wird (Frenz et al. 2011). 
 
2.1 Markt der Energieberatung 
Zielgruppe der Energieberatung sind alle potenziellen Sanierer. Dies sind nach dem aktuellen 
Zensus ca. 40 Mio. private Haushalte in über 18 Mio. Wohngebäuden (Statistisches Bundesamt 
2014). In Deutschland wurden nach Schätzung von Prognos et al. (2013) 2011 zwischen 
370.000 und 410.000 Energieberatungen (ausgenommen die Energieberatungen von 
Energieunternehmen) durchgeführt, wobei die Autoren davon ausgehen, dass über die Hälfte 
der Beratungen bei privaten Haushalten durchgeführt wurden, wovon bei Ein-
/Zweifamilienhausbesitzern ca. 60 % direkt vor Ort am Sanierungsobjekt stattfinden. 
Der Markt der Gebäudeenergieberatungen ist ein relativ neuer Markt, der erst seit Anfang der 
90er Jahre in relevanter Größe existiert und einen stetigen Aufschwung mit zahlreichen 
Markteintritten bis 2007 erlebt hat. Seitdem sinkt die Zahl der Anbieter von Energieberatungen 
stetig. Die Autoren der Studie von Prognos et al. (2013) begründen dies mit der Schwierigkeit, 
kostendeckende Energieberatungen anzubieten, da die Nachfrage dafür zu niedrig sei. 
 
2.2 Charakteristika der Energieberatung  
Die Hauptmotivation, einen Energieberater zu Rate zu ziehen ist der Wunsch, die Energiekosten 
zu senken bei fehlenden eigenen Informationen über energetische Gebäudesanierung (Schüle 
                                                 
25 Die Energieeffizienz-Expertenliste ist über https://www.energie-effizienz-experten.de abrufbar. Eingetragen 
werden können Energieberater für 150 Euro Jahresgebühr mit entsprechender Qualifikation. Dieser Eintrag muss 
alle zwei Jahre verlängert werden mit Praxisnachweis und gegebenenfalls besuchten Weiterbildungsmaßnahmen.  
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et al. 2011). Eine sehr niederschwellige Begegnung mit einem Energieberater ergibt sich für 
potentielle Sanierer bei der Erstellung eines Energieausweises. Die Pflicht zur Vorlage eines 
Energieausweises gilt mittlerweile bei Neubau, umfassender energetischer Sanierung sowie 
Verkauf einer Immobilie und kann bei jeder Neuvermietung vom Mieter eingefordert werden. 
Ziel dieser Maßnahme ist es, die energetische Qualität der Gebäude transparenter zu machen 
und möglicherweise Immobilienbesitzer zur energetischen Gebäudesanierung zu motivieren. 
Die Wirtschaftlichkeit von energetischen Gebäudesanierungen ist das Kernthema für die 
Steigerung der Energieeffizienz des Gebäudesektors. An der Amortisationszeit der jeweiligen 
Maßnahmen entscheidet sich, ob Sanierungen als sinnvoll akzeptiert oder als unrentabel 
abgelehnt werden. Vor allem bei Sanierungsmaßnahmen, die in Zeiträumen von über 10 Jahren 
amortisiert werden, nimmt die Neigung potenzieller Sanierer, entsprechende Maßnahmen 
durchzuführen, stark ab. So können sich nach einer Studie vom BMVBS (2007, S. 36) 
beispielsweise nur drei Prozent der Befragten vorstellen, eine Heizungsinvestition 
vorzunehmen, die sich erst nach 12 Jahren amortisiert. Insbesondere in diesem Fall können 
unabhängige Energieberater nicht nur die Amortisationszeiten von Sanierungsmaßnahmen 
offenlegen, sondern auch auf eine sinnvolle Kopplung verschiedener rentabler Maßnahmen 
hinweisen. 
Der Beitrag der Energieberatung zu einer Erhöhung der Sanierungsrate ist bis jetzt in der 
Literatur noch nicht erschöpfend behandelt worden. Ein Ergebnis ist jedoch, dass sich der 
Erfolg von Energieberatung empirisch nur eingeschränkt belegen lässt. Frondel et al. (2008) 
zeigen, dass kein erheblicher Unterschied bei den Energieeinsparungen nach Sanierungen 
festzustellen zwischen Haushalten die Energieberatung nutzen, und solchen, keine 
Energieberatung durchführen. Die Autoren begründen diesen Effekte zum einen mit hohen 
Mitnahmeeffekten – die Anreize Energieberatung in Anspruch zu nehmen, wird nur von 
Haushalten wahrgenommen, die auch ohne Förderung mit Energieberatern zusammenarbeiten 
würden – und Rebound-Effekten. Demnach ändern Haushalte nach Sanierungen ihr Verhalten 
und weisen somit einen höheren Energieverbrauch auf trotz der Nutzung eines Energieberaters. 
Diese Ergebnisse zeigen, dass der Nutzen der Inanspruchnahme der Energieberatung evaluiert 
werden sollte. Dabei sollte insbesondere die Qualität und Effektivität der Energieberatung für 





2.3 Rolle der Energieberatung 
Der Erfolg der Energieberatung bemisst sich hauptsächlich an der realisierten monetären 
Einsparung durch energetische Gebäudesanierung, bei der mit möglichst geringen Investitionen 
hohe Einsparungen erzielt werden sollen. Energieberater können dabei helfen, das finanzielle 
Risiko bei energetischen Sanierungsmaßnahmen abzusenken, wodurch die professionelle 
Beratung und die daraufhin schnellere Amortisation von Investitionen zu einer höheren 
Akzeptanz in der Bevölkerung führen können. Insbesondere in einer aktuellen Situation, in der 
die Erhöhung der Sanierungsmaßnahmen in der Öffentlichkeit unter kritischer Beobachtung 
stehen, haben Intermediäre mit einem hohen Maß an Sachverständnis und Beratungskompetenz 
eine zentrale Rolle für den weiteren Erfolg der energetischen Gebäudesanierung in 
Deutschland. Der Einfluss der Energieberater als Intermediäre ist jedoch insofern begrenzt, als 
die gesamte Nachfrage nach energetischen Gebäudesanierungen nur in geringem Maße durch 
die Energieberater selbst beeinflusst werden kann.  
 
3. Förderrahmen und bisherige Bilanz 
Bei der Betrachtung des Förderrahmens beschränken wir uns auf Förderprogramme der 
Bundesebene, wohlwissend, dass es auf Länder- und kommunaler Ebene ebenfalls zahlreiche 
Programme zur Förderung von Energieberatung gibt. Den größten Bekanntheitsgrad haben 
dennoch die drei unten beschriebenen Förderinstrumente der Bundesregierung erlangt, die zum 
Teil als Impulsgeber und Vorbild für andere Förderprogramme wirken. 
 
3.1 Informationskampagnen durch die Deutsche Energieagentur (DENA) 
Das Interesse an energetischen Gebäudesanierungen, vor allem im privaten Bereich, ist laut 
Stieß et al. (2010) nach wie vor als gering einzuschätzen. Informationskampagnen stellen einen 
Versuch der Bundesregierung dar, die Thematik für einen größeren Adressatenkreis zugänglich 
zu machen. 
Die Förderung der Informationen über Energieeffizienzmaßnahmen bei Wohngebäuden wird 
auf Bundesebene überwiegend durch die DENA gesteuert. Die DENA ist durch die 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland und die KfW zu 76 % in öffentlicher Hand und betrachtet die 
Vernetzung der Akteure der Energiesystemtransformation als ihre zentrale Aufgabe. Durch die 
DENA soll Unabhängigkeit von der öffentlichen Hand signalisiert und sichergestellt werden, 
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dass kontinuierlich und über Wahlperioden hinaus Informationen bereit gestellt werden, die 
nicht durch kurzfristige politische Einflüsse beeinflusst werden. Die DENA geht davon aus, 
dass es vor allem im privaten Bereich mit Schwerpunkt bei Ein- und Zweifamilienhausbesitzern 
einen erhöhten Informationsbedarf gibt; entsprechend ist ihr Ziel, die Informationsasymmetrien 
durch die breite Verteilung von Information an Haushalte abzubauen. Hierfür werden besonders 
Energieberater als Intermediäre in das Zentrum der Bemühungen der diversen 
Informationskampagnen gerückt. Durch sie soll die Nachfrage nach energetischen 
Sanierungsmaßnahmen erhöht werden.  
Aktuell koordiniert die DENA das Projekt „Die Hauswende“, bei dem in einer 
gewerkeübergreifenden Kampagne ca. 100 Informationsveranstaltungen in verschiedenen 
Städten mit parallel laufenden Anzeigenkampagnen abgehalten werden. Informationen werden 
angeboten, die für das Thema der energetischen Gebäudesanierungen sensibilisieren und auf 
Energieberater verweisen sollen, die unsichere Sanierer unterstützen können. Die Förderung 
solcher Informationskampagnen kann dazu beitragen, dass die Möglichkeit, Energieberater in 
Anspruch zu nehmen, einem größeren Adressatenkreis bekannt wird. Allerdings existieren 
ähnliche Informationskampagnen seit der 1. Wärmeschutzverordnung und scheinen – einzeln 
betrachtet – kein hinreichendes Mittel zur nachhaltigen Erhöhung der Sanierungsquoten zu 
sein, insbesondere bedingt durch die hohe Komplexität des Themas der energetischen 
Gebäudesanierungen. 
 
3.2 BAFA Vor-Ort-Förderung  
Von der Bundesebene ausgehend, wird Energieberatung für Wohnhäuser durch die BAFA 
„Vor-Ort-Beratung“ gefördert. Die Vor-Ort-Beratung wird von zertifizierten Energieberatern 
durchgeführt, die bei der BAFA registriert sein müssen und größtenteils auf der 
Energieeffizienz-Expertenliste der DENA zu finden sind. Gefördert werden bis zu 60 % der 
Förderkosten mit max. 800 Euro bei Ein- und Zweifamilienhäusern und max. 1.100 Euro bei 
Wohnhäusern mit mindestens drei Wohneinheiten. Bei der Erstellung eines 
Sanierungskonzeptes durch einen Energieberater haben die Eigentümer die Auswahl zwischen 
einem Plan für eine Komplettsanierung zum KfW-Effizienzhaus mit zusammenhängend 
durchgeführten Sanierungsmaßnahmen, und einem „Sanierungsfahrplan“ mit empfohlenen 





Quelle: eigene Darstellung, nach BAFA (2015) 
Abbildung 1 
Abbildung 1 zeigt, dass die Anzahl der Anträge für die BAFA „Vor-Ort-Beratung“ nach einem 
kontinuierlichen Anstieg bis 2009 bis 2014 einen drastischen Rückgang erlebt haben. Gründe 
hierfür sind etwa der erhebliche administrativen Aufwand, wegen dem nur 9 % der zertifizierten 
BAFA Energieberater die Förderung in Anspruch nehmen. Zudem wurde kritisiert, dass 
Handwerker und Verbraucherzentralen günstiger beraten, Beratungen kaum oder nicht 
kostendeckend vergütet werden und die Vorgaben für die Berichte, auf Grundlage derer die 
Förderung ausgezahlt wird, zu starr sind (Großmann 2014). Diese Kritik führte zu einer Reform 
der Förderrichtlinie mit einer Erhöhung der Förderhöhe und der Vereinfachung des 
Berichtwesens zum 01. März 2015. Es bleibt abzuwarten, ob der Trend der abnehmenden 
Inanspruchnahme der Vor-Ort-Beratung dadurch umgekehrt werden kann. 
 
3.3 KfW-Förderung 
Für die finanzielle Unterstützung energetischer Sanierungsmaßnahmen ist das 
„Energieeffizient Sanieren“-Programm der KfW relevant. Zuschüsse und Darlehen werden nur 
ausgezahlt, wenn ein KfW-zertifizierter Energieberater, der auf der Energieeffizienz-
Expertenliste stehen muss, die Maßnahme geplant und formell geprüft hat. Zusätzlich ist es 
möglich, einen Zuschuss für einen Energieberater als Baubegleiter zu erhalten, wobei 50 % der 

























Mindeststandard bei den von der KfW geförderten und sanierten Wohnobjekten sicherstellen. 
Zudem kann die BAFA „Vor-Ort-Beratung“ in Kombination mit der KfW-Förderung in 
Anspruch genommen werden, um so die Qualität der energetischen Sanierung über den 
vollständigen Zeitraum der Planung und Durchführung hinaus sicherzustellen. Abgesehen von 
den geförderten Einzelmaßnahmen wird bei allen anderen Förderprodukten die wirtschaftliche 
Unabhängigkeit der Energieberatung gefordert. Die Energieberater dürfen also nicht 
unmittelbar finanziell von der Ausführung der vorgeschlagenen und später geprüften 
Maßnahmen profitieren. Ausnahme hierbei bilden die, von der KfW geförderten, 
Einzelmaßnahmen. 
2012 wurden fast 88.000 Förderzusagen für mehr als 242.000 Wohneinheiten erteilt, wobei die 
Anforderungen der EnEV 2009 teilweise deutlich übererfüllt wurden. In 84 % der 
Förderzusagen bzw. bei 78 % der Wohneinheiten handelte es sich um Einzelmaßnahmen und 
nur in 16 % der Förderzusagen bzw. 22 % der geförderten Wohneinheiten wurden zum 
Effizienzhaus vollsaniert (IWU und Fraunhofer IFAM 2014). Laut IWU und Fraunhofer IFAM 
(2014) ist zu erwarten, dass für 2013 durch das „Effizient Sanieren“-Programm der KfW 4,75 
t CO2 eingespart werden. 
Das KfW „Energieeffizient Sanieren“-Programm ist somit eines der wichtigsten 
Förderprogramme für energetische Gebäudesanierung in Deutschland, mit großer Relevanz für 
die Energieberatung. Allerdings hat die Bedeutung der Energieberatung durch die Abschaffung 
der wirtschaftlichen Unabhängigkeit der Energieberater bei Einzelmaßnahmen 2014 
abgenommen. Es ist nun möglich die Prüfung als Energieberater bei gleichzeitiger Ausführung 
von KfW-geförderten Einzelmaßnahmen durchzuführen (NDR 2014). Dies hat entscheidende 
Auswirkungen auf die Energieberatung, weil der größte Teil der Fördermaßnahmen als 
Einzelmaßnahmen gefördert wird. Die Neutralität der Energieberater wurde dadurch reduziert. 
 
3.4 Bewertung des Förderrahmens 
Die Förderung der Energieberatung im Gebäudesektor ist von zentraler Bedeutung für den 
Erfolg bei der Steigerung der Sanierungsrate. Wie oben dargelegt setzt die Bundesregierung 
dabei auf dreierlei Instrumente: Information, direkte Förderung, sowie Energieberatung zur 
Qualitätssicherung der geförderten Maßnahmen. Die Annahme, dass ein Großteil der 
Wohneigentümer unzureichend informiert sind und Energieberater als Intermediäre die 
Komplexität für Nachfrager reduzieren können, ist das Motiv der Bundesregierung, die Anreize 
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für die Inanspruchnahme der Energieberatung zu steigern. Dabei kommt der öffentlichen 
Förderung eine erhebliche Rolle zu, denn rund ein Drittel der stattfindenden Energieberatungen 
wird staatlich gefördert (Prognos et al. 2013). 
Aus Perspektive der Förderer soll die Energieberatung einen entscheidenden Beitrag zur 
Erhöhung der Sanierungsrate bei energetischen Gebäudesanierungen leisten. Die Komplexität 
der Thematik und die Vielzahl der betroffenen Akteure machen dabei Intermediären nötig, die 
relevante Informationen bereitstellen und beratend zur Verfügung stehen. Die niedrige 
Sanierungsrate zeigt gleichzeitig an, dass die Förderung weiterhin notwendig bleibt, obwohl 
durchaus im qualitativen Bereich Erfolge erzielt wurden - so steigt etwa die Zahl der 
Förderungen für die Sanierung zu den energetisch anspruchsvollen Effizienzhäusern an. 
Allerdings konnte bislang keine signifikante Steigerung der Sanierungsrate insgesamt bewirkt 
werden. Das kontrafaktische Szenario ohne jede staatliche Förderung lässt eine noch niedrigere 
Sanierungsrate erwarten, da rund ein Drittel der stattfindenden energetischen Sanierungen im 
Wohngebäudebereich mit öffentlichen Mitteln unterstützt wird (IWU und Fraunhofer IFAM 
2014). Insofern erscheint der aktuelle Förderrahmen nötig, wenn auch nicht ausreichend, um 
die Ziele der Bundesregierung zu erreichen.  
 
4. Chancen und Herausforderungen für die Energieberatung 
Energieberater als Intermediäre sollen Unsicherheiten im Prozess der energetischen 
Gebäudesanierungen abmildern. Auch wenn aktuell die BAFA „Vor-Ort-Beratung“ modifiziert 
wird und die daraus folgenden Effekte für die Energieberatung noch nicht absehbar sind, lassen 
sich zukünftige Herausforderungen, aber auch Chancen für Energieberatung identifizieren. Im 
Folgenden werden die Ergebnisse von Interviews mit Experten aus dem Energieberatersektor 
diskutiert. 
 
4.1 Komplexität der Energieberatung 
Die Energieberatung bei energetischen Sanierungen greift in einen komplexen Prozess ein. Die 
Qualität der Beratung hängt neben der Kompetenz des Beratenden stark vom Verhalten der 
Kunden und dem Sanierungsobjekt ab. 
Die Übersetzungsfunktion für Energieberatung erfordert einen „Spagat“ in der Kommunikation 
zwischen Reduktion der Komplexität und Detailtreue bei der Planung und Umsetzung der 
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Sanierung. Vor allem wenn sich im Nachhinein zeigt, dass die gewünschten Erfolge nicht 
erzielt wurden, kann sich eine zu starke Vereinfachung der komplexen Zusammenhänge, die 
bei einer Sanierung wirksam werden, negativ bemerkbar machen. Um die Kommunikation 
zwischen den Akteuren erfolgreich zu gewährleisten und so die relevanten energetischen 
Wirkungsketten verständlich zu machen, ist entsprechend ein hohes Maß an Fachkompetenz 
nötig. Für die Akzeptanz und den Erfolg der Energieberatung ist es daher unabdingbar, dass die 
Komplexität der Materie durch Energieberater treffend „übersetzt“ wird. Hierbei liegt der 
Fokus nicht alleine auf dem notwendigen technischen Sachverstand. Gleichzeitig ist eine 
genaue Kenntnis der rechtlichen Rahmenbedingungen, insbesondere der häufig geänderten 
EnEV und die Kenntnis über die jeweils aktuelle Förderlandschaft und -möglichkeiten die 
Grundlage für eine erfolgreiche Energieberatung. Schließlich sollten auch die 
Verhaltensweisen der Bewohner des Sanierungsobjektes bei der Energieberatung 
berücksichtigt werden und in die Planung der Maßnahmen einfließen, was ebenfalls ein hohes 
Maß an Fachkompetenz und Kommunikationsfähigkeit erfordert. 
 
4.2 Rentabilität 
Auf Nachfragerseite wird Energieberatung als zusätzlicher Kostenfaktor gesehen. 
Verdeutlichen lässt sich dies durch die geringe Zahlungsbereitschaft der Kunden, die einen 
hohen Preisdruck bei Energieberatern erzeugt. 2011 gaben bei einer Umfrage der 
Fachzeitschrift „Gebäudeenergieberater“ mit 436 Energieberatern 57 % an, dass es für sie nicht 
möglich sei, kostendeckend Energieberatungen anzubieten (Prognos et al. 2013, S. 43). Nur die 
Minderheit der Unternehmen ist ausschließlich auf Energieberatung konzentriert. Die Mehrheit 
bietet Energieberatung nur zusätzlich zu anderen Dienstleistungen an, denn nur 10 % der 
Unternehmen, die Energieberatung anbieten, erzielen mit dieser mehr als 90 % ihres Umsatzes 
(Prognos et al. 2013, S. 44). Den Preisdruck beeinflusst ebenfalls die staatliche Konkurrenz 
durch die sehr günstige oder kostenfreie öffentlich finanzierte Energieberatung, die vor allem 
bei Initiativberatungen häufig genutzt wird (Dunkelberg und Stieß 2011, S. 16). 
Langfristig gesehen sollte es möglich werden, kostendeckende Energieberatungen anzubieten 
und am Markt durchzusetzen, da sonst professionelle Energieberatungen nur durch öffentliche 
Finanzierung überlebensfähig sein werden oder aber allein die Erwartung ertragsreicher 
Folgeaufträge die Motivation für Energieberatungen bleiben. Die aktuelle Form des 
Preiswettbewerbs zeigt auch, dass es teilweise Energieberatern nicht gelingt, den Kunden eine 
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potentiell höhere Qualität ihres Produkts zu signalisieren. Durch diese Marktintransparenz 
lassen sich häufig keine höheren Preise für höhere Qualität der Energieberatung durchsetzen, 
sodass kein Wettbewerb um höhere Qualität erreicht wird. 
 
4.3 Energieberater als Förderer 
Das Berufsbild des Energieberaters ist relativ jung und existiert erst seit Anfang der 90er Jahre 
in relevanter Größe. Daher setzt sich die Branche aus den unterschiedlichsten beruflichen 
Hintergründen zusammen, wie z.B. Architekten, Bauingenieure und Fachhandwerker. Die 
Ursprungsidee der Förderung von Energieberatern als zentralem Akteur bei der energetischen 
Gebäudesanierung, war es, einen Berufszweig aufzubauen, der eigenständig am Markt 
überleben kann, was sich nur unzureichend erfüllt hat. Nach Berechnungen von Prognos et al. 
(2013) werden fast 40 % der Energieberatungen öffentlich gefördert. Dies führt zu einer 
deutlich negativen Wahrnehmung in fachlichen Kreisen, da sie häufig nur als Mittel zur 
Erlangung von Fördermitteln und nicht als einflussreiche Berater bei der Umsetzung von 
Sanierungsmaßnahmen angesehen werden. 
Vor allem im gewerblichen Bereich werden die Energieberater häufig nur als „Mittel zum 
Zweck“ wahrgenommen, um öffentliche Fördermittel zu erhalten. Dabei wird die 
Energieberatung nicht tatsächlich zur Unterstützung der eigentlichen Sanierung in Anspruch 
genommen. Auch wenn bei professionellen Vermietern (Wohnungsbaugesellschaften, 
Baugenossenschaften etc.) angenommen werden kann, dass ein höheres Maß an Wissen über 
energetische Sanierungen existiert, weil durch ein größeren Gebäudebestand die Frage nach der 
Notwendigkeit von energetischen Sanierungen häufiger aufkommt, könnten hierdurch 
Chancen, durch den Energieberater über technische Alternativen informiert zu werden, verloren 
gehen. Ähnliche Bewertungen des Energieberaters lassen sich auch im privaten Bereich finden, 
wo die Beobachtung gemacht wird, dass der Anreiz Energieberatung in Anspruch zu nehmen, 
zu einem nicht unerheblichen Teil motiviert ist, staatliche Förderung zu erhalten. 
Für eine positive Zukunftsperspektive muss es der Energieberatung gelingen, den Nutzen einer 
Energieberatung umfassender darzustellen. Es sollte der Fokus auf die höhere Qualität der 
Sanierung gelegt werden anstelle der reinen Erlangung von Fördermitteln. Dieser Zustand ist 
zurzeit offensichtlich nicht erreicht, da der Energieberater nur eine inhaltlich begrenzte 




4.4 Ausbildung der Energieberater 
Der Begriff des Energieberaters ist nicht geschützt und kann somit in Deutschland von jeder 
Person ohne besondere Prüfung getragen werden. Stiftung Warentest hat bei der Überprüfung 
von Energieberatern durchschnittlich sieben von neun mit „mangelhaft“ bewertet, weil sie keine 
seriöse Energieberatung angeboten und nur ungenügende energetische Konzepte erstellen 
konnten(Stiftung Warentest 2012). Dieses Ergebnis zeigt einen deutlichen Mangel im 
Ausbildungsstand der Energieberater auf.  
Die bekannteste Weiterbildung ist die zum „Gebäudeenergieberater im Handwerk“, die von den 
Handwerkskammern angeboten wird. Der Weiterbildungsgang umfasst meistens 240 Stunden 
und steht Handwerksmeistern bzw. vergleichbar Qualifizierten aus dem Bau- und 
Ausbaugewerbe, sowie Ingenieuren und Architekten offen. Die Gebäudeenergieberater sind 
nach bestandener Ausbildung berechtigt, die BAFA „Vor-Ort-Beratung“ durchzuführen. Für 
die Zulassung zur eigenen Zertifizierung im Rahmen der anderen KfW-Programme müssen 
zusätzliche Weiterbildungskurse absolviert werden. 
Die Bundesregierung versucht über Setzung der Standards ihrer Förderprogramme 
Qualitätsstandards für Energieberater zu etablieren, um das Image der Energieberatung vor 
allem im privaten Bereich zu verbessern. So werden die Anforderungen an die Energieberatung 
im Rahmen der BAFA „Vor-Ort-Beratung“ und der KfW-Förderprogramme in den letzten 
Jahren anspruchsvoller gestaltet. Eine höhere Transparenz in der Ausbildung der Energieberater 
soll über die „Energieeffizienz-Expertenliste“ der DENA erreicht werden. Der Eintrag auf der 
Liste muss durch einen Nachweis von Fortbildungen und durchgeführten Praxisbeispielen alle 
zwei Jahre erneuert werden. Bei den professionellen Energieberatern wird das Verfahren als 
schwer verständlich wahrgenommen (GEB 2014). Laut Nationalem Aktionsplan 
Energieeffizienz (NAPE) der Bundesregierung, in dem u.a. auch energetische 
Gebäudesanierungen diskutiert werden, sollen daher die Qualitätsstandards weiter 
systematisiert und detailliertere Kriterien für einzelne Maßnahmen definiert werden (BMWi 
2014, S. 2). 
Die öffentliche Wahrnehmung der Energieberater wird insbesondere durch die Heterogenität 
ihrer beruflichen Hintergründe beeinträchtigt. Die ungeschützte Berufsbezeichnung führt zu 
Verwirrungen, da nicht zu erkennen ist, welche Ausbildung der jeweilige Energieberater 
besitzt. Dieses hohe Maß an Intransparenz auf dem Markt der Energieberater macht es 
schwerer, den Energieberater als Qualitätsmarke zu etablieren. Eine verbesserte und 
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vereinheitlichte Ausbildung kann somit eine entscheidende Stellschraube für eine höhere 
Akzeptanz von Energieberatung darstellen. 
 
4.5 BAFA Vor-Ort-Beratung und KfW-Zertifizierung als Qualitätskennzeichen 
Die Berechtigung eines Energieberaters, BAFA „Vor-Ort-Beratungen“ durchzuführen bzw. 
KfW-Produkte zu prüfen oder als Baubegleiter zu fungieren, garantiert nicht nur ein 
Mindestmaß an Qualität der Energieberatung, sondern wird auch als staatlich anerkannte Marke 
wahrgenommen. Nach eigener Auskunft wird das Zertifikat des BAFA-Beraters überwiegend 
als Marketing- und Qualitätslabel von den Energieberatern genutzt (Großmann 2014). Im 
Gebäudesektor sind staatliche Qualitätslabel und deren Nutzung wichtig und vereinfachen die 
Vermarktung von Sanierungsobjekten und die Finanzierung von energetischen 
Gebäudesanierungen. 
Mittlerweile hat sich das KfW-Effizienzhaus mit den entsprechenden Effizienzklassen als 
Marke auf dem Immobilienmarkt etabliert und Effizienzhäuser weisen höhere Absatzzahlen auf 
als vergleichbare Häuser ohne KfW-Siegel. Der gleich Effekt durch staatliche Label wird bei 
der Finanzierung erreicht: Häuser, die durch Energieberater einen Effizienzstandard bestätigt 
bekommen haben, profitieren bei der Finanzierung der Sanierung, da die Zertifizierung von 
Banken als positives Signal in Bezug auf das Qualitätsniveau wahrgenommen wird. Laut der 
befragten Experten aus dem Finanzbereich werden teilweise bessere Kreditkonditionen 
angeboten,26 da die Werterhaltung bzw. -steigerung der Sanierungsobjekte durch die Label 
sichergestellt ist. Umgekehrt werden von Bankenseite Energieberater weiterempfohlen, die 
BAFA- und KfW-zertifiziert sind.  
Die Bedeutung der staatlichen Förderung als Qualitätslabel führt dazu, dass der Staat die 
Qualität der Energieberatung durch die Erhöhung der Anforderungen an die BAFA „Vor-Ort-
Beratung“ und die Zertifizierung der KfW-Effizienzhäuser steigern kann. Dass dies nur 
eingeschränkt funktioniert, zeigt die Einführung des „KfW-Effizienzhaus Denkmals“. 
Energieberater müssen spezielle weitergehende Schulungen durchführen, um dieses Programm 
zertifizieren zu können. Da dieses Programm erst im Jahre 2010 eingeführt wurde und nur 916 
Personen bundesweit nach Energieeffizienz-Expertenliste (Stand: 22.01.2015) berechtigt sind, 
den Nachweis dafür zu erbringen, gibt es in gewissen Regionen keinen einzigen Energieberater, 
der die entsprechende Berechtigung besitzt. Es scheint hierbei ein, aus heutiger Perspektive, zu 
                                                 
26 Deffner et al. (2012) verweisen auf die Effekte solch einer Markenbildung im Baubereich hin. 
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hoher Standard gesetzt worden zu sein, dass das „KfW-Effizienzhaus Denkmal“ für 
Energieberater als nicht lohnenswert genug erscheint, um die notwendigen Fortbildungen 
hierfür zu besuchen.  
 
4.6 Die Koordination unterschiedlicher Akteure 
Die Energieberatung muss sich mit den an der energetischen Gebäudesanierung beteiligten 
Akteuren auseinandersetzen. Dabei müssen stets die Partikularinteressen von mehrerer 
Akteursgruppen berücksichtigt werden. Fast jede der beteiligten Akteursgruppe bietet ihre 
eigene Energieberatung an, um Sanierungsmaßnahmen, die für die jeweilige Bezugsgruppe 
interessante Lösungen in den Fokus potentieller Sanierer zu rücken. So ist die Energieberatung 
auch in den Verbänden der Akteure organisiert, die Energieberatung für Eigennutzer und 
privaten Vermieter etwa durch Haus und Grund e.V.. 
Bei einer energetischen Gebäudesanierung treffen u.a. die Eigeninteressen der Eigentümer, 
Mieter, Planer, Handwerker und technische Gebäudeausrüster aufeinander. Die 
Energieberatung soll im Zusammenwirken mit dem jeweiligen Eigentümer diese 
Eigeninteressen beachten und in technischer und wirtschaftlicher Hinsicht aufeinander 
abzustimmen. Die Rolle der Hausbewohner und ihr Einfluss auf den Erfolg der Sanierung muss 
bei der Energieberatung einkalkuliert werden, da nicht alle technisch machbaren Lösungen mit 
jedem Mieter zum Erfolg führen. So muss die Auswahl der technologischen Umsetzung der 
Sanierung sich auch nach dem Verhalten der Bewohner richten, wie etwa die korrekte 
Ausführung bestimmter Lüftungsanforderungen nicht von jedem Bewohner erwartet werden 
kann. Fehlverhalten kann hierbei z.B. zu Schimmelbildung führen, was zu einer mittelfristigen 
Wertminderung des sanierten Objektes führen kann. 
Von Bedeutung für erfolgreichen Verlauf von Sanierungen ist zudem die Verfügbarkeit von 
Firmen, welche die gewünschte Qualität der Sanierung gewährleisten können. Die 
Energieberatung sollte daher mit dem entsprechenden Netzwerk dafür sorgen, dass zuverlässige 
Partner bei der energetischen Sanierung ausgewählt werden. Diese Koordinationsfunktion wird 
erfolgreich erfüllt, wenn die Berater Beziehungsgeflechte zwischen den verschiedenen 
Akteuren verstehen und einen Ausgleich der jeweiligen Interessen erreichen. 
Bei der Akquise, zumeist von öffentlicher Energieberatung ist zu beobachten, dass überwiegend 
Eigennutzer als potenzielle Kunden angesprochen werden. Die Interessenslagen der restlichen 
Eigentümergruppen erscheinen im Vergleich zu den Eigennutzern als zu komplex, da das 
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„Vermieter-Mieter-Dilemma“ bei der Energieberatung von Eigentümern, die das 
Sanierungsobjekt nicht selber nutzen, oftmals eine zentrale Rolle spielt. Zwar sollte das Resultat 
der Sanierung die Minderung des Energieverbrauches und somit die Reduzierung der Ausgaben 
für Energie sein, jedoch profitiert hiervon nur der Mieter. Der Vermieter kann über die 
Modernisierungsumlage 11 % nach § 559 ff. BGB seiner Ausgaben auf die Miete umlegen.27 
Ob somit Kosten der Sanierung auf den Mieter umgelegt werden können, entscheidet weniger 
die Höhe der Sanierungsausgaben, als vielmehr in welcher Höhe auf dem spezifischen 
Wohnungsmarkt Mietsteigerung realisiert werden können. 
Die wirtschaftliche Unabhängigkeit als Garant für Neutralität wird in allen 
Bundesprogrammen, außer den KfW-Einzelmaßnahmen, gefordert. Wirtschaftliche 
Unabhängigkeit bedeutet dabei, dass der Energieberater nicht an den Ausführungen selbst, 
sowie der Planung und Baubegleitung der Vorhaben beteiligt sein dürfen. Der „neutrale“ 
Energieberater stellt somit ein zentrales Qualitätsmerkmal für eine gute Beratung dar. Da 
jedoch im heterogenen Umfeld der Energieberater jede Beratung durch die Perspektive des 
jeweiligen Akteurs geprägt ist, ist es schwer eine wirklich unabhängige Energieberatung 
auszumachen. So profitieren z.B. selbst bei formeller wirtschaftlicher Unabhängigkeit 
Energieberater von der Höhe der Planungssumme. Die Spannung zwischen der Idealvorstellung 
von einem neutralen, technologieoffenen Energieberater und der Realität führt zu einer 
negativen medialen Außenwahrnehmung.  
Die Energieberatung als Vertrauensgut hat insgesamt einen schweren Stand im Umfeld der 
energetischen Gebäudesanierung. Das hängt damit zusammen, dass das Qualitätsniveau der 
Energieberatung sowohl im Vorfeld schwer feststellbar ist, als auch im Nachhinein der Anteil 
der Beratung an der eigentlichen Sanierung unzureichend zu rekonstruieren ist. Sobald die 
eigene Unsicherheit der Beratung auf die Akteure der energetischen Gebäudesanierung trifft, 
entsteht daher ein hohes Streitpotential. Energieberater reagieren auf die Vertrauensgutsituation 
und ihrer inhärenten Unsicherheiten oftmals mit brancheninterne Schuldzuweisungen. Die 
heterogenen beruflichen Hintergründe werden als ursächlich für Qualitätsprobleme bei 
Energieberatern gesehen. Dabei wurden in den Experteninterviews immer wieder auf folgende 
Stereotypen verwiesen: Architekten legen den Schwerpunkt auf die Gestaltung der 
Sanierungsobjekte, während bei den Bauingenieuren technische Lösungen im Mittelpunkt 
stehen und bei den Handwerkern die Expertise bei Fragen der Ausführung im Vordergrund der 
                                                 




Beratung steht. Hierbei bleibt freilich außer Acht, dass jede dieser Berufsgruppen sich an 
unterschiedliche Bedürfnisse der Nachfrager richtet und die verschiedenen 
Schwerpunktsetzungen somit durchaus eine Berechtigung in der Energieberatung für 
unterschiedliche Sanierungsmaßnahmen haben. 
Die Beteiligung von Akteuren mit unterschiedlichen Interessen bei energetischer 
Gebäudesanierung und die Tatsache, dass Energieberater verschiedene  Ausbildungen genossen 
haben, werden sich kurz- bis mittelfristig nicht ändern lassen. Umso wichtiger ist es, sich bei 
der Erstellung neuer Ansätze für verbesserte Energieberatung möglicher Konfliktpotentiale 
bewusst zu sein. 
 
4.7 Zusammenfassung: Treibende und hemmende Einflussfaktoren in der Energieberatung 
In Tabelle 1 werden die oben diskutierten Aspekte zusammengefasst. Die Einflussfaktoren 
werden danach bewertet, wie sich die einzelnen Komponenten auf die Sanierungsrate 
auswirken. Bei (+) kann von einem positiven und bei (-) von einem negativen Einfluss 
ausgegangen werden. Die mit (+) und (-) markierten Faktoren lassen es nicht zu, einen 
eindeutigen Effekt auf die Sanierungsrate zuzuordnen bzw. sie vereinen gleichermaßen 
treibende und hemmende Teilaspekte. 
Tabelle 1. Einflussfaktoren und Wirkung auf die Sanierungsrate 
 
Die hier aufgeführten Einflussfaktoren werden insgesamt erheblich durch die konkrete 
Ausgestaltung der Energieberatung durch die staatliche Rahmensetzung und Förderung 
beeinflusst. Somit ist es durchaus denkbar, dass sich künftig Chancen in Herausforderungen 
wandeln. Externe Faktoren wie die Änderung der EnEV können hierbei große Auswirkungen 
auf das Gesamtumfeld der Regulierung haben. 
 
Einflussfaktoren Wirkung auf Sanierungsrate 
Energieberater als Förderer (+) 
Komplexität der Energieberatung (-)  
Rentabilität der Energieberatung (-) 
Ausbildung der Energieberater (+) & (-) 
Staatliches Label der Energieberatung (+) 
Interessenskonflikte bei energetischen Gebäudesanierungen (-) 
Energieberatung als Vertrauensgut (+) & (-) 
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5. Ansätze für eine bessere Energieberatung bei energetischer Gebäudesanierung 
Die folgenden Ansätze werden unter Berücksichtigung der Umsetzungswahrscheinlichkeit und 
ihrer Auswirkungen auf die Sanierungsrate diskutiert. Die Weiterentwicklung der staatlich 
zertifizierten BAFA- und KfW-Energieberater zu höheren Qualitätsstandards wird dabei 
vorausgesetzt. 
 
5.1 Wertschätzung der Energieberatung 
Der Erfolg der Energieberater jenseits der öffentlichen Förderung hängt vom in der 
Öffentlichkeit wahrgenommenen Nutzen der Energieberatung ab. Solange Energieberater nur 
zum Zweck der Erhaltung der Förderung oder als kostenfreies Zusatzangebot eingesetzt 
werden, bleibt der Einfluss durch Energieberater auf die Sanierungsrate marginal. Eine 
konkrete Handlungsempfehlung jenseits moralischer Appelle, die nur einen geringen, zeitlich 
begrenzten Einfluss haben, lässt sich aus heutiger Perspektive nicht geben. Nichts desto trotz 
ist die Basis einer guten Energieberatung, dass die Nutzung der Energieberatung bei 
energetischen Sanierungen einen zusätzlichen positiven Effekt hat. 
 
5.2 Vereinheitlichung der Ausbildung? 
Für die Zukunftsperspektiven der Energieberatung sind der Zugang zum Beruf des 
Energieberaters und die inhaltliche Ausrichtung der Ausbildung von maßgeblicher Bedeutung. 
Langfristig entscheidet sich an der Frage, welche Kompetenzen Energieberater haben sollten, 
ob die Energieberatung insgesamt in die Lage versetzt wird, substantiell Einfluss auf die 
Sanierungstiefe und Sanierungshäufigkeit im Wohngebäudesektor zu erreichen.  
In den Expertengesprächen wurde die Forderung geäußert, dass die Ausbildung des 
Energieberaters vereinheitlicht werden solle. Dies könnte den Effekt haben, dass jeder 
Energieberater am Ende der Ausbildung, unabhängig vom beruflichen Werdegang, annähernd 
die gleiche Qualität der Energieberatung anbieten könnte. 
Hierzu wäre die Einrichtung interdisziplinärer Studiengänge sinnvoll, die wesentliche 
Kompetenzen aus Architektur und Bauingenieurwesen und das Fachwissen aus den 
entsprechenden Gewerken vermitteln. Somit könnte Energieberater als Studienberuf qualifiziert 
werden. Einen ersten Versuch, einen solchen Studiengang zu etablieren, gibt es an der FH 
Rosenheim mit dem Studiengang Energie- und Gebäudetechnologie, welcher der 
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Studienrichtung Gebäudehülle zugeordnet ist. Ob auf diesem Weg die Energieberatung eine 
höhere Akzeptanz erfahren wird, bleibt noch offen. Allerdings ist an dieser Stelle darauf 
hinzuweisen, dass sich weiterhin die Frage nach der Rentabilität des Berufsbildes des 
Energieberaters stellt. Nach dem Evaluationsbericht von Prognos et al. (2013) hat die 
Attraktivität des Beruf des Energieberaters im Gebäudesektor stark nachgelassen, sodass es 
fraglich ist, ob es momentan für zusätzliche Studiengänge Interessenten gäbe.  
Zudem würde de facto ein Hochschulstudium als Zugangsvoraussetzung das Handwerk vom 
Beruf des Energieberaters ausschließen. Schon heutzutage führen die sich immer weiter 
verschärfenden Anforderungen für Energieberater dazu, dass die Bereitschaft der Handwerker, 
sich als Gebäudeenergieberater weiterzubilden, nachlässt, obwohl Bestandteile der 
Energieberatung ursprünglich genau für diese mittlere Qualifikationsebene konzipiert wurden 
(Heinen et al. 2010). Letztendlich muss für die Weiterentwicklung der Energieberatung 
entschieden werden, ob die Perspektivvielfalt beibehalten werden soll oder ob eine 
Akademisierung zu favorisieren ist, da sie förderlich für die Akzeptanz der Energieberatung ist. 
Von der Bundesregierung wird in dieser Frage momentan eine Zwischenlösung präferiert. Die 
Qualitätsanforderungen an die Energieberater, die an der BAFA- und KfW-Förderung 
partizipieren wollen, werden kontinuierlich erhöht, allerdings bleibt der Zugang weiterhin für 
alle oben genannte Berufsgruppen offen. Ziel ist es dabei, ein bestimmtes Minimum an 
Ausbildungsinhalten von öffentlich geförderten Energieberatern zu garantieren. 
Die Orientierung an den öffentlichen Anforderungen erscheint zurzeit als die effektivste 
Stellschraube, um die Qualität der Energieberatung zu erhöhen. Das zeigt sich auch daran, dass 
die Berechtigung, BAFA „Vor-Ort-Beratung“ und KfW-zertifizierte Energieberatung 
anzubieten, weithin als Qualitätsmerkmal wahrgenommen wird. 
Die Technologieoffenheit der Energieberatung sollte stärker als bislang ein zentraler 
Gegenstand der Ausbildung werden, um so die fachliche Unabhängigkeit der Energieberater zu 
garantieren, da diese eine zentrale Anforderung für eine größere Wirksamkeit der 
Energieberatung ist. Unsicherheit bei der Auswahl der besten Technologie für das 
Sanierungsobjekt ist ein zentraler Einflussfaktor der Energieberatung für alle potentiellen 
Sanierer – vom Eigenheimnutzer bis zum gewerblichen Vermieter. Zwar kann vollständige 
Technologieoffenheit aufgrund der unterschiedlichen Perspektiven der Energieberater nie 
erreicht werden, aber dennoch würde sie die Wahrnehmung als unabhängige Instanz 
unterstützen. Vor allem die Bereiche der Komplexität von Gebäuden und der 
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Beratungsdienstleistungen der Energieberater können hierbei in der Weiterbildung als 
Ansatzpunkt Berücksichtigung für eine Weiterentwicklung der Energieberatung dienen. 
Die Ausbildung der Energieberater kann bei der Formulierung öffentlicher Standards für 
Energieberatung eine zentrale Rolle einnehmen. Allerdings lassen sich Änderungen bei der 
Ausbildung nur über einen langen Zeitraum realisieren, sodass potentielle positive Effekte erst 
zeitverzögert eintreten. 
 
5.3 Nachkontrolle von energetischen Gebäudesanierungen? 
Energieberatung beschränkt sich zumeist auf die Phasen der Informationsbereitstellung vor der 
Sanierung und der Baubegleitung. Der Nachkontrolle hingegen wird von staatlicher Seite keine 
große Rolle beigemessen. Dabei ist der Nachweis über Erfolg oder Misserfolg der Sanierung 
von zentraler Bedeutung für die qualitative und die quantitative Weiterentwicklung der 
Energieeffizienz im Gebäudesektor. Vor allem in Fällen, in denen sich die gewünschten 
Ersparnisse nicht realisieren ließen, könnte eine anschließende Analyse deutlicher die Gründe 
und Optimierungsmöglichkeiten aufzeigen. 
Die öffentliche Wahrnehmung des Erfolgs der energetischen Gebäudesanierung ist ein zentraler 
Einflussfaktor für die Erhöhung der gesamten Sanierungsrate. Der Nachweis über Qualität lässt 
sich, wenn überhaupt, erst durch nachträgliche Kontrollen erbringen. Um das Bewusstsein in 
der Bevölkerung für die Bedeutung energetischer Sanierungen zu schärfen ist es zentral, die 
Energie- und Kosteneinsparungen aufzeigen zu können. Allerdings sind Nachkontrollen, wenn 
überhaupt möglich, aufwendig und kostenintensiv, sodass Angebote für kostenpflichtige 
Nachkontrollen von Seiten des Handwerks laut Auskunft der Handwerkskammer nur 
unzureichend wahrgenommen werden. Der Nachweis für die Zertifizierung der KfW-
Förderung zum Effizienzhaus orientiert sich an einer formalen Prüfung der durchgeführten 
Maßnahmen, enthält aber keine praktische Prüfung am Sanierungsobjekt, um herauszufinden, 
ob die technische Realisierung wie geplant durchgeführt wurde. Von der KfW koordinierte 
Stichproben sollen eine detaillierte Nachprüfung enthalten, allerdings ist man hier noch in der 
Planungsphase (Deutsche Energie-Agentur 2013). Prinzipiell würde auch die Akzeptanz für 
Energieberatung steigen, wenn der Beitrag der Beratung zur energetischen Sanierung 




5.4 Koordination in der Planung und Ausführung 
Die herkömmliche Energieberatung fokussiert in erster Hinsicht auf die Nachfragerseite. 
Entsprechend sind Ausbildungsinhalte primär auf die Frage ausgerichtet, wie die Beratung von 
potenziellen Sanierern ausgestaltet werden und funktionieren sollte. Die Koordination der 
Planung und Ausführung einer energetischen Gebäudesanierung werden dabei nur in geringem 
Maße berücksichtigt. Eine stärker akteursübergreifende Denkweise könnte hierbei zu einer 
qualitativ hochwertigeren Sanierung und zu Effizienzsteigerung führen. Ebenso könnten 
Fehler, die bei der Ausführung der Sanierung vorkommen, durch die Schulung in Richtung 
einer gewerkeübergreifender Zusammenarbeit reduziert werden. In zweierlei Hinsicht ist 
Energieberatung ein entscheidender Faktor bei der Koordination der Planung und Ausführung 
der Sanierungsmaßnahmen. Zum einen kann der Energieberater verstärkt Aufgaben der 
Koordinierung der ausführenden Akteure übernehmen, was vielerorts schon passiert. Zum 
anderen bietet die Weiterbildung zum Energieberater Architekten, Bauingenieuren und 
Handwerkern die Möglichkeit, die Prozesse der energetischen Gebäudesanierung insgesamt 
besser zu verstehen und Abläufe effizienter zu strukturieren und mögliche Fehlerquellen 
frühzeitig zu erkennen. Dies gilt gleichermaßen wenn der Energieberater nicht selbst an der 
Durchführung der Sanierung beteiligt ist. 
 
5.5 Kommunikatoren bei energetischen Sanierungen in Siedlungen und Quartieren 
Bei energetischen Gebäudesanierungen kann der Trend beobachtet werden, dass neben den 
Maßnahmen für Einzelgebäude auch großflächigere Sanierungen auf Siedlungs- und 
Quartiersebene in den Fokus geraten. Die Grundidee hierbei ist es, Technologien anzuwenden, 
die in Quartieren zu effizienteren Ergebnissen führen können. Als Beispiel hierzu kann das 
Blockheizkraftwerk herangezogen werden, welches nur bei einem Mindestgrundumsatz 
effizient betrieben werden kann (Pielke und Kurrat 2009, S. 3). Je mehr Wohngebäude jedoch 
einbezogen sind, desto höher wird der Koordinierungsaufwand für die beteiligten Akteure und 
desto wahrscheinlicher wird das Auftreten gegenläufiger Interessen, welche die Kooperation 
gefährden. Energieberater könnten die Rolle eines Vermittlers und Förderers der energetischen 
Gebäudesanierung einnehmen. Dies würde bedeuten, dass nicht nur die technologische 
Beratung einen wichtigen Teil einnimmt, sondern Energieberater das soziale Gefüge der 




Die Anforderungen an den Gebäudeenergieberater steigen durch den Einbezug und die 
Koordination großflächigere Sanierungen. Die Möglichkeit des Einsatzes von Technologien, 
die erst auf Siedlungs- und Quartiersebene gewinnbringend sind, macht die Beratung 
komplexer und kann die Unsicherheit der Sanierungsnachfrager steigern. Außerdem muss bei 
heterogenen Besitzstrukturen sichergestellt werden, dass die beteiligten Akteure eine 
gemeinsame energetische Gebäudesanierung für sinnvoll erachten und langfristig unterstützen.  
 
5.6 Regionale und kommunale „Kümmerer“ 
Der Erfolg der energetischen Gebäudesanierung hängt stark vom Engagement und der 
Zusammenarbeit von Akteuren in der jeweiligen Region ab und wird stark von regionalen 
Gegebenheiten geprägt. Energieberater könnten daher entscheidende Akteure sein, die auf 
regional- und kommunalpolitischer Ebene Aufmerksamkeit für diese Thematik erzeugen und 
etwaige Kooperationen zwischen den Beteiligten initiieren. 
Die Konzentration auf regionaler Ebene ist durch die großen Unterschiede regionaler 
Wohnungsmärkte begründet. Die Sanierungsraten schwanken von Region zu Region sehr stark 
und können sich selbst in unterschiedlichen Vierteln einer Stadt stark unterscheiden. Gründe 
hierfür liegen u.a. im Zusammenspiel verschiedener Faktoren wie der Lage des 
Sanierungsobjektes, dem regionalen Arbeitsmarkt, dem Wert der Immobilie und der 
Altersstruktur der Besitzer. Außerdem variiert die Anbieterstruktur für energetische 
Gebäudesanierungen. Alle Faktoren erzeugen einen hohen Grad an Unsicherheit. So gibt es nur 
für wenige Regionen umfassende Daten und Statistiken, die genügend Ansatzpunkte für eine 
Strategie zur Erstellung von umfassenden „Sanierungsfahrplänen“ enthalten. 
Energieberater mit hoher Netzwerkaffinität können durch eine gute Kenntnis der Spezifika der 
heimischen Region Impulsgeber für Ansätze zur Erhöhung der Sanierungsrate sein. Dies ist 
schon im Berufsbild des Energieberaters angelegt, bei dem der Umgang mit verschiedenen 
Akteursgruppen und deren Koordination im Zentrum der alltäglichen Arbeit stehen. 
Ein Beispiel für die Energieberatung als „Kümmerer“ sind die regionalen Energieagenturen. 
Sie wirken als Kompetenzzentren der Energieeffizienz im Gebäudesektor und nehmen eine 
Mittlerrolle zwischen Kommunalpolitik, regionaler Wirtschaft und potenziellen Sanierern ein. 
Die regionalen Energieagenturen betrachten es als ihre Hauptaufgabe, bei allen Akteuren das 
Interesse am Thema zu wecken und dabei die Einstiegshürden für die komplexe Thematik mit 
Berücksichtigung auf die regionalen Gegebenheiten zu senken.  
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Die Stärkung der Energieberatung auf regionaler Ebene ist daher sinnvoll, da Energieberater 
mit staatlichen Zertifikaten ein Mindestqualitätsstandard vorweisen können, der bundesweit 
anerkannt ist, und auf der anderen Seite den Bedarf für energetische Sanierungen auf regionaler 
Ebene gut einschätzen können. Die möglichen Ansätze, um den Gebäudebestand zu 
modernisieren, allerdings unterscheiden sich von Region zu Region, was aber durch das 
spezifische Wissen durch kommunal verankerte Energieberater kompensiert werden kann. 
Beispielhaft sind die Energiekarawane im Rhein-Main-Gebiet28 und die Innovationscity 
Bottrop29. Dabei handelt es sich um Ansätze mit Energieberatung als zentralem Bestandteil in 
einem begrenzten Einzugsbereich, in dem Energieberater es schaffen, gezielt potentielle 
Sanierer anzusprechen und die Sanierungsrate dadurch anzuheben. 
Die Bedeutung der Energieberater auf regionaler Ebene zeigt sich nicht nur im 
Wohngebäudesektor. Die Bundesregierung hat im NAPE auch die Förderung von 
Energieeffizienznetzwerken in ihre strategischen Planungen aufgenommen. Bis 2020 sollen 
mehr als 500 Netzwerke entstehen, die sich mit Fragen der Energieeffizienz auf betrieblicher 
Ebene beschäftigen. Der Energieberatung kommt hierbei erneut eine wichtige Rolle zu, vor 
allem um eine höhere Akzeptanz für das Thema der Energieeffizienz bei den beteiligten 
Akteuren zu schaffen (BMWi 2014). 
Ob es zu einer Erhöhung der Sanierungsrate kommt entscheidet sich auf regionaler Ebene. In 
Zukunft wird daher der Vernetzung der Energieberater auf regionaler Ebene größere Bedeutung 
zukommen. Auch wenn auf kommunaler Ebene agiert wird, bedeutet dies nicht, dass der Bund 
sich aus der Förderung herausziehen kann, da für viele Kommunen die nötigen Mittel zur 
Finanzierung der Programme zur Energieberatung nicht aufbringen können. 
 
6. Perspektiven für Gebäudeenergieberatung 
In Bezug auf die Energieeffizienz im Gebäudesektor kann die Energieberatung eine zentrale 
Rolle spielen. Die Zukunft der Energieberatung hängt davon ab, ob die Sichtbarkeit der Qualität 
der Energieberatung im komplexen Umfeld der energetischen Gebäudesanierungen erhöht wird 
und bei großflächigeren Sanierungen auf Siedlungs- und Quartierebene Energieberater 
relevante Akteure als Netzwerker sein werden. 
                                                 
28 Das Projekt ist von der Initiative Energieeffizienz Metropolregion Rhein-Neckar initiiert und vom BMU 
gefördert worden (http://www.mehr-aus-energie.de/wohngebaeude/energiekarawane/). 




Die Förderung der Energieberatung kann nur im Zusammenhang mit den anderen existierenden 
Instrumenten des CO2-Gebäudesanierungsprogramms der KfW funktionieren; Die 
Energieberatung nimmt in diesem Zusammenspiel eine wichtige Rolle ein, muss aber immer 
als zusätzliches Instrument verstanden werden, da das zusätzliche Angebot von Informationen 
allein die Sanierungsrate nicht substantiell erhöhen kann. 
Thematisch kann es für eine wirkungsvolle Energieberatung sinnvoll sein, neben dem 
Kernkompetenzbereich der energetischen Sanierung einen umfassenderen Blick auf 
Modernisierungsaktivitäten im Baubereich für Kunden zu richten. Hierbei bietet sich vor allem 
in Verknüpfung mit dem Thema des Bauens im Alter in Anbetracht des demographischen 
Wandels ein zukunftsträchtiges Betätigungsfeld für Energieberater an. Zukunftsfähiges 
Wohnen und energetische Effizienz sollten hierfür zusammen gedacht werden, da durch die 
Kopplung von altersgerechten und energetischen Maßnahmen Sanierungen zielgruppengerecht 
zum Erfolg geführt werden können. Eine aktive Ansprache an die Zielgruppen durch 
Energieberater kann in diesem Fall dazu führen, dass die Aufmerksamkeit der Zielgruppe zum 
richtigen Zeitpunkt für eine Umbaumaßnahme (Instandhaltung, Immobilienerwerb, etc.) 
hergestellt wird. 
Es ist davon auszugehen, dass die Energieberatung einen erheblichen Beitrag zur Erhöhung der 
Sanierungsrate leisten kann, vor allem vor dem Hintergrund, dass die Modernisierung des 
Gebäudebestands sich nur sehr langsam entwickelt und bei gleichbleibender Sanierungsrate das 
Ziel des nahezu klimaneutralen Gebäudesektor bis 2020 nicht erfüllt werden kann. Das Konzept 
eines vertrauenswürdigen und fachkompetenten Energieberaters als Intermediär in einer von 
Unsicherheit geprägten Situation kann in der Öffentlichkeit die Akzeptanz für energetische 
Gebäudesanierung steigern. Ebenso wichtig ist es, dass durch zielgerichtete Beratung die 
Wirtschaftlichkeit der Sanierungsmaßnahmen, bzw. deren Amortisation nachhaltig verbessert 
wird. Mehr als alle anderen Maßnahmen würde dies zu einer stärkeren Nachfrage nach 
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